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These papers were submitted for discussion by individual members of the
Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union. This Committee had
been set up by the European Council at its meeting in Hanover on 27 and 28 June
1988 in order 'to study and propose concrete stages leading towards economic and
monetary union in Europe . In response to this mandate the Committee prepared
a 'Report on economic and monetary union in the European Community , which
was submitted to the Heads of State or Government in April 1989.
The papers were submitted to the Committee as background information and were
prepared on the personal responsibility of each author. The views expressed in the
papers are therefore those of their authors and not necessarily the views of the
Committee.II -- The Werner ReportThe Werner Report revisited
Gunter D. Baer
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa
The Werner Report on the realization by stages of economic and monetary union
was drawn up against the background of the end of the transitional period leading
to the completion of the customs union and the definition of the common agri-
cultural policy. The Hanover Council has asked that renewed impetus should be
given to the objective of economic and monetary union in the light of the
adoption of the Single European Act and the fact that the process of completion
of the internal market programme has now reached a point at which it is irre-
versible.
This discussion paper first outlines the main features of the Werner Report and its
legislative follow-up. It then gives an assessment of the Report itself and its
implementation. Finally it discusses some major developments during the post-
Report period.
Main features of the Report
The Werner Report gave a comprehensive definition of the  final objective which it
said should be achieved by stages. A detailed description of the measures needed
for implementing the  first stage  was, however, not matched by an examination of
the process by which one stage would lead to another and to the final objective.
The second stage was essentially to have been a reinforced first stage. The Report
also paid relatively little attention to institutional matters.
1.  The final objective
Economic and monetary union, the Report said, would make it possible to 'realize
an area in which goods and services, people and capital will circulate freely and
without competitive distortions, without thereby giving rise to structural or
regional disequilibrium . Equilibrium within this area would be achieved, as in an
individual national economy, by the mobility of factors of production and
financial transfers by public and private sectors. Hence only the balance of
payments of the Community as a whole would be of importance.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
Monetary union would imply 'the total and irreversible convertibility of
currencies, the elimination of margins of fluctuation in exchange rates, the irre-
vocable fixing of parity rates and the complete liberation of movements of
capital' .
The Report considered that many elements of economic policy-making in this
union would have to be centralized or transferred to the Community. 'The
creation of liquidity throughout the area and monetary and credit policy will be
centralized; monetary policy in relation to the outside world will be within the
jurisdiction of the Community; and policies as regards capital markets would
have to be unified' . Also
, '
the essential features of the whole of the public budgets
and in particular variations in their volume, the size of balances and the methods
of financing or utilizing them, will be decided at the Community level. Regional
and structural policies will no longer be exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
member countries; and a systematic and continuous consultation between the
social partners will be ensured at the Community level'.
The Report recognized that the above would require 'the creation or the transform-
ation of a certain number of Community organs to which powers until then
exercised by the national authorities will have to be transferred'. It did not
however, give detailed consideration to the institutional structure that would be
necessary, but it considered that the following two Community organs would be
indispensable to the control of economic and monetary policy inside the unions
(i)  a Centre of decision for economic policy,  which would in itself exercise a
decisive influence over Community economic policy, and especially national
budgetary policies. It would also have responsibility for changes in the parity
of the sole currency or the whole of the national currencies. The Centre would
have to be politically responsible to a European Parliament;
(ii)  a Community system for the central banks which could be based on the
structure for the Federal Reserve. It would conduct the principal elements of
internal monetary policy and be responsible for intervention on the foreign
exchange markets.
2.  The first and second stages
The primary aim of the first and second stages was to reinforce the coordination
of economic policies so as to make it possible to decide on guidelines in common.
The intention was that constraint on national policy-making should be applied
progressively. This was to be achieved by a strong interaction between decision-
making at Community and national levels. National decisions were progressively
to be made in the light of Community guidelines; and as well as there being a
system for prior consultations for budgetary and monetary policy, performances
would be closely monitored. A system of indicators would detect the emergence of
potentially dangerous situations.THE WERNER REPORT REVISITED
The coordination of general economic policy-making was to be principally the
responsibility of the Council, which would fix medium-term objectives and annual
programmes on the basis of a detailed procedure which was designed to lead to
permanent surveillance of the economic situation.
The Committee of Governors of the Central Banks was to play an increasingly
important role in both internal and external monetary policy-making. So as to
define the general guidelines of monetary and credit policy, the Committee was to
prepare the regular Council meetings which the Governors were to attend.
The Governors would also manage the proposed system for Community exchange
rate relations, which would progressively lead to a narrowing of the fluctuation
bands.
Progress in the convergence of economic and monetary policies should be such in
the course of the second .stage that Member States no longer have to resort on an
autonomous basis to the instrument of parity adjustment'
The creation of a 'European fund for monetary cooperation' would be necessary
in the second stage, but it could also be part of the first stage. The fund would
take over the short- and medium-term support mechanisms and would
progressively manage Community reserves. In the final stage it would be inte-
grated into the system of Community central banks.
II  Follow-up to the Report
I. The Werner Report considered that the first stage could last three years and
begin at the start of 1971. In March that year the Council adopted a Decision on
the strengthening of cooperation between central banks and a Resolution on the
attainment of economic and monetary union by stages. That Resolution accepted
the definition of the final objective that had been given in the Report and the
need for a broadly-based package of measures to strengthen the coordination of
economic policy-making.
Over the following three years, a number of important measures were taken to
implement the first two stages:
1972: the 'snake' was created , and the Council Directive on regulating inter-
national capital flows and neutralizing their undesirable effects on
domestic liquidity was adopted;
1973: the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) was set up;
1974: the Council Decision on the attainment of a high degree of convergence
of economic policies and the Directive on stability, growth and full
employment were adopted.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
2. However, the legislative implementation did not fully correspond to the letter
or the spirit of the Report.
Firstly, little consideration was given to policies other than monetary or budgetary
policies: the initial actions were concerned only with limiting exchange rate fluc-
tuations, and the 1974 Decision on convergence concentrated largely on
procedures for the coordination of budgetary policies.
Secondly, interaction between the Community and the Member States in policy-
making was not really put into practice. The important prior consultation was
lacking, and there was no internal pressure on Member States to follow the
guidelines given at the Community level. Procedures were defined for  ex-post
monitoring and giving recommendations, but they were rarely used.
Thirdly, the Committee of Governors was not given extended powers to play an
increasingly important role in the coordination of monetary and credit policy as
had been called for in the Report. Procedures were not put in place, which had
been recommended, for obligatory prior consultations and to allow the
Committee to lay down general guidelines for monetary and credit policy for the
Community. Moreover, whereas the Report had said that monetary policies
should be determined 'having regard' for the guidelines for general economic
policy, the 1971 Resolution said that monetary policy should be coordinated while
observing  these guidelines. Furthermore the EMCF was put under the 'observing
control of the Council, whereas the Report had said that it should be under the
control of the central bank Governors.
III - An assessment
The Werner Report had concluded that economic and monetary union could be
achieved within a decade, provided that the political will existed to realize that
objective. However, by the mid-1970s the momentum had been lost and the
Werner Report was no longer a driving force in Community developments. This
can be attributed to the change in the international environment, but it may be
asked whether it was not also due to possible intrinsic weaknesses in the Report.
Among these the following could be of special relevance: insufficient constraints
on national policies, institutional ambiguities, inappropriate policy conception
and lack of internal momentum.
1.  Change in the international environment
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system, together with the first oil price shock
significantly altered the economic environment in which the Report had been
expected to be implemented. However, these unforeseen changes did not pose
insurmountable problems of a technical nature. Adjustments to the Report'
technical framework would have been possible and, indeed, were to some extentTHE WERNER REPORT REVISITED
attempted in the context of the ' snake . Rather, the basis for coordinating
economic policy was greatly undermined by disagreements about the appropriate
policy response to the oil shock and by expectations that more flexible exchange
rates would enlarge the scope for autonomous domestic economic management.
2.  Insufficient constraints on national policies
While the Report advocated obligatory prior consultation procedures initially
involving existing Community bodies, the impetus for a process of convergence
and progressive integration rested basically on voluntary agreement on broad
Community objectives which were to be achieved through national policies
carried on in accordance with guidelines. These guidelines had the character 
recommendations and there was no provision to ensure their observance. Such an
approach could work only as long as there was a sufficiently strong policy
consensus and willingness to cooperate. However, once that consensus began to
weaken, more binding constraints on national policy would have become
necessary; in other words, the Report lacked safeguards against (temporary)
lapses in policy consensus.
3.  Institutional ambiguities
While the Report concentrated on the mechanics of how and when decisions
should be made, it left it somewhat unclear who should make the decisions and
how responsibilities were to be distributed. For instance, although the Committee
of Governors was supposed to be given extended powers, the scope of these
powers relative to those of the Council was left ambiguous.
4.  Inappropriate policy conception
The procedures for policy coordination detailed in the Report implied a very high
degree of confidence in the ability of policy instruments to affect policy goals in a
known and predictable way. This over-optimistic view of the efficacy of economic
management gave rise to a rather mechanistic and relatively rigid approach to
policy coordination (especially in the budgetary field) which left less room for
discretionary and flexible policy responses than was needed in the face of
changing economic circumstances.
5.  A lack of internal momentum
The first stages were self-contained and lacked a dynamic element. They formed a
complete process rather than a framework within which there could be growing
pressures for policy coordination. This led to both a lack of internal momentum
within a given stage and insufficient impetus to move from stage to stage towards
the final objective. The report did not envisage an interactive process in which the
implementation of certain steps would trigger market reactions that in turn would
necessitate further steps towards economic and monetary union. Rather, the
Report' s method tended more towards stressing the need for parallel progress.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
IV  The post-Werner Report period
From the mid-1970s onwards developments in the  economic environment the  policy
consensus  and the  Community  itself increasingly changed the background against
which progress towards economic and monetary union could be considered.
1.  The economic environment
Two features can be singled out as being of primary importance. Firstly, inflation.
The Werner Report was written against the background of a relatively long period
of price stability. By contrast, the following decade saw the average inflation rate
in the Community rise well above 10%. In the course of the 1980s, the average
inflation rate in the Community has again been brought down to levels not seen
since the 1960s. The experience of high inflation and of the severity of the
measures necessary to curb inflation once it has taken hold in an economic system
has emphasized the need for monetary arrangements that promote and preserve
stability.
Secondly, international monetary arrangements have also moved through a
complete cycle. The Werner Report was written as the dollar-denominated Bretton
Woods system was collapsing. There then followed a period of floating exchange
rates in which policy coordination was minimal. More recently, there has been an
evolution towards a more managed and multi-polar system. Policy coordination
has been strengthened through multilateral surveillance procedures and currency
arrangements have been developed.
2.  Policy consensus
Towards the end of the 1960s there was a remarkable consensus on policy-making.
The evidence seemed to strongly confirm the effectiveness of medium-term
planning and fine-tuning. In the 1970s experience with stagflation destroyed this
consensus. Now a new consensus has developed in which attention has shifted
towards medium-term financial stability, the supply side of the economy and
structural policies. Part of the legacy of the earlier consensus is, however, large
budget deficits and a high level of government debt. When the Werner Report was
drafted, budgets in the Community were in approximate balance. Deficits
subsequently peaked at over 5% of GDP and are still above 4%. Government debt
at the beginning of the 1970s averaged less than 40% of GDP, whereas it now
averages over 70%.
3.  The Community
(a) Significant non-monetary developments
Although the Community .entered a difficult phase as it absorbed new members
within an unchanged framework and in an unfavourable economic environmentTHE WERNER REPORT REVISITED
a number of steps were taken. Among these, as well as enlargement itself, were the
following:
in 1974 the European Council was created to take the place of the earlier
summit meetings held at irregular intervals; it became the driving force of the
subsequent development of the Community;
in 1975 the first European Regional Development Fund was set up, repre-
senting the beginning of a growing redistributive role for the Community
budget;
in 1977 the Sixth VAT Directive establishing a uniform basis for collection was
adopted, marking a major step in the process of tax harmonization;
in 1979 the first direct elections to the European Parliament were held
broadening the democratic basis of the European structure.
(b) Monetary developments
The European Monetary System  was created in 1979, with the primary objective of
establishing a zone of monetary stability, involving both low inflation and stable
exchange rates. The exchange rate constraint has acted as a focal point for
improved policy coordination, and the EMS has provided a framework for
enhancing multilateral surveillance within the Community. Participants have
gradually opted for a strong currency policy stance, so putting the greatest
emphasis on domestic adjustment measures. The system has evolved in response
to changes in the economic and financial environment, especially improved
convergence and increased capital mobility. Most recently, the Basle/Nyborg
Agreement of September 1987 made some important modifications to the mech-
anisms of the system to secure a more balanced implementation of the exchange
rate commitment by all participants. The procedures for surveillance were also
strengthened.
The use of the ECU  within the system has been limited. By contrast, the
non-official use of the BCU, especially as a denominator of financial transactions
has increased considerably. International banking business in ECUs has expanded
markedly and a significant share of international bond issues is now denominated
in ECUs. The non-financial use of the ECU, however, has remained limited
although some increase appears to have taken place recently.
(c) New Community impetus in the 1980s
The internal market.  In 1985 the programme for completing the internal market
was proposed by the Commission and adopted by the European Council. It aims
as already stated in the Werner Report, at achieving full freedom of circulation of
goods, services, people and capital by 1992, and to this end calls specifically for
the removal of all physical, technical and fiscal frontiers.
In November 1987 proposals for the creation of a European financial area
including the full liberalization of capital movements, were tabled. These wereCOLLECTION OF PAPERS
adopted by the Ecofin Council of June 1988 and will be implemented by most
Member States by 1990. The early implementation of full capital mobility will
entail further developments in other areas. For example, since it will increase the
potential for exchange rate instability, it will be necessary to further reinforce
cooperation within the EMS. Also, as the Werner Report recognized, m.easures
will have to be taken so that differences between tax regimes do not lead 
distortions or increased tax evasion.
The Single European Act  is the first significant modification to the Treaty of
Rome. Its enactment was possible because the internal market programme laid out
in the White Paper of 1988 had given the Community a new and concrete
objective, together with a more streamlined method of implementation based on
mutual recognition rather than full harmonization and a fixed timetable. The
Single European Act makes changes that are vital to ensuring that the internal
market programme can be completed within the specified time-scale. In particular
it greatly expands the scope of majority voting and lays the basis for an improved
institutional balance within the Community with a strengthened role for the
European Parliament. The Single European Act not only deals with the internal
market but also sets objectives .and provides for action in the following related
areas: social policy, economic and social cohesion, research and technological
development and the monetary capacity of the Community.
Accompanying policies.  The Brussels European Council of February 1988 agreed
on a package of measures which, as well as putting the Community budget on a
solid basis and reinforcing the reform of the common agricultural policy, will lead
to a doubling in real terms of the structural Funds. By 1992 Portugal, Greece and
Ireland will be receiving inflows of grants and loans from the Community
amounting to between 3Y2 and  6Y2%  of their GDP (and hence 15 to 30% of their
gross investments). Transfers to Spain and Italy could amount to something of the
order of 1% of GDP.
Conclusions
The link between the free movement of goods, services and capital and the need
to create an economic and monetary union was the point of departure of the
Werner Report; and the mandate from the Hanover Council also comes ata time
when significant progress is being made towards completing the internal market.
The two processes are self-reinforcing, and the full potential of the single market
will only be realized with satisfactory monetary arrangements.
Since the Werner Report was written many of its recommendations have been
implemented and there have been significant developments going beyond those
that the Report considered to be necessary for the first steps towards economic
and monetary union. That ultimate goal, however, still remains unachieved. This
is partly because of unfavourable external circumstances, but also because of
intrinsic weaknesses in the approach and inadequate implementation. A better
understanding of these shortcomings can only increase the chances of future
success.III - Papers relating  to  economic unionEcono.mic and monetary union and relaunching
the construction of Europe
J. Delors
For the first time in almost 15 years, the European Council in Hanover has
reopened definite prospects for economic and monetary union. It not .only
recalled that this objective is now in the Treaty, but also established a procedure
to examine ways to achieve this union. This development is based on the spec-
tacular progress made recently in the construction of Europe and especially the
irreversible' nature of completing the internal market by 1992.
More than ever the Community is now in a position to achieve the fundamental
goal, given in Article 2 of the Treaty, which says: 'The Community shall have as
its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the
economic policies of Member States, the promotion throughout the Community of
a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced
expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living
and closer relations between the States belonging to it.'
Prompted by Chancellor Brandt, the Hague Summit in 1969 reaffirmed the
political will to establish economic and monetary union. The Werner Report made
some concrete recommendations and concluded that the objective could be
achieved within the decade. We know what became of the resolutions and
decisions taken by the Council between 1971 and 1974. Their implementation was
impeded, first by the upheavals in the international economic and monetary en-
vironment, and then even more profoundly by Member States turning in on
themselves and pursuing divergent economic and monetary policies. The period
was characterized by  rising tide of protectionism, declining trade within
the Community, unemployment and inflation.
Against this background, the creation of the European Monetary System - based
on an intergovernmental agreement rather than on Community law  was a
welcome reaction. An exceptional combination of circumstances and the judicious
use of a method pioneered by Jean Monnet in the creation of the ECSC, made it
possible to overcome strong reservations associated with the deep sense of
national sovereignty in the sensitive area of monetary policy.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
The success of the EMS has done much to reverse the process of disintegration of
the Community by engendering a new process of economic policy convergence.
Yet the European Council in Luxembourg, in December 1980, postponed indefi-
nitely the transition to the institutional phase of the EMS.
In retrospect, the first plan for economic and monetary union looks somewhat
abstract. It was based on a political design, but was out of phase with the actual
state of integration of the European economy of that time. Today, the recent
progress towards integration is an incentive to approach the relaunching of
Europe in a variety of ways, in addition to the main driving force, which is the
dynamic of the internal market. The process initially focused on optimizing the
allocation of resources, but unless this is complemented by an awareness of the
need for cohesion and balanced development, and for economic growth and
stability, this dynamic could fall apart. In other words, the keys to the success of
the large internal market are part and parcel of the very logic of economic and
monetary union. Moreover, this is evidenced by the Single Act and its implemen-
tation.
The current progress in the construction of Europe must first be set in the context
of the crisis experienced by the Community after the successes of the 1960s.
The creeping paralysis of the Community was the result of the Member States
calling into question the Community method for the progressive and limited
transfer of national powers to common institutions possessing a real power 
make decisions. The very ambitious nature of the Community s ultimate objectives
to achieve an economic union and to found a political entity  has been used
as a reason for refusing to go too fast in relinquishing sovereignty, since the inevi-
tability of doing so seemed out of proportion with the degree of interdependence
of the economies, the social systems, and the cultures of the Member States. In
addition, it was sometimes felt that the development of Community powers would
deprive Member States of any possibility of supplementing Community action
with national measures. The gradualism of the Community method of integration
was replaced  de facto  by intergovernmental cooperation based on the search for
consensus for even the most trivial decisions.
Despite, or because of, the challenge of the economic crisis, the Community was
reduced to its  acquis,  its legacy  that of the ECSC, the customs union and the
common agricultural policy. The crisis generated by one Member State s claim for
a reduction in its budget contribution exacerbated the problems by paralysing the
operation of the Community and by automatically preventing new policies from
being launched.EMU AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE
The provisional settlement which the European Council in Fontainebleau devised
for the budgetary and agricultural problems made it possible to break the log-jam
in the negotiations for Spanish and Portuguese accession and to launch the inte-
grated Mediterranean programmes; nevertheless, it could not conceal the fact that
the Community was in danger of relapsing into a state of lethargy without a
strategy to give fresh impetus to integration.
* * *
The central element in the relaunching of Europe was proposed by the Commission
of the European Communities in 1985, with the objective of achieving a unified
economic area by 1992. The essential part of the measures for the removal of
physical, technical and fiscal barriers was set out in a White Paper. It lays down a
programme, a timetable and a method (mutual recognition and harmonization of
essential standards). The White Paper also notes that there is a link between
completing the internal market and the adoption of complementary policies. It
states that the ' strengthening of coordination of economic policies and the
European Monetary System will be essential factors in the integration of national
markets
' .
The Milan European Council in June 1985 after adopting the 'detailed
programme' and the 'specific timetable' drawn up by the Commission , agreed to
undertake the necessary revision of the Treaty of Rome in order to equip the
Community with a more effective decision-making process. But the reform which
was to be completed six months later with the adoption of the Single Act, goes far
beyond a simple institutional adjustment aimed at making it easier to complete
the large market by 1992.
The institutional reform is based on three principles: faster decision-making,
better decision-making and more democratic decision-making. Extending the
scope of qualified-majority voting is a sign of the determination to remove the
constraint of the permanent search for consensus. Formerly, the Council merely
had the option of relying on the Commission for measures for the implementation
of the general rules which the Council lays down: now this is transformed into an
obligation. Finally, Parliament is given a genuine part in the legislative process
and, in cases where unanimity has been replaced by qualified-majority voting, it is
given the power to propose amendments provided that it has the support of the
Commission.
But the Single Act, by establishing the objective and the institutional means for
creating by 31 December 1992 'an area without internal frontiers in which the free
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured' opens up new fields
of action which cannot be dissociated from the completion of the large market.
The Single Act introduces into the Treaty of Rome the need to strengthen the
Community s economic and social cohesion, the recognition of the Community
monetary capacity in the perspective of economic and monetary union, theCOLLECTION OF PAPERS
strengthening of the Community s scientific and technological basis, the harmon-
ization of working conditions and the dialogue between management and labour
and action to protect the environment.
It remained for the Community to give itself the financial resources which would
ensure the credibility of the Single Act's overall strategy, and, in particular, of the
new objective of economic and social cohesion. This was to be the work of the
European Council in Brussels in February 1988 which took the decisions required
for the agricultural policy to be better adapted to market conditions, for the
resources of the structural Funds to be doubled in order to assist the less-
developed regions or those in industrial decline, and for the Community to be
provided with sufficient and stable financial resources.
The prospects opened up by the Single Act very quickly led to concrete measures
which, in varying degrees, correspond to the three functions of Community action
consistent with the pursuit of economic and monetary union: stabilization, allo-
cation and cohesion.
In September 1987, the Basle and Nyborg Agreements developed certain mech-
anisms of the EMS and also increased the responsibilities of those important
Community bodies, the Committee of Governors and the Monetary Committee
for the surveillance of monetary and economic policies. It remains to be seen
whether the new procedures and methods will be sufficient to meet the challenge
represented by the forthcoming complete liberalization of capital movements
pursuant to the Directive on that subject adopted by the Council in June 1988. At
all events, there remains the problem of the closer coordination of economic and
monetary policies, in the framework of some commonly agreed procedures.
In a few months, numerous and important decisions have been taken affecting the
free movement of persons, goods, capital and services. Examples are the recent
agreement on the new approach to standards, the equivalence of diplomas, the
partial opening-up of public procurement, and insurance. This momentum has
resulted from the recognition that the process of completing the internal market
has become irreversible and from the dynamic force that the objective of 1992 has
created at every decision-making level. The anticipation effect is clearly seen in
the strategies of European firms: an unprecedented number of mergers fore-
shadows a strengthening of industrial cooperation. Credibility in the reality of
relaunching Europe is restored, as it is in the decision-making capacity of
Community bodies.
The imminent implementation of measures ensuring the freedom to provide
services has resulted in a quiet revolution taking place. It is likely that fair compe-
tition will be guaranteed by certain common disciplines being laid down in the
form of Community directives, and no longer mere recommendations. Similarly,
the need to take account of the external dimension in the main decisions
concerning completion of the internal market gives rise to the principle that the
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services or the opening-upEMU AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE
of public procurement will be applicable to third-country firms under 
agreement negotiated by the Community.
The social dimension of the internal market should be one of its important
components. There should soon be definite progress in the dialogue between
management and labour and the adoption of a minimum core of fundamental
worker rights and of a statute for a European company, involving tested methods
of employee representation. In order to achieve this, patience will have to be
exercised in bringing national positions closer together.
Substantial resources (ECU 13 000 million in 1992) have been set aside for the
policy of economic and social cohesion laid down by the Single Act, and the
reform of the structural Funds will enable the Community to develop a genuine
regional policy. Nevertheless, the relative size of the sums in question will remain
modest (three-thousandths of Community ' GNP' ) and the function of redistri-
bution and of assisting adjustment, which can be exercised by Community action
between now and 1992, will remain limited in scope, even if it does achieve
macroeconomic significance for the four countries most concerned. The amounts
devoted to the development of research (2% of the national research budgets) is
similarly modest.Regional policy and European economic integration
Maurice F. Doyle
Introduction
Progress towards economic and monetary union (EMU) in Europe is usually
discussed in terms of achieving the objective of the internal market by the end 
1992 and, beyond that, the closer coordination of policies, leading ultimately to
irreversibly fixed exchange rates. The regional dimension receives much less
emphasis and is less well defined than other aspects of the process of economic
and monetary integration. This paper attempts to introduce more balance. In
Section 1, emphasis is placed on the importance of regional policy as an essential
part of the integration process. The failure of the market mechanism to guarantee
an even distribution of the gains from economic integration and the consequent
need for regional policy is elaborated upon in Section 2. A description of what
should be viewed as the most desirable features of an effective regional policy is
given in Section 3. The final section emphasizes that regional policy must make a
real contribution if the peripheral economies are to participate in the benefits of
EMU, thereby ensuring that the Europe of the future will have an optimum
output and welfare level and the cohesiveness necessary to compete effectively on
a global basis.
In the light of the experience of both an economic and monetary union for 100
years and a monetary union for some 50 years with Britain, there are definite
views in Ireland on the nature of a viable union, on the principles on which a
successful regional policy should be based and, of course, on the pitfalls that
should be avoided. In addition, Ireland is in a unique position, being a peripheral
economy fully participating in the exchange-rate mechanism of the EMS.
1. Economic and monetary union: Requirements and potential problems
The main elements of EMU are:
freedom of movement of goods and services, capital and labour;
- a high degree of policy coordination;
the elimination of regional disparities;
irreversibly fixed exchange rates.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
Clearly, these requirements go far beyond those of the internal market
programme, which does not require the close coordination of fiscal and other
economic policies or the fixed exchange rates demanded under economic and
monetary union.
It is crucial that the important  preconditions  of EMU be recognized at the outset.
The process of economic integration requires a number of distinct stages, with
monetary union, involving irreversibly fixed exchange rates, being the final stage.
Before this can be achieved, all Community countries will need to have reached a
broadly similar stage of economic developm.ent and be committed to broadly
similar economic policies. If this is not the situation, disparities within the
Community would cause persistent capital and labour flows from the less pros-
perous to the richer regions, creating both economic and political tensions that
could put the whole process in jeopardy.
The economic union phase of integration requires the removal of restrictions, the
elimination of regional disparities and close policy coordination. While Member
States would retain the possibility of exchange rate adjustment as a response to
external shocks and differences in the evolution of competitiveness, a policy of
exchange rate adjustment should be avoided. This is because, firstly, such
adjustment would be inconsistent with the degree of exchange rate discipline
required for moving towards the ultimate objective of monetary union and
secondly, because any benefits to problem countries would be merely temporary,
being quickly reflected in higher inflation and a loss of credibility and would not
promote the narrowing of divergences between the richer and poorer countries.
Moreover there is increasing agreement that this principle of avoiding
realignments in order to increase credibility and to achieve price stability is
appropriate not only for small open economies; other larger ERM participants
through their words and actions, have shown their support for this principle.
Economic union is not something which will suddenly begin after 1992 but
rather, is a process already under way which will continue after 1992 for quite
some time before the final stage of EMU is reached. One important element in
this process is that, as integration proceeds, Member States will experience an
increasing loss of autonomy with increasing coordination of economic and other
policies. Without complete political union, Member States will, of course,
continue to exist, but there will be growing constraints on their freedom of
economic action to deal with their own national regional problems. At the level of
the European Community, it is the theory of regional economics, and not the
theory of international trade, which will become increasingly relevant in the
future. Regional economic theory, confirmed by Ireland's historical experience
suggests that in the absence of appropriate accompanying policies, market forces
will not of themselves be sufficient to eliminate divergences and bring about the
required degree of economic cohesion within the Community, but rather the
reverse. This is because factors such as better infrastructure, lower transport and
distribution costs and proximity to bigger markets would almost certainly favour
the growth of the stronger regions and the stagnation, or even contraction, of theREGIONAL POLICY
weaker. The process already occurs in the existing nation-States of Europe. Areas
of France south of Lyons, the Mezzogiorno in Italy, and some northern regions of
Germany clearly exhibit, although at different absolute levels of income, the
process of relative impoverishment - relative, that is, to the richer regions in
these countries  even while the national economy as a whole grows richer.
According as the barriers to trade, capital and labour movements come down and
the freedom for Member States to have independent monetary, fiscal and
exchange rate policies diminishes, exactly the same process will take hold
throughout the European Community, since economies will no longer be
definable simply by reference to national boundaries. The Community as a whole
can be expected to fare better in the aggregate from moves towards EMU, but
there is a need, already urgent, to tackle the issue of regional imbalances directly;
otherwise, the weaker peripheral regions of Europe such as Ireland could suffer
rather than benefit, from the process of economic integration. This can only be
achieved through the development of a comprehensive Community regional
policy with adequate resources for the task.
While a convincing case can be made for significant regional support in a more
integrated Europe, it tends nevertheless to be viewed as a national demand based
on national self-interest, rather than a requirement of a sound regional policy
framed in the interests of the Community as a whole. The history of the European
Regional Development Fund since 1975, with its rigid adherence to national
quotas to which each Member State was 'entitled' , bears this out. The Fund was
viewed not so much as a means of dealing with Community regional problems but
rather as Community .assistance to Member States to deal with their own, internal
regional problems. The fact that Ireland was recognized as a .single region for the
purposes of the Fund was more a reflection of the political process than an
acknowledgement that Community problems had to be dealt with on a
Community scale. There are signs that these attitudes are changing  the
doubling of the structural Funds by 1992 and the institution of a 'quota-free
component of the Regional Fund are obvious examples  but there is some way
to go yet before it is fully accepted that the backward regions of Europe, whether
they are so because of geography, trade patterns or the decline of once-prosperous
industries, must get special assistance if they are to remain attractive places in
which to live and areas which have an economic future. Regional policy needs to
be seen as an essential element in the policy mix necessary to achieve EMU, but
equally all members must recognize that regional policy is not simply a question
of financial grants for specific projects, or even for programmes, still less does it
comprise subsidies to prop up non-viable ways of life; rather it is the continuing
application of a regional dimension to  every  European policy.
2. Costs and benefits of economic integration
The establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975
was the first major recognition of the need for an active regional policy at
Community level. When outlining the Community decision the Commission noted
that:COLLECTION OF PAPERS
. . . not only do the less-developed regions fail to integrate fully within the
Community, but the problems to which they give rise become an increasingly
heavy burden on national economies and thus increase the pressure on the public
authorities concerned to refuse the constraints inherent in the mechanism of
Community integration. It is, moreover, an illusion to hope for the convergence of
Member States' economies so long as regional problems continue to weigh so
heavily on certain economies... It follows from this situation that Community
regional policy must be strengthened and its field of application expanded. This is
not only desirable: it is now one of the conditions of continuing European
economic integration.' ('Community regional policy  - New guidelines Bulletin
of the European Communities, Supplement  2/77)
These considerations are even more relevant today than they were in 1975. There
is still no guarantee that the benefits of market integration will be evenly
distributed among all Member States. Indeed, these concerns increase as
economic integration proceeds towards EMU in that the availability of policy
instruments to deal with the problems arising from further integration are reduced
and thus regional disparities could become more permanent. For these reasons
there is an urgent need to establish a strong regional policy before proceeding to
EMU. Before outlining in more detail the particular factors likely to give rise to
problems, it is worth looking at the case for the complete freeing of trade and the
furthering of market integration.
The case for free trade is usually based on the principle that there are efficiency
gains from the removal of trade restrictions which are welfare-increasing for the
Community as a whole. These gains are generally seen as being of two types.
Firstly, there are those resulting from comparative advantage which, in turn, can
be classified into gains from increased specialization and gains from an increased
volume of trade. These gains increase the welfare of  all parties  engaged in trade
and arise primarily from trade involving the output of different industries in the
trading countries (that is, interindustry trade). Secondly, there are gains arising
from the existence of economies of scale in some industries whereby as a result of
the removal of trade restrictions, firms can expand and thus produce more effi-
ciently. This trade involves the output of similar industries in different countries
(that is, intra-industry trade). Many of the gains from freer trade within the
Community have been of the latter type though, in this case only some parties
may gam.
One must take a number of considerations into account, however, when
considering the likely distribution of both types of gains in the context of
increasing market integration in the Community. Firstly, while the principle of
comparative advantage is generally seen as providing a compelling justification
for a policy of opening up markets, there are a number of qualifications which
need to be considered. These relate to the fact that the basic assumptions
underlying the comparative advantage model i.e. free competition full
employment of factors of production, full mobility of capital and labour and zero
transportation costs, are unlikely to be fulfilled in reality. Thus one of theREGIONAL POLICY
predictions of the model, that trade liberalization leads to the equalization of
factor prices and hence to a convergence of incomes and living standards is not
borne out in practice, largely because of incomplete factor mobility. Moreover
the forces which give rise to the second type of gains, that is, those arising from
the phenomenon of intra-industry trade, that is from the operation of economies
of scale in production, suggest that the convergence of incomes and living
standards is even less likely. Other considerations such as the non-uniformity of
transport costs, the effect of demand factors and the existence of external
economies would, in fact, reinforce this conclusion.
The existence of economies of scale in production has been the most important
factor giving rise to intra-industry trade in the Community. This provided
important efficiency gains in the early days of the Community of Six when
economic structures were relatively similar. However, in the present enlarged
Community there are much greater differences in economic structures and thus
the effect of economies of scale will most likely be to favour the further devel-
opment of the stronger central regions. This arises because the existence of these
economies of scale will create market structures that are oligopolistic, being
dominated by a few firms located, for the most part, in the stronger central
regions. The effect of other factors will also tend to work in this direction. The
level of transport costs will tend to be higher in the peripheral regions of the
Community than in the central regions, reflecting the rather obvious fact that it
costs more to bring goods to a distant market than to a neighbouring one. This
will tend to attract firms to central rather than peripheral regions. The effect of
demand factors is likely to be similar  because central regions tend to be
densely populated and peripheral regions do not, the -largest and most dynamic
markets will be found at the centre of the Community and not at the periphery.
The central regions will also tend to benefit to a greater extent from external
economies, such as a highly developed infrastructure, closer contact with suppliers
and access to a larger labour market.
The combination of all these considerations strongly suggests that the .attraction of
central regions is much stronger than peripheral regions for both the location and
growth of new firms. Moreover, the strength of a region is of itself likely to create
further external economies and thus one faces the possibility of creating a spiral
effect, whereby the relative strength of the central region is an important factor in
ensuring its continued growth. This growth, however, is to some extent achieved at
the expense of the peripheral regions which find it increasingly difficult to catch
up on the more developed regions.
In sum, therefore, while economic theory suggests that the Community as a whole
should gain from the integration process, the considerations just outlined strongly
indicate that this gain will be concentrated in the stronger regions and will be
achieved at the cost of major adjustment on the part of the weaker economies. As
a result, the efficiency gap between the weaker and the stronger regions may
actually be widened. This suggests that if left to itself the market process would
increase divergences between regions rather than lead to convergence.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
Another important point which must be borne in mind is that the movement of
factors of production from the periphery to the centre may be determined by
private rather than social cost considerations. For instance, significant movements
of labour into already densely-populated areas may lead to some problems of
congestion while, from the point of view of the less-densely populated regions, the
outflow of labour will mean that the cost of maintaining the economic and social
infrastructure will increase. This latter problem is likely to be compounded
because, as Irish experience indicates, the migration of labour tends to come from
the younger, more skilled and more enterprising sections of the population; thus
those remaining behind are reduced not only in numbers but also in competitive
ability, thereby exacerbating the initial disadvantage.
The above reasons indicate not only why there is a need for a regional policy
within the Community  but also why, as integration proceeds, there is a need for that
policy to playa greater role.  The requirements of EMU go a considerable distance
beyond the 1992 programme in terms of the constraints which they place on
policy autonomy in individual countries. For EMU to be sustainable, the
economies of the countries forming the union must be similarly competitive or
else some countries would be faced with the equivalent of a constant balance-
of-payments deficit which, in EMU, would be reflected in terms of stagnation and
unemployment. Obviously, the only way in which countries in such a union can
compete on similar terms is for the burden of problem regions to be tackled.
Otherwise, pressures on national governments would be likely to force them to
abandon the commitment to EMU and to take autonomous action to solve their
regional problems. This danger, presented by regional imbalances, is the greatest
threat to the realization of economic and monetary union.
3. Principles of regional policy in the context of moving towards EMU
Regional policy, which refers not simply to regional fund expenditure but rather
to all policies affecting the development of the regions, must be an essential
element in the policy mix necessary to achieve economic and monetary union. In
its absence, the Community may well fare better on aggregate than before
embarking on the process, but it would have created problems associated with
highly concentrated industry and populations.
1.  The role of regional policy in reducing disparities
The objective of Community regional policy should be to correct imbalances by
contributing to the development and the structural adjustment of the regions.
Eliminating regional disparities should not be confused with equalizing income
per head between regions. Differences in income could, of course, be greatly
reduced by some transfer mechanism, but a mechanism based primarily on
income subsidies would not contribute to the achievement of sustainable growth.
Rather, it could act as a disincentive to effort in the region receiving the transfers
while possibly damaging the dynamism of the stronger regions. It would, at best
erely subsidize the continuation of the problem; it would not help to solve it.REGIONAL POLICY
Instead, it is more constructive to think in terms of equalizing the conditions
needed for the production of goods and services.. Here, the main difficulty faced
by problem regions is a lack of adequate infrastructure. This is true both of
peripheral regions and declining regions. Peripheral regions have inferior infra-
structure largely because they are both poorer and less densely populated and the
per capita cost of providing the infrastructure becomes prohibitive. Declining
regions, on the other hand, tend to suffer because decaying infrastructure is not
being replaced. The lack of good infrastructure discourages new firms from
locating in either type of region and results in higher costs for existing firms. In
order to overcome this problem, peripheral regions need assistance to bring their
infrastructure up to a similar level as that obtaining in the stronger regions of the
Community.
Here, one of the key areas is transport. For example, in Ireland, it is estimated
that industry spends approximately IRL 1 billion annually in transporting
materials and distributing finished products. Though geography and a lack 
producer goods industries will always mean that transport costs in Ireland will
represent a significant proportion of total manufacturing costs, it has been
calculated that these costs could be reduced by almost half through significant
improvements in the road network. The recent decision to expand the Community
regional programme to include infrastructural projects undertaken by the private
sector is, therefore, welcome.
Even if physical disparities were considerably reduced, however, there remain
other locational disadvantages  not merely the demand factors mentioned
earlier, but also the existence of economies of scale in the central regions arising
from, for example, proximity to research institutes, major financial centres and
other services and an abundant supply of skilled labour. The importance of these
disadvantages could, however, be reduced as. more firms locate in the periphery
and as the problems of communication over long distances are reduced by new
technology.
2.  Regional policy and labour mobility
Economic theory tells us that in an economic and monetary union, disparities
between regions will produce movements of labour and capital. While such
mobilitiy is obviously a requirement of any dynamic economy, large-scale
mobility, particularly in the case of labour, would hardly be politically acceptable
as a major adjustment factor in an integrated Europe. Indeed, from an Irish point
of view, the extent of labour mobility might well be regarded as a  measure 
regional disparities and of the lack of success in overcoming them. While
disparities cannot be totally eliminated, they must be reduced to a level where
labour mobility, in particular, is largely voluntary. It is recognized that migration
and emigration today are complex issues and it can be misleading to classify
emigration in simple terms such as voluntary or involuntary, but Ireland has long
experience of the effects of large-scale involuntary emigration and it has very fewCOLLECTION OF PAPERS
positive features. In a more integrated Europe, it is essential that the weaker
regions do not become mere suppliers of labour. Regional policy must be
structured in such a way as to induce enterprises to locate and labour to stay in
the peripheral regions. It is worth bearing iri mind that the education and training
of individuals who, in the event, emigrate to take up employment elsewhere in the
Community represents an outright benefit for the receiving region while, for the
region of emigration, it is an investment from which it obtains little or no return.
This is a non-trivial example of the way in which the richer regions may benefit
from integration at the expense of the weaker areas.
Another aspect of the impact of regional policy on labour is that there should be a
move .away from providing labour-intensive low-pay projects for peripheral
regions. With rapid changes in technology, such projects tend to be short-lived as
competition increases from some of the newly industrialized countries with even
lower wage levels. Such a policy would not seem likely to bring about the
obJective of reducing disparities in living standards in the EC.
3.  Structure of regional policy
The difficulties posed by the 'national quotas' approach to the Regional Fund
were mentioned earlier. In the context of European integration, a basic principle
must be that aid should be determined on the basis of regions and not of
countries. The adoption of this principle should help to reduce the political
friction in regional policy, with aid being allocated to approved programmes
within the designated regions, regardless of the country in which they happen to
be located. This implies a major increase in funding for programmes with specific
objectives in mind, a process already under way. It means a shift of emphasis
towards setting overall objectives for infrastructure at Community level and
providing funds to achieve them, rather than engaging in piecemeal project
financing. The recent Council Regulation on the use of the structural Funds
commits the Community increasingly to concentrate on programme funding,
which by end-1987 was targeted to account for only 20% of regional policy
expenditure. This development clearly has much further to go.
truly European regional policy in the context of EMU should not become
another open-ended drain on Community resources and should eventually
become self-sustaining. As some regions become self-supporting and able 
compete without assistance, there could be greater concentration of resources on
the remaining problem areas. A point would eventually be reached where the
amount of Community resources needed would decline. A properly-framed
regional policy would not become an ever-expanding part of the Community
budget; a policy that did so would contain the seeds of its own destruction.
The corollary of a policy for the less-favoured regions is a policy for the more-
advanced regions. The other side of the coin of a policy that encourages growth
where it now lags is a conscious discouragement of growth where it is not merely
unnecessary, but brings great social and economic costs in terms of congestionREGIONAL POLICY
pollution, social problems and even destruction of the environment. If transfers of
much-needed resources to the peripheral areas are acknowledged as necessary for
the cohesion of European integration, then it is surely beyond argument that the
case for subsidies to industries operating in the richest and most polluted areas in
Europe is open to serious question. A subsidy given to industry to locate in
developed Europe has an inevitable and negative effect on underdeveloped
Europe. Indeed, the external costs imposed on society by locating an industry in
an already overcrowded and polluted environment would justify the imposition of
a tax rather than the granting of a subsidy. It is not only the peripheral regions
that need to justify subventions for their development.
3.4.  Financing and composition of expenditure
There should be a move away from a policy of widely dispersing regional aid
towards one of concentrating that aid on programmes, projects and activities in
regions. This would ensure the maximum return for a given transfer expenditure.
Moreover, in designing regional programmes it is important to guard against the
problem of 'fatigue' on the part of the richer countries. This tends to arise in the
context of debates on annual allocations of national contributions toa central
budget and reflects an unduly static analysis of the costs/benefits of regional
policy. By focusing mainly on the costs of providing transfers to the poorer
regions and taking insufficient account of the less-quantifiable opportunities
provided by the opening-up of these countries' markets, an unbalanced picture of
the integration process emerges. One way of overcoming the problem of fatigue is
by ensuring that a major portion of Community financing is on an 'own resource
basis; that is, that it accrues to the Community budget automatically. From the
point of view of the recipient regions, there is a need to ensure that funding would
continue to be available for programmes until divergences between the objectives
and actual achievements of a regional plan are either eliminated or reduced to
acceptable levels.
An essential aspect of a Community regional policy must be that regional
transfers should be earmarked for specific purposes rather than taking the form of
general purpose funding which, due to fungibility with other uses, can be used to
maintain public consumption at unrealistic levels. Thus, the use of specific-
purpose transfers would be geared directly towards reducing the impact of loca-
tional disadvantages and towards mitigating the adverse effects in the disad-
vantaged regions of economies of scale arising elsewhere. It would also be
desirable that such grants be flexible in their time-frame of application so as to
provide an incentive for a country or region to reduce regional disparities in
infrastructural facilities at a rapid rate. If Community spending cannot be
expanded to match accelerated investment by a national government, it effectively
means that national quotas in terms of regional transfers operate in practice; these
would not provide any incentive for Member States to undertake ambitious devel-
opment programmes.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
There must also be full appreciation and acceptance of the fact that the
Community budgetary funds must be large enough to be effective in reducing
regional disparities. In this regard, it is instructive to compare the allocation of
structural Funds amounting to ECU 8 billion in 1988 (not all of which is
earmarked for the least-favoured regions) to the gains expected from the single
market. The Cecchini Report estimated the direct gains from the move to the
single market to be of the order of ECU 216 billion in 1988 prices. Even on this
basis, there is clearly a need for a greater volume of transfers to the least-favoured
regions; otherwise they are likely to contribute more to the gains from the single
market than they would receive. An examination of existing federal States demon-
strates that the amount of funds as a proportion of GDP devoted to the elimi-
nation of regional disparities within these States is considerably greater than it is
as between the Member States of the Community. It is not unrealistic to suppose
that this may explain why the extent of disparities within existing federal States (at
least in the industrial world) is much less than it is within the Community.
5.  Administration
The Community budgetary system should be as democratic and efficient 
possible. It is clear from experiences of highly centralized administrations that, in
the interests of both democracy and efficiency, the principle of decentralization
should be espoused. As much planning and execution as possible should be made
and carried out in the regions. There is, however, also a need for much more coor-
dination of policies at a Community level to ensure that there is not a wasteful
duplication of projects in the Community. These two opposing needs could be
satisfied by the regions developing medium-term plans of say three to five years
which they would submit to the Council for discussion, negotiation and approval
, as the case may be, rejection. It is encouraging to note that this type of
approach is advocated in the Council Regulation on the use of the structural
Funds. Once the medium-term plan and funds (or means of raising the funds) to
carry it out is approved and synchronized with other Community plans, adminis-
tration should be carried out in the region. A Community authority should be
empowered to carry out regular audits to ensure that the conditions of the plans
were being adhered to.
4. Contribution of regional policy to a stronger Europe
Conclusions
In an economic and monetary union, there would be no  national  policy
instruments available to offset the tendency for poorer regions to suffer from the
effects of market integration. It is essential, therefore, to be clear on the basic
principles that should inform a European regional policy. Among the more
important principles on which regional policy should be based are:
the need to eliminate the locational disadvantages of the poorer regions in the
production of goods and services;REGIONAL POLICY
large-scale movements of labour must not become a major adjustment factor;
regional transfers should be sufficiently large to effect the necessary reduction
in disparities between Member States;
the need for aid should be determined on the basis of regions, not of countries
and aid should be concentrated in the poorer regions;
the composition of regional transfers should be weighted in favour of
programme financing rather than project financing; moreover, it should be
designed, as far as possible, to catalyse private-sector investment in the regions
so that they become self-sustaining;
Community regional transfers should be financed from the OWn resources of
the Community and be complemented by macroeconomic policies directed
towards financial stability in the medium term;
- a sizeable Community budget.
Regional policy must be directed at enabling the peripheral areas to compete, not
at subsidizing them in continued deprivation; it must be far more than financial
transfers, and those transfers should be directed towards reducing costs and
raising productivity; it should mean a regional dimension to every European
policy, and not simply a fund, however well-spent; and it must encompass the
richer regions too  both to discourage undesirable development and to
acknowledge that the losses of the poor are often the gains of the rich. EMU
involves surrendering a high degree of national autonomy in economic policy-
making. This should take place in an environment in which the interests of the
peripheral regions are protected. Central economies should not gain the benefits
of integration at the expense of the peripheral economies. Rather, EMU should
mean that all share in the decision-making process and in the benefits that accrue.
Commitment to EMU must involve a corresponding commitment to ensuring that
the integration process is beneficial to all. In particular, the stronger economies in
the Community cannot pick and choose the elements of EMU that are favourable
and disregard the rest. EMU must be a package representing a sharing of costs
and benefits that is equitable and acceptable to all member countries. The
achievement of economic and monetary union on these terms would result in a
much more cohesive Europe than is the case at present. This would guarantee not
only the sustainability of EMU but also a Europe that would have a more decisive
influence in its dealings with the other major economic blocs.Regional implications of economic and monetary integration
J. Delors
Summary
Since monetary integration progressively eliminates the instrument of exchange
rate adjustment between the regions of the economy, this raises a number of issues
concerning regional adjustment and convergence, notably:
(i) the question whether the processes of market and monetary integration are
likely to be progressive or regressive in their impact on income distribution
between regions.
The economic literature points to the presence of several conflicting paradigms
which is why it seems not justified to make any simple predictions, such as that
the geographic core will profit at the expense of high-wage areas. It seems
necessary to adopt a rather agnostic overall view, unless one is prepared to
undertake an extensive and complex multi-factor analysis of the determinants of
the evolution of individual regions. Actual trends of comparative regional devel-
opments in the industrialized countries would seem to confirm this call for
caution;
(ii) the degree of convergence of regional economic performance that may be
judged normal or desirable in a double programme of market and monetary
integration, or even as a pre-condition to embarking upon such a programme.
It is observed that disparities within the EC at present are considerable, but not
incomparably greater than in some mature federations such as the United States,
Canada or Switzerland. The political tolerance level for these disparities may be
relatively high when language and cultural barriers result in a low propensity to
migrate, as is the case in much, but not all (namely Ireland), of the Community.
Therefore, the problem of regional disparities, while calling for a serious regional
policy effort, would not seem to be an obstacle to a furthering of the EC'
economic and monetary integration;
(iii) the lessons of regional policy, as revealed in part by how the public
authorities have in recent times been adapting their policy instruments
or strategies.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
Regional policies of the industrialized countries have been evolving in the light of
experience (in the Community and elsewhere) in the direction of a lesser emphasis
on automatic, generalized and larger-scale transfers, and with more emphasis on
incentives for decentralized local development efforts. Such thinking is also
reflected in the current reform of the EC's structural Funds. However, regional
policy in the EC is also addressed to specific problems such as cross-frontier
infrastructure networks and easing the adjustment costs caused by EC policies
such as 1992;
(iv) how the mature federal monetary unions have handled these issues and
whether this is helpful in thinking about the future needs of a European
monetary union.
The experience of all federal economic and monetary unions is that a diversity of
budgetary mechanisms combine in assuring an important 'shock -absorber
function between regions and states with respect to the impact of cyclical and
structural shocks. However, the degree to which such shocks are absorbed, and the
type of mechanisms used (budget equalization transfers, specific-purpose grants
automatic regional effects of federal taxes and social security) is quite diverse.
There is no apparent model on which all integration efforts seem destined to
converge. It would thus seem plausible to expect a substantial development of the
budgetary function of the EC in the case of a monetary union, but the mech-
anisms would need to be chosen as a function of the specific needs of the
Community at that time.
(i)  The impact of integration on regional convergence.  Economic analysis is
currently more agnostic than has sometimes been argued about whether the
process of economic integration should lead to regionally regressive or progressive
outcomes. Both theoretical and empirical evidence contribute to this new view.
A traditional view, that predicts a regressive concentration of prosperity on rich
regions at the geographic centre at the expense of a poorer periphery relies on two
arguments: firstly, the locational disadvantage in terms of transport costs of the
periphery, and, secondly, the cumulative advantages of economies of scale in
large-scale production (in the enterprise, and in the wider economic advantages of
large urban agglomerations).
While these arguments have a certain weight, a more qualified view is obtained
when a number of newer arguments are introduced. One relates to changes in
technology and demand, which witness a faster growth of demand now in the
industrialized countries for commodities that have a high value per unit of weight
(electrics, electronics, office and data-processing products, chemical and pharma-
ceutical products, high-quality foods and clothing), with low growth seen in the
case of many commodities that have low value per unit of weight (metal productsREGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
ores and metals, basic textiles, construction materials). 1 This means that transport
costs are becoming, on average, less important in the location of industrial
production.
Developments in telecommunications and capital mobility also make it less
evident where enterprises will choose to locate their different facilities. The factors
just mentioned enhance the sensitivity of investment decisions to the relative
levels of costs other than transport and the quality of the business environment in
competing locations. In addition EC initiatives in the 1992 programme and
accompanying policies should have a beneficial impact on the transport and tele-
communications facilities of the periphery. All the main transport services will be
rendered more competitive by the 1992 programme, which will further erode
without of course eliminating, the locational disadvantages of the periphery.
Also relevant to the issue at hand, there has been a fundamental change of
emphasis in the economic literature in the analysis of international trade and
industrial organization. 2
The new view gives less importance to the paradigm of comparative advantage as
an explanation of trade. While for some sectors the distribution of comparative
advantages remain relatively fixed (agriculture, tourism), for much of industry
natural endowments are not so important. The alternative paradigm is that trade
increasingly consists of a complex pattern of intra-industry specializations
between regions and countries of the industrialized world, especially in Western
Europe. Competitive advantages are increasingly to be attributed to deliberate
strategies of the public authorities relating to market conditions and investments
in human capital, R&D and economic infrastructure, and the reactions of mobile
corporations to these strategies. The likelihood of systematic imbalances in the
impact of market integration is reduced thus diminishing the predictability
winners or losers. 
This complex set of influences seems to be consistent with the uncertain pattern of
regional economic trends in the industrialized economies. It may be observed, for
example, that the United States economy has in recent years seen pronounced
economic growth at its geographic edges rather than favouring any dominant
centre. There have also been striking changes in the relative economic
performance of certain regions: the emergence of much of the south of the United
States from economic backwardness, and the recovery of New England. Extreme
locational disadvantage in the Far East Asian economies has not prevented spec-
tacular advances in their market shares in North America and Europe.
1 For data, see Table 1.1.3. of 'The economics of 1992' European Economy,  No 35, March 1988.
2 See Chapter 8 of 'The economics of 1992' for a fuller presentation of these arguments and further references.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
Within Europe, much of the periphery has been growing faster in recent 'years
than the geographic core of the EC. During the present decade, the UK, Spain,
Portugal and Italy have grown on average 0.55 % per annum faster than the
average of Germany, France and the Benelux. Within the larger EC countries the
picture is also complex, but one in which some of the arguments advanced above
can be recognized. Within Germany the traditional core regions (for example, the
Ruhr) have slipped behind, as also have other traditional regions such as Wallonia
and N orth- East France, which are centrally placed in a Community perspective.
Meanwhile, new centres of growth have emerged, as in Bavaria and the Rhone
valley where these trends are associated with the technological shifts mentioned.
Within Italy the problems of the Mezzogiorno have been gradually changing, with
prosperity spreading down the Adriatic coast, and the deep problems of Calabria
Campania .and Sicily manifestly influenced by non-economic factors. Within the
United Kingdom, one has seen parts of Wales and Scotland whose industrial
structures had much in common with Wallonia and North-East France make
rather striking recoveries, in spite of their geographic peripherality.
(ii)  Regional inequality in economic and monetary unions.  A related question is to
ask whether the experience of existing monetary unions points to certain
minimum standards of regional convergence, which would be implicitly required
for viability of the union. Put more strongly still, the question may be put whether
there are preconditions of this kind to be met before unions should be formed.
Comparisons of regional GDP or income levels per capita call for care over the
comparability of the unit sizes, since the smaller the units the larger the
differences tend to be. In comparing the EC and the US, one may observe that the
12 Member States GDP per capita ranges from 47 in Portugal to 129 in
Luxembourg, whereas, in the US, of nine census regions the range of per capita
incomes is from 77 in the South-East to III on the West Coast. If one looks for a
closer comparison with the US census regions, thus merging small units into larger
ones, one may note a range between 66 for the Iberian peninsula to 122 for north-
eastern Europe (Germany and Denmark). 
At the level of small units, one observes a range of 66 for Mississippi to 131 for
Alaska and Washington DC, which compares with 45 for the poorest regions of
Greece to 237 for Groningen, followed by 195 for Hamburg, 159 for the lIe de
France and 155 for Greater London. Both top groups include regions which are
conspicuous for their hydrocarbon production, which is a reminder of how these
interregional comparisons may be of uncertain policy significance when small
units are compared.
1 Detailed regional data are given in 
Efficiency, stability and equity  (Annexes D and E), Report of a group of experts
presided by T. Padoa-Schioppa, Oxford University Press, 1987.REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Other federations have considerable intra-regional differences. In Canada
Newfoundland at one extreme has a GDP per capita of 60, compared to Alberta
at 123. In Switzerland, Obwald has a GDP per capita of 76, compared to Zug at
160. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Saarland has a GDP per capita of
, .
compared to Hamburg at 165.
Among the unitary countries, France and the United Kingdom experience
disparities which are of the same broad proportions as in Germany, whereas Italy
experiences wider disparities, comparable to those' of Canada or Switzerland.
Overall these data suggest that the regional disparities in the EC are somewhat
greater than in the United States, but not incomparably so. Considerable regional
disparities are observed in many economic and monetary unions. However, these
simple statistical comparisons have to be qualified by a number of socio-political
considerations, of which one of the most important is the propensity for people to
migrate between regions and the political system s attitude to migration. Assuming
a legal freedom to migrate between States, the important issues are whether the
populations have a high propensity to migrate across political frontiers and
whether such migration is considered negative, positive or neutral in terms of
political values. In the United States the propensity to migrate is high. Across the
language frontiers of the EC, the propensity to migrate is today rather low but
politically, mass migratory movements would also be viewed more critically.
A given degree of regional income disparity would call for a more prompt or
powerful policy response where the propensity to migrate was high and its
political acceptability was low. In practice, the US sees a high propensity but also
a high acceptability of migration: therefore there is a relatively relaxed view of
interregional disparities. Within the EC, the political acceptability may be lower,
but the propensity to migrate is also lower on the whole. It might be expected
therefore that the EC could tolerate as great, if not somewhat wider regional
disparities than the US. For these reasons the present level of disparities within
the EC, while actually the target of policies to reduce them, need not be regarded
as a road-block on the path to further integration: especially when it is observed
that quite a few backward areas are now catching up or recovering.
Ireland is today the only EC country experiencing a politically uncomfortable rate
of emigration. The larger part of this emigration goes to other English-speaking
countries (60% to the UK 25% to North America). This may explain a high
propensity to emigrate in the Irish case, but of course it does not ease the
economic problem of loss of educational investment in human capital.
The case of Turkey, comparable in some ways to Mexico in relation to the United
States, offers a further perspective on these issues. Turkey s income per capita is
one third lower than that of Portugal. Turkey s population shows a highCOLLECTION OF PAPERS
propensity to migrate when the regulations of the countries of immigration permit
, no doubt influenced by the extremely low wage levels in Turkey and the almost
non-existent social security provisions for much of the population. If the 
labour market were opened to Turkey, that country s potential emigration would
appear to be very substantial. In this case it is realistic to discuss the issue of
preconditions to joining a European economic and monetary union whereas
among the present members of the EC this debate seems to be much less relevant.
(iii)  Evolution of regional policies.  To identify the essence of new trends in regional
policy in the industrialized countries, it is useful to characterize three types of
strategy. Practice does not correspond to any of these types in a pure way, but the
evolution of their relative importance is significant. The three types are:
(a) Policies that are designed to compensate for institutional rigidities in factor
prices or mobility. These are illustrated, on the side of labour, by the reduced
social security taxes applied in the South of Italy since 1971 or the regional
employment premium system of the United Kingdom of the 1960s (ended in
1977). On the side of capital, there is the widespread tendency to differentiate
investment grants regionally, although here also there is nowadays a tendency
to apply such subsidies more selectively. These may be called 'neo-classical'
regional policies.
(b) Policies that are designed to sustain income and demand in the regions, that
for structural or cyclical reasons, may be economically weakened. The main
mechanisms here are budget equalization transfer systems, often found in
federations, and the automatic interregional redistributive effect of central tax
and social security systems. The Reagan Administration in the United States
for example, reduced the importance of these mechanisms, abolishing the
federal revenue-sharing system. These may be called 'Keynesian' or
demand-side' regional policies.
(c) Policies designed to improve the resource base of the region, not only through
subsidized investments in physical infrastructure and human capital, but also
through incentives to encourage local initiative, even new institutions, to
mobilize efforts for the regeneration of weakened regions or communities. The
financial flows in these cases may be less than under the first two categories.
Policies in several countries, in North America as well as Europe, and in the
EC itself, have been heading more in this direction. These may be called
decentralized supply-side' regional policies.
There are some reasons why an attempt to move more in the direction of the first
two types of policy would not seem advisable for the EC in its next phase of
systematic development. Regional employment subsidies, on a macroeconomic
scale, would risk giving an inappropriate signal to those responsible for labour
competitiveness. With the reduction of exchange rate variability, it is important
for the wage system to become more responsive to considerations of competi-
tiveness. To suggest that deficiencies in this respect would be compensated byREGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
subsidies would be dangerous. As regards the subsidization of capital, the risks to
be averted are also those of encouraging inefficient investment, and in particular a
capital-intensive bias that may exacerbate employment problems. Experience in
some European countries shows this to be not just a theoretical possibility.
As regards the Keynesian type of transfer policies, these are justified basically by
one of two arguments, one political and the other economic, neither of which
however, is strongly represented in the EC at the present time. The political case 
where a country chooses to write into its constitution, explicitly or implicitly, the
objective of having nearly equal standards of public welfare and services in all
regions, as seen in Germany or Australia for example. The economic case is where
labour mobility is so fluid that moderate differences in public welfare service and
tax systems may be sufficient to induce migration which has no other economic
justification. (However, in the United States the fluidity of migration between
jurisdictions is, to some degree, perceived as a control on the efficiency of local or
state public administrations. This is an extreme extension of the paradigm of
competition between rules.
In much of the industrialized world considerable scepticism has developed over
the effectiveness of the first two categories of centrally developed and financially
rather massive systems of regional transfers. This is certainly the case when the
policy objective goes beyond purely distributional issues and is addressed to
helping weak regions improve their relative economic performance. As a result
there has been some shift in favour of policies that rely more on decentralized
initiative and a more selective availability of central subsidies. In the United
States some striking success stories have been seen in some states  such as
Massachusetts, Ohio, Michigan and Pennsylvania  which organized their own
revitalization programmes, and succeeded in achieving dramatic reductions in
local unemployment levels. In general in the United States, regional income
disparities have reduced greatly over the last 50 years, with the South-East moving
up from 53 to 86 in relation to the national average, the South-West moving up
from 69 to 94 and the Plains from 76 to 96. Federal subsidies can hardly be
regarded as the key to this convergence.
In Europe, there have been only hesitant moves in the direction of more decen-
tralized forms of regional policy, although political regionalization has been
important in some countries: Spain, Italy, to a lesser degree France, and more
emphatically now Belgium. The United Kingdom has seen considerable change in
the organization and powers of local government, and this has shown up in the
emergence of regional development efforts with new organizational forms. An
interesting example is seen in the Strathclyde area of Scotland, where there have
been considerable achievements to the credit of the Scottish Development Agency
and the Strathclyde Regional Council. These have been supported by the EC
structural Funds, including an integrated development programme. The main
points here have been a reduced emphasis on grants for large inward investment
projects, with more emphasis on the encouragement of local entrepreneurship andCOLLECTION OF PAPERS
labour training, environmental improvement of old urban areas and local institu-
tional developments favouring policy innovation and local initiative. This has
features in common with some of the US success stories.
Current reforms of the EC' structural Funds also push in some of these
directions. The new regulations entering into force in 1989, applicable until 1993
by which time the real level of annual expenditure will have doubled to ECU 
billion, call for the preparation of regional development plans, including a
regional dimension even in the smaller Member States such as Ireland, Portugal
and Greece. For these three countries, and to a lesser degree for Spain also, the
Funds will permit a qualitative improvement in economic infrastructure, such as
transport and telecommunications; also the expansion, in some cases the estab-
lishment for the first time, of extensive manpower training schemes. Another point
of emphasis in the reforms is to support the needs of industrial areas defined at
the level of quite small regional units, hit by serious problems of restructuring.
This should help overcome inter alia,  the adjustment problems posed by the 1992
programme.
The budgetary grants of the structural Funds combined with loans from the
European Investment Bank, are due to rise, as a share of the beneficiaries' GNP
to around 5 % in the case of the three smaller countries, and 1 Y2 % in the case of
Spain. These amounts will represent substantial percentages of the total financing
of these countries' economic infrastructure and manpower training programmes.
In terms of the absorptive capacity of the countries concerned, either managerial
or from the standpoint of .avoiding inflation bottlenecks in sectors such as
construction, the funds are on a scale that already represents a considerable
challenge for the beneficiaries. The Commission also has particular responsi-
bilities for evaluating the experiences of this new phase of EC structural policy.
(iv)  The case of economic and monetary union.  As and when the system in the
Community moves to a fully developed economic and monetary union, one might
expect the Community s budgetary mechanisms to develop. The existing systems
of the advanced federations have some common features, but it is not evident that
between them they offer anything like an ideal model towards which all inte-
gration processes must converge. 
As regards the most explicit forms of interregional distribution, three federations
(Australia, Canada and Germany) have budgetary equalization mechanisms which
raise the fiscal capacity of weak states to federally determined minimum
standards. However, two federations (United States and Switzerland) have, in
contrast, relied more upon specific-purpose grant mechanisms for pursuing policy
objectives such as health, education and investment in economic infrastructure.
These programmes have a far weaker interregional redistributive power
1 These mechanisms were documented in detail in 
The role of public finances in European integration  (Vols I and II),
Report of a group of experts presided by Sir D. MacDougall, Commission of the European Communities, 1975.REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
than the equalization systems. The pattern in these cases is more like a much
extended version of the Community s structural Funds and its instruments for
pursuing technology policy objectives.
Of course, the central responsibility for defence is a common feature of all the
federations, together with its financing by federal taxation, usually including a
heavy income-tax component. This always results in  signifi.cant degree of
automatic and implicit fiscal redistribution between rich and poor states.
Social security systems may also have an important role in automatic inter-
regional redistribution, and this is certainly the case in Germany. However, social
security in several cases has strongly decentralized features.. Indeed, in the United
States social security regimes, especially for health care, probably differ more
between the states than is the case between the Member States of the EC.
A common feature, none the less, is that in all federations the different combi-
nations of federal budgetary mechanisms have powerful ' shock-absorber' effects
dampening the amplitude either of economic diffi.culties or of surges in prosperity
of individual states. This is both the product of, and source of the sense of
national solidarity which all relevant economic and monetary unions share. 
1 'Relevant' here is meant to exclude the frequently observed cases where very small units voluntarily enter into
economic and monetary union with much larger neighbours, sometimes exploiting tax-haven advantages in pref-
erence to fiscal integration.Macro-coordination of fiscal policies in an economic and
monetary union in Europe 
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Introduction
This note attempts to provide a basis for the discussion of the degree of macro-
fiscal coordination that might be needed after the establishment of economic and
monetary union (EMU) in Europe and during the period of transition towards it.
The note examines several arguments that have been put forward in support of
fiscal coordination. Their assessment is based partly on -theoretical considerations
and partly on lessons drawn from the experience of federal states. As the
arguments overlap somewhat, the conclusions bring together the various strands
of the analysis.
The note is complemented by two appendices. The first contains a brief review of
fiscal arrangements and coordination in federal states, compares the fiscal
structure of these states with the current .and prospective situation in the EEC and
assesses the relevance of their experience for the Community. The second
appendix discusses in more detail the question whether market forces can be
expected to exert disciplinary effects on fiscal policy and thereby lessen, at least in
part, the need for explicit fiscal policy coordination.
The main conclusion of the analysis is that fiscal policy coordination .appears to
be a vital component of a European EMU. Such coordination would have to be
conceived and implemented with two objectives in mind:
to allow the determination of a global fiscal policy in a way that is sufficiently
responsive to evolving domestic and international requirements; and
to avoid tensions arising from excessive differences between the public sector
borrowing requirements of individual member countries.
II - Why coordination?
Basically three partly overlapping arguments have been put forward in support 
macro-fiscal coordination in a European EMU, while a fourth one focuses on the
difficulties during the transition period:
the need for an appropriate fiscal policy for the union as a whole;
the need to avoid disproportionate use of Community savings by one country;
- a possible bias towards lack of fiscal restraint;
the need for convergence in budgetary positions during the transition period.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
Argument  1:  An appropriate fiscal policy for the EMU
Description.  An economic and monetary union transforms the Community into a
single economy. Both for the purpose of internal macroeconomic objectives and
in order to be able to participate in the process of international policy coordi-
nation, the Community will require a framework for determining a coherent mix
of monetary and fiscal policies. The creation of a single currency area implies, by
definition, the adoption of a single monetary policy for the Community as a
whole. By contrast, if it is assumed that fiscal policy is not centralized, the
Community s fiscal stance would merely be the result of the aggregation of uni-
laterally decided budgetary positions in individual member countries. Conse-
quently, without an explicit coordination of fiscal policies, the Community would
not be able to formulate a common fiscal policy, be this with a short-term or
longer-term orientation. Monetary policy would be the only instrument available
for pursuing macroeconomic objectives.
Assessment.  The essential theoretical foundation of this argument is that policy
coordination is beneficial to countries whose economies are closely intertwined.
Strong linkages between real and financial markets across countries imply that the
policies pursued by one country have significant repercussions on economic
developments in others. If this interdependence is not taken into account in the
policy setting, there is a danger that independent national policy decisions lead to
an outcome inferior to that which could have been achieved by a cooperative
approach. 
A simple illustrative example of the desirability of a jointly decided policy stance
in an EMU could run as follows. Even if domestic conditions in the Community
called for a fiscal stimulus, each country (region) on its own might have little
incentive to shift to a more expansionary fiscal policy (for instance through tax
cuts). Each would fear that the policy change would lead to a deterioration in its
budgetary position with little gain in output, since a large part of the induced
income effect would be transferred via higher 'imports' to other Community
countries. If, by contrast, all countries decided jointly to lower taxes, the expan-
sionary income effects would reinforce each other and stimulate economic activity
1 The benefits deriving from coordination in the presence of interdependence are in general supported by the theor-
eticalliterature. This is what in game-theory terms is known as the ' cooperative' solution , where every player (e.g. a
country) can be better off relative to the ' non-cooperative' solution where each one acts in isolation. For some
examples see P. R. Krugman (1987), 'Economic integration in Europe , Annex A to  Efficiency, stability and equity
(Padoa-Schioppa Report), EC, especially page A-19; or, with particular reference to the present EMS
arrangements, P. De Grauwe (1985),  Fiscal policies in the EMS: A strategic analysis,  International economics
research paper No 53. These studies also make it clear that, while establishing the need for coordination is relatively
simple, specific rules depend critically on detailed assumptions about national objectives, the workings of the
economy and, implicitly, the ability to control budgetary variables. While the existence of benefits is beyond
dispute, there has recently been some scepticism about their magnitude  see, e.g. G. Oudiz and J. Sachs (1984),
Macroeconomic policy coordination among tIifdndustrial economies Brookings papers on economic activity.  Note
also that the specific question of fiscal policy coordination in an EMU has not as yet been examined within this
analytical framework.COORDINATION OF FISCAL POLICIES
with smaller adverse effects on budgetary positions. The creation of a single
market and a single currency area greatly strengthens the linkages between indi-
vidual member countries, thereby heightening the importance of such common
decisions within the Community. 
The above example illustrates how the need for coordination in a European EMU
would arise from a possible misalignment of national (I.e. regional) fiscal policies.
There are in principle two iypt::s of solution. One would be to use the Community
budget to correct any distortions in the aggregate fiscal policy resulting from inde-
pendent national decisions; the other would be to intervene at the source, by
limiting the scope of national discretion in determining budgetary positions.
The problem is clearly analogous to that faced by federal states where regional
governments have sizeable budgets. 1. With the exception of Australia, all the
federal states examined have tended to discard the second solution. Their macro-
fiscal policy is conducted in the context of their sizeable federal budgets, while
budgetary policies of individual states are left primarily to the discretion of their
governments. This type of solution seems to avoid unnecessary friction with
regional authorities. This solution, however, is out of the question for a pros-
pective European EMU because its central budget is not expected to exceed 3 
of GDP. This compares with federal expenditures that range from around 10 to
30 % of GDP. The size of the Community budget would clearly be too small to
provide for an adequate  masse de manoeuvre  for an .effective macro-fiscal policy.
As .a result, in an EMU an .appropriate aggregate fiscal policy could not be
determined without impinging on the autonomy of national budgetary positions
whether for purely domestic reasons or for the purpose of international policy
coordination.
Argument  2:  Undue appropriation of EMU savings by one country
Description.  There is a danger that without coordinated fiscal policies individual
member countries might run excessive national deficits and absorb a dispropor-
tionate proportion of Community savings. This lack of convergence would impose
unwelcome costs on other countries.
1 It is clearly also possible to construct examples with opposite biases, by pointing to crowding-out effects through
increases in interest rates in other countries or to the possibility of higher inflation. The precise results will always
depend on the specific assumptions made about the objectives of the authorities and the transmission mechanisms
involved, The general point, however, remains valid: greater interdependence in principle raises the potential
benefits of coordination.
2 The implicit recognition of the existence of a coordimition problem among regional governments has been the basis
for traditional arguments that in a federation the stabilization function should be conferred on the federal
government - see R. A. Musgrave and P. B. Musgrave (1973),  Publicfinance in theory and practice McGraw-Hill.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
Assessment.  A similar argument has traditionally been made in support of capital
restrictions designed to ensure that domestic savings are invested in the national
economy. Obviously, in a Community with a single market where goods, services
and capital can move freely, the 'earmarking' of  domestic savings for domestic
use would not be a meaningful concept. With fully integrated financial markets
any government borrowing would be financed voluntarily, though at a price
determined in the market. Only if markets persistently underpriced their lending
to governments, or if the fiscal authorities could tax other countries' citizens,
directly or indirectly, could there be a danger of one country ' unduly exploiting
the savings of the Community.
Since it can be ruled out that even upon completion of EMU individual
governments will be able to tax residents outside their borders directly, an inap-
propriate (i.e. involuntary) use of private non-resident savings could only occur if
circumstances forced all, or at least some, citizens of other Community countries
to bear some part of the required financing costs.
One way that this could happen would be if a particular government encountered
refinancing difficulties. Since a certain part of claims on that government might
result from earlier voluntary lending by residents of other Community countries
there could be strong political pressure throughout the Community to bailout the
government in financial trouble. Such pressure might be difficult to resist
especially if the country facing refinancing problems was relatively large and if
the EMU implied stronger solidarity ties. Through these bail-out arrangements
citizens of other member countries would effectively be taxed and their savings
exploited' by the national government concerned.
Another possibility might be that excessive borrowing by one country would raise
the interest rate level throughout the Community and crowd out investment in
countries where the interest rate would otherwise have been lower. 1 Finally, an
exploitation' of savings might also occur if one country s borrowing either
exerted pressure for a more accommodative monetary policy (resulting in a higher
rate of inflation throughout the Community) or led to a depreciation of the
Community s exchange rate  vis-a-vis  third currencies (entailing terms-of-trade
losses for all Community residents).
The strength of these arguments largely depends on whether, without policy coor-
dination and explicit constraints on national budgets, market forces could exert
sufficiently strong disciplinary effects On national governments' fiscal behaviour.
There is reason to be sceptical about the adequacy of sanctions imposed by the
market mechanisms (see Appendix II). Rather than operating directly (through the
higher borrowing cost to the government, partly associated with credit risk
differentiation), 2 market forces tend to operate indirectly (through political
1 This argument implicitly assumes that markets do not work efficiently in this case in the sense that the private
return on such financing flows exceeds the social return because of the displacement of potentially more useful
investment spending, i.e. the market 'underprices' such financing from the social viewpoint.
2 Evidence from Canada and the United States suggests that markets differentiate between the various regions as
regards credit risk.COORDINATION OF FISCAL POLICIES
pressures resulting from the perceived costs of the fiscal stance on the economy)
(see Appendix II). Their effectiveness could be enhanced, however, by explicit
no-bail-out provisions, which would encourage greater prudence on the part 
both borrowers and lenders.
The general absence of constraints on the budgetary policies of regional auth-
orities in federal states would seem to suggest that there is little concern about an
excessive use of savings by one region at the expense of the others. Nevertheless
the experience of federal states may be of relatively limited guidance in this
respect (see Appendix I). Not only have EEC Member States historically shown
markedly divergent attitudes towards the merits of fiscal orthodoxy, but the
Community is also unique in having a major fiscal imbalance in one of the large
regIOns.
Argument  3:  Bias towards lack of fiscal restraint in an EMU
Description.  It is sometimes argued that in an EMU constraints on national
budgets would be needed to avoid an excessively lax fiscal stance for the
Community as a whole. A tendency towards fiscal expansion could lead to
pressures on the monetary authorities to adopt a more accommodative monetary
policy. If this pressure was not resisted, it would jeopardize control over the price
level. If resisted, interest rates would rise, thereby crowding out investment and
undermining longer-term growth prospects. In either case, monetary policy would
be unduly compromised.
Assessment.  This argument, which has never been spelled out in detail, appears to
be essentially a variation of Argument 2. There would seem to be at least three
theoretical reasons for less fiscal restraint in an economic and monetary union.
The first has to do with the fact that the EMU would rule out changes in
intra-union exchange rate parities. To the extent that the threat of a depreciation
of the domestic currency as a result of excessive fiscal expansion had acted as a
constraint under the EMS arrangements, its disappearance would encourage
financial indiscipline.
The second is that, as outlined above, expectations might arise that the union
would tend to make assistance from other member governments more likely in the
event of debt-servicing problems. Counting on this assistance, a government might
feel less constrained and markets might not properly signal the emergence of diffi-
culties through appropriate risk premiums.
A third reason might be that a move to EMU could entail additional demand for
government spending. In the poorer regions in particular, claims could emerge for
I A situation of this kind would seem partly to explain the difficulties in restraining regional government expenditure
in Italy. As noted earlier, in Canada and the United States markets differentiate among the various regions in terms
of credit risk, suggesting that bailing-out is not perceived as automatic.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
comparable levels of government services and, more generally, comparable living
standards. Quite apart from political pressures, in .a situation of greater capital
and labour mobility there would be clear limits to the possibility of raising tax
revenue as higher tax rates would lead to a loss in the regional tax base. Similarly,
the possible negative output and employment effects associated with the more
competitive environment in the EMU and the disappearance of exchange rate
adjustments could give rise to demands for specific assistance over and above
what is at present allowed for in the calculations of future Community transfers.
Resistance to the implied higher tax burden at the Community level would result
in a larger deficit,i
On the other hand, fears of a bias towards lack of fiscal restraint may be exag-
gerated. A move to EMU might in fact increase the constraints on fiscal
expansion precisely for national governments with a track record of excessively
expansionary fiscal policies. For these are the governments that have tended to
monetize their deficits and had recourse to direct controls on domestic and inter-
national financial transactions with a view to keeping financing costs artificially
low (e.g. Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal). They therefore stand to lose most
from the creation of a union.2 The abolition of restrictions on residents' purchases
of foreign assets would reduce the demand for domestic securities. Similarly, with
the liberalization of financial services in the Community the battery of domestic
controls which directly or indirectly increase the demand for government
liabilities and/or reduce their rate of return would need to be largely dismantled.
The abolition of these restrictions whose link to the deficit is sometimes only
vaguely perceived, would be equivalent to the elimination of a ' hidden tax . By
pointing to the true costs of the deficit more clearly, it might tend to encourage
discipline.
The available evidence from federal systems would not seem to suggest a bias
towards lack of fiscal restraint. Over the period examined, in all cases except one
there has been no apparent  medium-term  problem of control of regional expen-
ditures and deficits, which have not tended to grow relative to their federal
counterparts. Moreover, beyond the provisions defining the areas of responsibility
of federal and regional authorities in the expenditure and tax spheres, there are no
federally imposed  constraints on regional government borrowing. A key aspect of
all the federal systems considered is the denial (or strict limitation) of access to
central bank financing to regional governments in an attempt to subject them to
the discipline of the market. It remains unclear, however, what are the factors ulti-
mately accounting for the apparent lack of a bias in the states examined. This
I The creation of an EMU could also lead to pressures for reductions in the average level of tax rates in the absence
of effective tax rate coordination, as countries with higher than average tax rates may face an erosion of their tax
base in favour of those with lower than average rates.
2 The implicit tax levied through controls on domestic financial holdings alone may be quite large. See, for example
GECD Economic Survey, Spain,  1986.
J Otherwise, quite apart from any legal obligations, the domestic financial industry, notably banks, would face
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raises doubts about the extent to which their experience can be of guidance for
foreseeable conditions within a European EMU (see Appendix I).
Argument  4:  Convergence during the transition period to EMU
Description.  A certain degree of convergence in the budgetary positions of member
countries is a prerequisite for the transition towards a monetary union. Only if
fiscal policies are better aligned among Community countries will it be possible to
reduce the need for exchange rate realignments and gradually prepare the ground
for an irrevocable fixing of exchange rates. The desirability of a financially disci-
plined and prudent fiscal stance calls for convergence towards the budgetary
positions of the more fiscally conservative countries.
Assessment.  The need for convergence (and hence, implicitly, for some form of
fiscal coordination) depends on the degree to which divergent fiscal policies are
thought to affect exchange rate relationships. Unfortunately, economic theory and
empirical research do not provide unequivocal answers on either the size or
indeed, the direction of the pressure that fiscal shocks can exert on exchange rate
parities. They merely suggest that factors such as the impact of fiscal policies on
interest rates and on the current account are important, and that neither of these
can be determined without knowing whether the monetary authorities will
monetize the deficit or not. Thus, for instance, expectations of monetization of an
increase in government borrowing can lead to a depreciation of the currency,
whereas a non-accommodative monetary stance could cause an appreciation by
increasing the interest rate differential in favour of domestic assets.
If economic theory emphasizes that the precise effects of divergent fiscal policies
can only be analysed with reference to actual circumstances, it also indicates that
changes in fiscal policy will in general have important repercussions in asset
markets. This view is confirmed by practical experience within the Community
and, perhaps even more clearly, by the discussion of the role of fiscal policy in the
context of G- 7 efforts to achieve a greater degree of exchange rate stability among
the main currencies. Thus, measures to coordinate fiscal policies within the
Community and to enhance their compatibility with a view to exchange rate
cohesion would greatly facilitate the Community s approach to EMU.
While the importance of such measures is beyond doubt, it is more difficult to
define in practice what the appropriate degree of fiscal policy convergence should
be. As long as countries differ considerably in the structure and relative size of
their budgetary expenditure and revenue, in their sectoral saving/investment
propensities and in their central banks' ability to resist pressures for monetization
there would be no economic justification for broadly uniform budgetary positions.
As far as the direction of convergence is concerned, the shift towards fiscal
consolidation for domestic purposes in a number of countries suggests that
convergence towards the position of the more fiscally conservative countries
would be desirable.COLLECTION OF PAPERS
III - Conclusions
review of fiscal arrangements in federal states and of their experience with
fiscal coordination suggests that there generally exist few constraints on the
budgetary policies of sub-federal governments and that concerns about fiscal
coordination have not ranked highly. At the same time, there are at least two
major differences between conditions in these countries and in the EEC which call
for caution in deriving possible lessons for appropriate fiscal arrangements in the
Community.
Firstly, with the possible exception of Canada, there have been no large and
persistent differences in the fiscal behaviour of the member states in the various
federations. This is in marked contrast to the widely divergent 'propensities to run
deficits' prevailing in the EEC. Secondly, the Community budget will , in the fore-
seeable future, remain a much smaller proportion of total public spending in
Europe than the federal budget as a percentage of total public expenditure in
other contemporary systems.
Much of the fiscal convergence achieved in federal states is probably the result of
tradition and history  factors which in Europe appear to favour divergence. Nor
would it be wise to rely principally on the free functioning of financial markets to
iron out any excessive differences in fiscal behaviour between member countries.
It is unlikely that the interest premium to be paid by a high deficit member
country would be very large, since market participants would tend to act on the
assumption that the EMU solidarity would prevent the 'bankruptcy' of the deficit
country. In addition, to the extent that there was a premium, it is doubtful that it
would reduce significantly the deficit country s propensity to borrow. There is
therefore, a serious risk that, in the absence of constraining policy coordination
major fiscal imbalances would persist.
This raises two concerns which differ according to the stage reached in the
progress towards a fully-fledged EMU. During the transition period (stage two),
the greater part of the burden of trying to respect the stricter intra-Community
exchange rate commitments would have to be borne by the monetary policies of
individual member countries. This task would be harder to fulfil than under the
present ERM arrangements and failure to succeed would have more devastating
consequences for the whole integration process than it would today.
If the stage of irrevocably locked exchange rates had been reached (stage three),
the emergence, or the persistence, of a significant public sector borrowing
requirement in one or more of the member countries would mean that real interest
rates would be higher in the other member countries than they would otherwise
have been. Private investment in these countries would thus be 'crowded out' by
the fiscal policies of the deficit countries. This could lead not only to the
emergence of intra-EMU political tension, but also to pressure on the federal
monetary authority to relax monetary policy.
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The combination of a small Community budget with large, independently
determined national budgets leads to the conclusion that, in the absence of fiscal
coordination, the global fiscal policy of the EMU would be the accidental
outcome of decisions taken by Member States. There would simply be no
Community-wide macroeconomic fiscal policy.
As a result, the only global macroeconomic tool available within the EMU would
be the common monetary policy implemented by the European central banking
system. Even within a closed economy, this would be an unappealing prospect as
it would imply the serious danger of an inappropriate fiscal/monetary policy mix
and pressures tending to divert monetary policy from the longer-run objective of
preserving price stability. But such a situation would appear even less tolerable
once the EMU was regarded as part and parcel of the world economy, with a
clear obligation to cooperate with the United States and Japan in an attempt to
preserve (or restore) an acceptable pattern of external balances and to achieve
exchange rate stabilization. To have even the smallest chance of reaching these
objectives, all cooperating partners will need flexibility in their policy mixes.
On the basis of these arguments, fiscal policy coordination would appear to be a
vital element of a European EMU and of the process towards it. Appropriate
arrangements should therefore be put in place which would allow the gradual
emergence, and the full operation once the EMU is completed, of a
Community-wide fiscal policy. Such arrangements should also aim at avoiding
disruptive differences between the public sector borrowing requirements of
individual member countries.
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Appendix I
The experience of federal states and the EEC
I - Introduction and summary of factual findings
When searching for some empirical evidence to assess the various arguments for
coordination, it seems natural, for want of a better alternative, to turn to the
experience of federal states. This might provide some, albeit crude, parallels with
possible conditions within a European EMU. What follows considers five
countries (the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Australia
and Switzerland) before looking at the present situation in the Community and
assessing the relevance of the comparison.
The key findings that emerge from the factual analysis are the following:
federal states differ markedly with respect to the degree of autonomy enjoyed
by sub-federal governments in the fiscal sphere; it is particularly great in
Switzerland, Canada and the United States and much less in Germany
and Australia;
- federally-decided limits on the borrowing of regional governments exist only
in Australia, though in both Germany and the United States there are
restrictions imposed by the states themselves;
with the exception of Germany, where it is in any case of negligible
importance, in no country do regional authorities have access to direct central
bank financing;
except for Australia, over the period examined no country appears to have
experienced serious problems with, or been much concerned about
medium-term control over sub-federal budgetary positions;
concern has at times been expressed, however, about an inappropriate overall
fiscal policy stance arising from independent decisions taken at the regional
level;
the size of the federal budget has generally allowed these conflicts to be
resolved with a minimum of interference in sub-federal budgetary policies.
From a structural viewpoint the main differences between the EEC and the
federal states are the following:
the much smaller size of the Community (central) budget;
greater concentration of expenditures and, especially, borrowing needs in a
few 'regions
greater dispersion of net borrowing and indebtedness in relation to regional
variables;
- much smaller inter-regional transfers.
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II --- Federal states
With respect to the degree of autonomy enjoyed at sub-federal government levels,
the federal states in the sample exhibit strong variations. In Switzerland, Canada
and the United States decisions are very decentralized. They are much less so in
Germany and Australia.
1.  Autonomy with respect to expenditure and revenue
The spheres of  expenditure  over which federal and sub-federal governments have
control are normally specified, to varying degrees, in the constitution, with at least
defence and social security tending to be the responsibility of the federal
governmentl Beyond that, there are no statutory limits on the expenditure
decisions of sub-federal government authorities (henceforth also referred to as
regional' governments).
very rough indication of the degree of expenditure autonomy of regional
governments can be derived from a look at the breakdown of total government
spending (see Table 1). This indicates that the aggregate  expenditure  of regional
authorities is always at least one third of total consolidated governmentexpen-
diture. In two countries, Canada and Switzerland, it actually exceeds the expen-
diture of the federal government, even when the latter is measured gross of
transfers to the regional governments.
The  revenue  autonomy of regional governments varies widely across the sample
(see Table 2). The degree of autonomy is particularly high in Canada, the United
States and Switzerland, where some three quarters of total revenue comes from
either taxes for which the regional authorities are free to choose the base and/or
rate, or from other independent sources. It is very low in Germany, where less
than one fifth of total revenue is accounted for in this way. In Australia the states
autonomous revenue amounts to about one third of the total, a proportion closer
to the German figure.
Tax  sources over which sub-federal governments retain a significant measure of
discretion account for about half of their total revenue in Canada, the United
States and Switzerland, about one third in Australia and a negligible proportion
in Germany. In the latter case, the tax revenue of the  Lander  is practically all in
the form of tax-sharing agreements, the proceeds coming from taxes for which
both base and rate are uniform throughout the Bund.
I Switzerland is the only case where sub-federal autborities share a substantial portion of social security responsi-
bilities.
2 Shared tax arrangements of a broadly similar kind are also sizeable in Australia, where they account for about one
third of sub-federal governments' revenue. They exist but are of little significance in Switzerland.
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Federal governments contribute to the revenue of regional units through  federal
grants.  Together with tax-sharing agreements these are the main redistributive
mechanism to compensate for regional variations in the standard of living. As a
proportion of sub-federal revenue, grants are highest in Australia (about one
third) and lowest in Germany and Switzerland (not exceeding some 15 
%).
2.  Constraints on borrowing
In none of the countries considered are there any federally-imposed statutory
limits on the  borrowing  capacity of regional entities. However, in Australia the
Loan Council - an institution  de facto  dominated by the federal government 
in effect sets both an aggregate borrowing limit for all government levels and
decides on its distribution amongst them.! In both Germany and the United
States2 states have included borrowing restrictions in their own constitutions.
They are generally defined as (qualified) balanced-budget amendments or ceilings
on borrowing (the United States) or as a limitation of borrowing for investment
purposes (the United States and Germany). In Canada and Switzerland there are
no statutory limits of any kind.
Regional governments do not generally have access to  central bank financing.  The
exception to the rule is Germany, where, however, these facilities are of minor
significance.4 Beyond these constraints, central banks do not normally influence
the financing choices of the various levels of government, although at least the
Bundesbank plays a consultative role through a variety of mechanisms.
Federal restrictions on 
foreign currency borrowing  exist only in Australia, where
the Loan Council regulates the foreign borrowing of the states. In Germany and
Switzerland the sub-federal governments have not turned to international capital
markets. Canadian provinces have made the largest use of this option.
3.  Size and distribution of expenditure and net borrowing
Tables 3 to 7 provide key indicators of the relative size of the regional fiscal units
in the various countries and Tables 8 to 12 of the degree of dispersion relative to
regional variables.
1 For a detailed explanation of the history and institutional arrangements of the Loan Council, See R. Mathews, 'The
development of commonwealth-state financial arrangements in Australia' (1988),  Yearbook of Australia  1988,
Australian Bureau of Statistics.
2 In the United States the only exception is Connecticut.
3 The federal government in Germany, with the consent of a majority of the states represented in the Bundesrat, has
some limited power to set temporary limits on borrowing by the  Lander  for conjunctural stabilization purposes.
This power was exercised only in 1973.
4 In Switzerland, the central bank may rediscount paper issued by the  Cantons.
5 At the end of the 1983-84 fiscal year, for instand:, some CAD 10 billion of the outstanding bonds and debentures
of the provinces, or almost one quarter of the total, had been raised in foreign markets. About 60 % of total foreign
borrowing had been done in the United States.
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The distribution of  expenditure  in relation to  union  variables amongst regions
tends to be more concentrated in Canada and Australia than in the other
countries, with the United States being the country where it is most diffused. In
Canada, for instance, Ontario and Quebec account for one third of total
consolidated government spending, or some 15% of GDP. By contrast, in the
United States only the top 35 states account for a similar proportion of
government spending, or some 13% of GDP.
When expenditure is measured in relation to  regional  output (see Tables 8 to 12),
all countries show a significant dispersion, with a range of at least some 
percentage points. Some countries have regions which are clear outliers.
With the exception of Australia, the aggregate  net borrowing  requirement of the
regions tends to be smaller than that of the federal government. In the United
States and Switzerland sub-federal levels are in fact in surplus.
The degree of dispersion in borrowing needs in relation to  union  output is highest
in Canada (see Tables 3 to 7). For the year considered (1982), the net borrowing
requirement of Ontario was around 0.3% of Canadian GDP, while Alberta
enjoyed a surplus that was equivalent to some 0.5% of national GDP.
The degree of dispersion in net borrowing measured relative to  regional  variables
varies significantly across countries (see Tables 8 to 12). It is relatively limited in
Australia and Germany, the more centralized countries and, to a lesser extent, in
Switzerland. It is especially high in Canada. In the United States there are some
outliers. This general picture is also broadly confirmed by the dispersion in
interest payments or outstanding debt stocks, which serve as a proxy for the
evolution of borrowing over time. Evidence from Canada2 and the United States
indicates that the capital market differentiates between the credit risk of the
varIOUS regIOns.
4.  Medium-term control and coordination problems
In no country, with the exception of Australia, does experience seem to suggest
serious problems with medium-term control over regional spending and deficits.
Tables 13 and 14 indicate no discernible tendency for either the aggregate net
lending or the expenditure of regional authorities to grow over time relative to
their federal counterparts. In the United States and Switzerland, as already
mentioned, there have tended to be surpluses or very small deficits, either because
1 Because of statistical difficulties only the broad orders of magnitude are relevant.
2 Judging from their international borrowing, the credit ratings of the provinces range from medium to the highest
grade.
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of explicit self-imposed constraints (the United States) or because of a historical
belief in the merits of fiscal orthodoxy (Switzerland). In both, the close association
between spending and revenue autonomy has probably also played a part. In
Canada and Germany net borrowing of the regions has, if anything, shown a
more restrained performance than its federal counterpart.! Expenditure exhibits a
broadly similar pattern at the two government levels. By contrast, in Australia
there have be.en protracted periods of relatively fast growth in the expenditure and
net borrowing of the states.
Consistent with this broad picture, the only country where there would appear to
have been much concern about the coordination issue is Australia. The Loan
Council has been the main instrument through which the federal government has
attempted to enforce restraint on state governments so as to counteract a tendency
for their finances to thwart efforts at fiscal consolidation.2 This centralization has
meant that financial markets have not been encouraged to differentiate between
the debts of the various government units, in sharp contrast to the Canadian case.
Some concern would also seem to exist in Germany, where tax powers are highly
centralized and there are a number of institutional, albeit mainly consultative
arrangements for coordination.
5.  Short-term coordination and macro-management
The fact that concerns about medium-term coordination do not appear to have
ranked highly does not imply a lack of episodes or periods of tension. Recently,
for instance, the Canadian federal authorities have expressed concerns about the
rate of growth of spending in Ontario associated with its booming regional
economy, while western provinces, damaged by the oil price fall and agricultural
difficulties, have been unable to cut expenditure in the face of the
recession-induced decline in .revenue. This pattern of events has partly hampered
fiscal consolidation efforts.
Similarly, in all countries, to the extent that macro-management is attempted at
all, it is at the federal rather than at the regional level The size of the federal
budget seems to have been generally sufficient to allow a minimum of interference
with regional budgetary policies.
I In Canada this does not .seem to have been true in the 1960s, however.
2 In the late 1970s and early 1980s control by the Loan Council was somewhat relaxed. At the same time, states
started borrowing in technical forms not covered by the Council's authority. In 1985 the coverage was broadened.
For more details, see R. Mathews op. cit.
3 One such body is the ' Finanzplanungsrat' which coordinates the budgetary policies of the various government
levels. The body is composed of the Federal Minister of Finance (Chairman), the finance ministers of the various
Lander  and representatives of the  Gemeinden.  The Bundesbank regularly participates in the meetings. The
institution s recommendations, however, are not binding. For the period 1985-87 they took the form of a gener-
alized indicative limit of 3% on the growth of spending of all government units, i.e. below the projected growth of
annual income.
4 See  DECD Economic Surveys,  Canada, 1988.
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III - The situation in the Community
Tables 15 and 16 summarize the existing situation in the EEC. There are essen-
tially four structural features that deserve attention in comparison to federal
states:
1. the relatively small size of the Community budget;
2. the generally greater degree of concentration of both expenditures and net
borrowing in a few 'regions
3. the historically greater degree of dispersion of net borrowing in relation to
regional variables;
4. the small role of inter-country budgetary transfers.
1.  The Community budget
The present size of the Community budget is some 1% of EEC GDP. Even after
the creation of a single market, it is apparently not expected to exceed 3%. That is
clearly much smaller than the size of federal budgets in the countries examined
regardless of whether transfers are included or netted out, which range from
around 10 to 30%.
2.  Expenditure and net borrowing concentration
The greater concentration of expenditure and net borrowing in the Community 
in large measure a reflection of the relative size of the EEC countries, with the big
four accounting for some 80% of total EEC GDP and a number of small ones
having negligible weight. Such a configuration makes the EEC markedly different
from the United States and Switzerland and more similar to Canada and
Australia. The greater concentration is also partly dependent on the small size of
the Community budget, which does not substitute for member governments
expenditure in the same way as the central budget does in federations. But with
regard to net borrowing, it is particularly affected by the existence of a large and
persistent deficit in one of the big four countries, namely Italy. That country
deficit alone, at some 2% of EEC GDP, is equal to over 40% of the aggregate EEC
deficit.
3.  Dispersion of net borrowing
Measured relative to regional output, it appears that the dispersion of net
borrowing is greater in the EEC, with Canada being the country that most closely
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resembles the Community. This dispersion has clearly persisted over time, as
indicated by the figures on outstanding stocks of debt and on interest payments. A
broadly similar picture is obtained by' relating net borrowing positions to
revenues.
4.  Budgetary transfers
The relatively small present and prospective role of budgetary transfers in the
Community is ultimately a reflection of the lack of political unity, which imposes
major constraints on the acceptability of redistributional transfers between
member countries. It is partly responsible for some of the differences between the
Community and other federations just discussed, notably the relative size of the
central budget and, possibly, the regional variations in the size of deficits.
IV - How relevant is the experience  of  federal states?
The review of fiscal arrangements in federal states and of their experience with
fiscal coordination has suggested that with the exception of one country few
constraints exist on the budgetary policies of sub-federal governments and
concerns about fiscal coordination have not ranked highly. At the same time, a
number of considerations call for caution in drawing possible lessons for appro-
priate fiscal arrangements in the Community.
Firstly, all the federal states examined possess a large central budget relative to
GDP which can be used to set the short or long-term macro-fiscal stance for the
federation. By contrast, the prospective size and structure of the Community
budget would make it highly unsuitable for that purpose. Therefore, any distortion
in the aggregate fiscal stance of the Community could not be corrected without
impinging on the autonomy to determine national budgetary positions.
Secondly, the EEC app.ears to have presented historically a significantly greater
degree of dispersion in budgetary positions than most federal states, with Canada
being the only possible parallel. It is furthermore unique in having a sizeable and
persistent imbalance concentrated in one large region (Italy). The experience of
the federal states may, therefore, not be particularly illuminating with regard to
the tensions that a situation of this kind might generate in an EMU.
Thirdly, none of the federal states examined provides guidance for the problems
that could be faced during the transition period towards an EMU or as a result of
its establishment.
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TABLE 1
The expenditure of federal and regional governments, 11987
Federal expenditure Federal Sub-federal
Country GrOSS Net4 transfers expenditure
% of total consolidated expenditure
United States 70. 64. 7.4 36.
FR of Germany 63. 60. 39.4
Canada 51.0 41.6 9.4 58.
Australia 69. 48. 21.0 51.9
Switzerland 29. 70.45
1 For the United States, state and local governments; for the Federal Republic of Germany,  Lander  and  Gemeinden;
for Canada, provincial or territorial and local governments including hospital sector (i.e. the PLH sector). For
Australia, state and local governments. Budget definitions which include public trading enterprises. For Swit-
zerland,  Cantons  and  Gemeinden.
2 Consolidated.
3 Including transfers to regional authorities.
4 Excluding transfers to regional authorities.
5 Not consolidated as data on transfers between  Cantons  and  Gemeinden  were not available.
Sources:  Council of Economic Advisers Economic Report of the President,  1988; Bundesministerium der Finanzen
Finanzberichte;  National sources for Canada; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Government financial
estimates and budget papers; and Eidgenossische Finanzverwaltung,  Offentfiche Finanzen der Schweiz.
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TABLE 
The structure of regional governments' revenue
United Germany Canada Australia Switzerland
Item States
Taxes
Exclusive taxes  18. 10.
Competing taxes 30. 29.2 31.8 43.5
Sub-federal
surcharges 24.
Shared taxes 70. 33.
Total 49. 70.3 53. 65. 59.3
Other sources
Federal grants 22.3 13. 20.4 30.4 14.
Non-fiscal income 28. 16. 26.4 25.
Total revenue 100. 100. 100. 100. 100.
Memorandum item:
Autonomous
. sources 77. 16. 79. 35. 79.4
1 The sub-federal government has the sole right to tax the source of income or transactions concerned and is free to
choose both the tax base and the rate.
2 The sub-federal government is free to choose both th(~ base and the rate, but has no exclusive right to tax the source
of income or transaction concerned.
3 The sub-federal government is free to choose the rate but not the base.
4 The tax base and rates are uniform throughout the federation and the tax proceeds are distributed according to
certain rules among the various sub-federal government levels.
Exclusive taxes, competing taxes, sub-federal surcharges and non-fiscal income. The distribution between
autonomous sources of revenue and the rest is obviously a matter of degree. The categories chosen serve only as a
crude approximation.
Source:  , 'The distribution of economic powers in the public finances of federal economic and monetary unions
internal working paper.
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TABLE 
Fiscal indicators of regional governments 1 in the United States, 1985
Expenditure Net lending Expenditure2
Regional
GDP
Region % of national
GDP/GNP of total of union GDP
California 1.73 0.13 12.
New York 1.50 8.5
Texas 2.2
Illinois 1.7
Pennsylvania 1.6
Next 4 states:
Average 1.5
Range 0.47 - 04- 1.3-1.5
Next 14 states:
Average
Range 20-0.36 00- 1.3-
Next 13 states:
Average 0.4 1.0
Range 10- - 0. 0.4 1.6
Next 15 states:
Average 0.4
Range 03- - 0. 0.3 0.2-
Tota14 12. 1.6 36. 100.
Federal Government4 22. 63.
I State and local governments, consolidated, fiscal year.
2 Direct general expenditure.
3 General revenue minus direct general expenditure.
4 National accounts basis.
5 Expenditure net of transfers.
Sources:  US Department of Commerce Statistical abstract of the USA,  1988; and  Survey of current business,  May
1988; Council of Economic Advisers,  Economic Report of the President,  1988; and own estimates.
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TABLE 
Fiscal indicators of regional governments! in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1987
Expenditure Net lending Expenditure Regional
Region GDP
% of national
GNP of total of union GDP
Nordrhein-Westfalen - 0.3 26.
Bayern - 0. 18.
Baden- Wiirttemberg - 0. 16.
Niedersachsen - 0.
Hessen 1.7 - 0. 10.
Berlin 1.1 - 0.
Rheinlan d - Pfalz 1.0 - 0. 5.4
Schleswig-Holstein - 0.1 1.5 3.5
Hamburg - 0. 1.3
Saarland 0.3 - 0. 1.5
Bremen 0.3 - 0. 1.4
Total 17. - 1.1 37. 100.
Federal Government 30. - 1.4 62.
Liinder  and  Gemeinden,  consolidated.
2 Expenditure net of transfers, calculated as general government expenditure, including social security, minus expen-
diture of regional governments.
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden Finanz und Steuern Fachserie 14, Reihe 2.
112COORDINATION OF FISCAL POLICIES
TABLE 
Fiscal indicators of regional governmentsl in Canada, 1982
Expenditure Net lending Expenditure
Regional
GDP
Regions % of national
GDP of total of union GDP3
Ontario ~ 0.3 18. 38.
Quebec ~ 0. 16. 22.3
Alberta 3.4 13.
British Columbia - 0. 11.4
Saskatchewan 1.0 2.4
Manitoba 1.0 2.3
Nova Scotia - 0. 2.4
New Brunswick 0.5 - 0. 1.2 1.8
Newfoundland - 0. 1.1 1.4
Prince Edward Island 0.3 0.3
Northwest Territories
Yukon
0.4
Total4 25..4 59. 100.
Federal Government4 17. - 1.6 41.05
1 Provinces or Territr,ries and local authorities, consolidated, .fiscal year.
2 Estimates based on consolidation of expenditures and revenues of provincial and local authorities measured on an
administrative basis. Calendar year for the provinces and fiscal year for the local authorities.
3 1984 percentage shares.
4 These figures are not comparable with those in Table 13 because they are estimates based on an administrative,
rather than national accounts, basis. This problem distorts especially the revenue side, reducing the net borrowing
requirements. The main item responsible is the inclusion of net revenue from pension schemes.
5 Expenditure net of transfers.
Sources:  Statistics Canada Canada Yearbook  1988 and own estimates.
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TABLE 
Fiscal indicators of regional governments! in Australia, 1986-
Expenditure Net lending Expenditure Regional
Region GDP
% of national
GNP of total of UnIon GDP
New South Wales 7.3 17.3 34.
Victoria 13.3 27.
Queensland - 0. 14.
Western Australia 5.3 9.3
South Australia 1.9 - 0.
Tasmania - 0. 1.5 2.4
Northern Territory 0.5 1.2 1.1
Total 21.6 - 2. 51.6 100.
Federal Government 20.3 - 1.0 48.4
1 States and local governments
, .
consolidated. Budget definitions which include public trading enterprises.
2 Estimates.
3 The total adds to 100.0 only if the Australian Capital Territory is included, but the latter has no autonomous
budget.
Sources:  Department of the Treasury,  Economic Round-up,  November 1988 and own estimates.
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TABLE 
Fiscal indicators of regional governments! in Switzerland, 1986
Expenditure Net lending Expenditure
Regional
income
RegiOn % of national
GNP of total of umon income
Zurich 13. 21.4
Bern 10. 12.
Valid 1.9 8.3
Geneve 1.8 - 0. 7.3
St Gallen 1.2 5.3
Aargau 1.1
Next Cantons:
Average
Range 02- 1.5- 4.4
Next 10 Cantons:
Average
Range 0.3 02-
Total 21.5 0.3 70.3 100.
Federal Government 29.
Cantons  and  Gemeinden,  not consolidated as data on transfers were not available.
Source:  Eidgenossische Finanzverwaltung,  OjJentliche Finanzen der Schweiz.
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TABLE 
Regional dispersion. of fiscal indicatorsl in the United States, 1985
Federal
Expenditure Net lending Debt transfers Net lending
Region received
% of regional
GDP of revenue
California 13. 1.0 10.
New York 17. 1.5 18. 3.4
Texas 10. 13. 1.6
Illinois 12. 1.2 11.0 2.5
Pennsylvania 13. 1.8 14. 11.8
Next 4 states:
Average 14. 1.1 13. 7.4
Range 13. 15. 1.3 15.
Next 14 states:
Average 13. 1.0 14.3
Range 11.2-16. 1.8 24. 2.1- 12.
Next 13 states:
Average 15.3 1.56 19.
Range 11. 23. - 0. 46. 1.9- - 1.5-25.4
Next 15 states:
Average 15. 1.36 16. 3.4
Range 19. - 1.1- 24.3 1.7- - 6. 22.
TotaF 12. 1.6 14.4 10.
1 State and local governments, consolidated, fiscal year.
2 Direct general expenditure.
3 General revenue minus direct general expenditure.
4 Including federal transfers.
5 Excluding Alaska, an outlier, the average expenditure, net lending and debt as a percentage of state GDP would be
respectively, 14. , 1.0 and 16.3 %. Average net lending as a percentage ofrevenue would be 6.6 %. The ranges would
be similar to those of the groups with larger states.
6 Absolute value.
7 National accounts basis.
Sources:  US Department of Commerce Statistical abstract of the USA,  1988;  SurYey of current business May 1988;
and Council of Economic Advisers Economic Report of the President,  1988.
116COORDINATION OF FISCAL POLICIES
TABLE 
Regional dispersion of fiscal indicators! in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1987
Interest Federal
Expenditure Net lending payments transfers Net lending
Region received
% of regional
GDP of revenue
N ordrhein-W estfalen 17. - 1.7 1.7
Bayern 16. - 0.4
Baden -Wiirttemberg 16.
Niedersachsen 20.3 - 1.7 1.7 1.6 9.4
Hessen 17. 1.2
Berlin 28.4 - 0. 16. 2.4
Rheinland- Pfalz 18. - 1.7 1.7 1.6
Schleswlg- Holstein 20. - 1.7 1.7
Hamburg 14.3 - 1.4 1.3 - 11.
Saarland 20. 1.7 - 14.
Bremen 20. - 2. 1.8 - 14.3
Total 18. - 1.1 1.3 1.7 6.4
Lander  and  Gemeinden consolidated.
2 Including government transfers.
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden Finanz und Steuern,  Fac!J.serie 14, Reihe 2.
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TABLE 10
Regional dispersion of fiscal indicatorsl in Canada, 1982
Federal
Expenditure Net lending Debt3 transfers Net lending
Region received
% of regional
GDP of revenue4
OntarIO 20. 19. 3.3
Quebec 32. - 0.3 29. 5.4 1.0
Alberta 24. 16.4 13.
British Columbia 24.5 - 0. 16.
Saskatchewan 25. 35. 4.3
Manitoba 26. - 1.0 36.4
Nova Scotia 35. - 4.3 43. 13.
New Brunswick 29.3 - 2.3 42. 10.
Newfoundland 32. 57. 12.
Prince Edward Islands 35. 38. 16. 1.8
Western Territories
Yukon 34.5 2.3 26.
Total 25.4 23. 100.
1 Provinces or Territories and local authorities, consolidated, fiscal year.
2 Defined as in Table 5. Regional GDPs were estimated by using 1984 percentage shares in national GDP.
3 Debt outstanding at the end of March 1984.
4 Including federal transfers.
Sources:  Statistics Canada Canada Yearbook  1988 and own estimates.
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TABLE 
Regional dispersion of fiscal indicators! in Australia, 1986-87
Interest Federal
Expenditure Net lending transfers Net lending
Region
payments received
% of state GDP % of revenue
New South Wales 20. - 2.1 1.9 - 11.
VictorIa 20. - 11.0
Queensland 23. - 2. 1.7
Western Australia 23. - 2. 2.5
South Australia 24. - 1.6 11.3
Tasmama 26. - 2.4 14.
Northern Territory 47.3 35.
Total 21.6 - 2.1 10.
1 State and local governments, consolidated. Budget definitions which include public trading enterprises.
2 Estimates.
3 Including federal transfers.
Sources:  Department of the Treasury,  Economic Round-up,  November 1988 and own estimates.
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TABLE 
Regional dispersion of fiscal indicators! in Switzerland, 1986
Expenditure Net lending Interest
Net lending
Region payments
% of  Canton  revenue % of revenue
Zurich 22. 1.0
Bern 29. - 0.4 1.0 - 1.3
Valid 27. 1.0 1.1
Geneve 29.3 - 0. 1.5 - 2.
St Gallen 26.
Aargau 18. 3.4
Next Cantons:
Average 26.3 1.03 1.3
Range 20.4-32. - 1.0-2.5 2.3 - 3.3-
Next Cantons:
Average 24. 1.13
Range 14. 34. 1.8 0.4-1.1 - 8. 11.5
Total 25.3 0.3 1.1 1.3
Cantons  and  Gemeinden not consolidated as data on transfers were not available.
2 Revenue is overestimated as it is not on a consolidated basis. It includes federal transfers.
3 Absolute value.
Source:  Eidgenossische Finanzverwaltung,  Ojfentliche Finanzen der Schweiz.
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TABLE 
Fiscal indicators of federal and regionaP governments in the United States, the Federal Republic of
Germany and Canada, 1970-
Countryl 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
government level % of GNP/GDP
United States Expenditure
Federal, net2 18. 19.4 19.3 20. 22. 22. 21.2 22. 21.9 21.5
Federal
transfers 2.4 3.4 2.3
Regional 13. 14. 13.3 12. 13. 12. 12. 12. 13.3 12.
Net lending
Federal 1.2 4.3 3.4
Regional 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.0
FRof
Germany Expenditure
Federal, net2 23. 32. 30. 32. 32. 31.8 31.3 30. 30. 30.
Federal
transfers 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6
Regional 17. 21.4 21.0 21.2 21.0 20.3 19. 19. 19. 19.
Net lending
Federal 3.4 1.9 2.4 1.9 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.4
Regional 1.3 1.9 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.1
Canada Expenditure
Federal, net2 13.4 16.3 15. 16.3 18. 19. 19. 19. 18. 18.
Federal
transfers 4.3 4.1
Regional 21.4 23. 23. 24. 26.4 26. 25. 25. 25. 25.4
Net lending
Federal 1.1 3.5 5.4
Regional 1.4 0.3 1.5 1.5 1.0 1.2
1 For the United States, state and local governments; for Germany,  Lander  and  Gemeinden;  for Canada, provincial
or territorial and local governments including hospital sector (i.e. the PLH sector).
2 Excluding transfers to regional governments.
3 Transfers to regional governments.
Sources:  Council of Economic Advisers Economic Report of the President,  1988; Bundesministerium der Finanzen
Finanzberichte;  and Canadian national sources.
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TABLE 
Fiscal indicators of federal and regional go\'ernments in Australia and Switzerland, 1 1970-
Country I
government level
Australia
Federal, net2
Federal
transfers
Regional
Federal
Regional
Switzerland
Federal, gross
RegIOnal
gross
Federal
Regional
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
% of GNP/GDP
Expenditure
18. 19.3 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.1 21.0 20. 18.
16.
9.3
19. 20.4 21.1 22.
9.3
22.
9.3
21.6 21.8 21.6 20.
Net lending
- 0.0 - 4.6 - 0.7 - 0.3 - 2.7 - 4.2 - 3.2 - 2.4 - 1.0 0.
1.1 - 0.1 - 2.0 - 2.7 - 2.9 - 2.2 - 1.8 - 2.0 - 2.1 - 1.3
Expenditure
8.3 9.4
17.4 22. 21.7 21.4 21.8 22. 21.5 21.2 21.5 21.4
Net lending
2 - 0.9 - 0.6 - 0. 1 - 0.2 - 0.4 - 0.2 - 0.3
- 0.8 - 0. 0.2 - 0.1 - 0.5 - 0.4 - 0. 0.1 0.3
0.4
0.3
I For Australia, state and local governments. Budget definitions which include public trading enterprises. For
Switzerland Cantons  and  Gemeinden.  For Australia, fiscal years starting in the year indicated.
2 Excluding transfers to regional governments.
3 Transfers to regional governments.
4 Including transfers to regional governments as data isolating them were not available.
S Non-consolidated between 
Cantons  and  Gemeinden.
Sources:  Eidgenossische Finanzverwaltung,  Offentliche Finanzen der Schweiz;  and ABS, Government financial
estimates and budget papers.
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TABLE 
Fiscal indicators of national governments in the EEC, 19881
Expenditure Net lending Debt Expenditure Debt National
GDP
Country % of total % of total % of EEC
% of EEC GDP EEC EEC debt GDP
expenditure
FR of Germany 12. 11.9 25. 19.3 26.3
France 10. 20. 13. 19.
Italy - 1.9 17. 18.3 28. 18.
United Kingdom -- 0.32 13.3 13. 15.
Spain - 0.3
The Netherlands - 0.3
Belgium 1.7 3.5 3.3
Denmark 1.4 1.3 2.4
Greece - 0. 1.0 1.2 1.1
Portugal 0.3 - 0. 1.1
Ireland - 0. 1.5
Luxembourg.
Community 1.2
Total EEC 49. -- 4. 61. 100. 100. 100.
, Based on estimates and forecasts made by the Economic Secretariat of the European Communities.
2 More recent figures for the United Kingdom (OECD Economic Outlook, December 1988) indicate a surplus of
0.3% of own GDP and would therefore change the above estimates. They are not markedly different from the above
projections for the other three large countries.
Source:  EC,  European Economy,  No 34.
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TABLE 
National dispersion of fiscal indicators in the EEC, 19881
Expenditure Net lending Interest Debt Net lending
Country
payments
% of national GDP % of revenue
FR of Germany 47.1 45. 4.4
Fran(;e 51.3 2.3 40.3
Italy 50.3 - 10.4 97. - 26.
United Kingdom 41.7 54.1
Spain 42. 51.6 13.
The Netherlands 58. 85. - 11.5
Belgium 52.4 11.0 128.4 13.
Denmark 57.3 1.7 53.3
Greece 47.3 67. - 26.
Portugal 41.7 78. - 23.
Ireland 52.1 10. 138. - 17.
Luxembourg 51.2 1.1 14.
Total EEC 47. 4.4 61.6 10.
1 Based on estimates and forecasts made by the Economic Secretariat of the European Communities.
2 More recent figures for the United Kingdom (OECD Economic Outlook, December 1988) indicate a surplus of
0.3% of GDP. They are not markedly different from the above projections for the other three large countries.
Source:  European Economy,  No 34.
124COORDINATION OF FISCAL POLICIES
Appendix II
Market forces and budgetary discipline
This brief appendix considers in more detail whether there exist market mech-
anisms which can encourage prudent fiscal behaviour on the part of governments.
For a private firm, the ultimate market threat which penalizes imprudent
borrowing is the danger of bankruptcy and liquidation. Market forces signal this
risk by incorporating a default premium into the cost of funds and/or by
rationing them. In addition, lenders may curtail the decision-making autonomy of
the enterprise when a position of financial stress is approached. As in 
competitive environment there exist strict limits to the extent to which revenue can
be obtained by simply raising prices, the borrowing and expenditure decisions of
firms tend to be relatively responsive to market pressures.
Whether similar market pressures can be brought to bear on governments is less
clear. One may distinguish here between the situation of a single State and of one
which is an EMU member. In a single State, a government may be less responsive
in the short run to an increase in the cost of its borrowing resulting from market
anticipations of future debt problems because it might feel that higher debt service
payments can be met by raising taxes and/or, perhaps, by monetizing the deficit.
It is only in the longer run that the costs of such actions become apparent, either
in the form of resistance to the implied tax burden or higher inflation.! At that
point, political pressure may be exerted to cut expenditure. As the experience of a
number of countries illustrates, however, the lag with which such pressures tend to
emerge is considerable.
When a State is a member of an EMU, at least two contrasting forces would seem
to be at work. On the one hand, the exclusion from access to central bank credit
may make governments more sensitive to signals coming from the market in the
form of higher costs of funds. On the other hand, the closer economic and soli-
darity ties implied by membership of the union may generate market expectations
that the country concerned would ultimately be bailed out by other EMU
members. That would mean fewer pressures on fiscal consolidation and less
differentiation in the cost of funds. The country would effectively benefit from the
credit rating of others. The case of New York City may be taken as an example. It
is clear that in that instance market mechanisms were not effective in preventing
the financial crisis and that central government assistance was indeed forth-
comIng.
I They can also show up, probably earlier, as resistance to any perceived crowding-out effects associated with the
fiscal policy stance.
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I - Introduction
The member countries of the European Community have made considerable
progress in recent years in their efforts to achieve greater convergence in their
economic policies and economic development. Stability of the value of money as
the prime objective at the national level and exchange rate stability as the
common goal within the European Monetary System (EMS) have been achieved
to a higher degree than ever before. The generally favourable economic and
monetary situation provides sound prerequisites for achieving the objective of
creating a single European market by 1992. This would fulfil essential precon-
ditions for an  economic union.
With the planned creation of an integrated financial market with free movement
of capital, a basic component of a future  monetary union  would also exist. An
additional basic element, namely firmly fixed exchange rates, is admittedly not in
prospect within the foreseeable future because setbacks in coordinating economic
policy can no more be excluded than can disturbances in the financial markets
and the real economy, which can make exchange rate adjustments necessary.
Corrections in exchange rates will remain a necessary safety valve for the fore-
seeable future also within the EMS in order to reduce any tensions that may arise
without incurring excessive damage to individual economies or the Community as
a whole. Even the unification of the markets to form a single European market
does not necessarily presuppose the existence of a monetary union or a common
currency.
The time may nevertheless have come to develop some concrete ideas about the
process of integration which can lead to a monetary union.
A number of recent proposals seek to anticipate the emergence of new conflicts
between the common objective of exchange rate stability and national notions of
price stability through a quantum leap, by coupling the commitment to achieve a
single European market and an integrated financial space with freedom of capital
movements by 1992 with the creation of a European central bank. From the
German point of view it is essential to ensure, in the discussions about the future
design of a European monetary order, that monetary and credit policy is not
geared to stability to a lesser extent in an economically united Europe than is the
case at present in the Federal Republic of Germany. Apart from this, it should be
made clear that monetary integration cannot move ahead of general economic
integration, since otherwise the whole process of integration would be burdened
with considerable economic and social tensions. Moreover, examples from history
demonstrate that new nations did not confer a uniform monetary order on them-
selves until after the process of unification was concluded. Any durable attempt to
fix exchange rates within the Community and finally to replace national
currencies by a European currency would be doomed to failure so long as a
minimum of policy-shaping and decision-making in the field of economic and
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fiscal policy does not take place at Community level. Without this prerequisite
being met, a common European monetary policy cannot ensure monetary stability
on its own. Above all, it cannot paper over the problems in the Community
arising from differing economic and fiscal policies.
The following considerations begin with the basic elements of an economic and
monetary union (EMU). The thread cannot simply be picked up at the ideas
contained in the Werner Report as long ago as 1970, namely to move towards this
goal via a multi-stage plan. With the 'snake' and the EMS , experience has been
gained and with the progress in economic and monetary policy cooperation facts
have been created which suggest the need for a new start. In this context, it must
be ensured from the outset that agreement exists between the governments and the
Community institutions for which they are responsible with respect to the basic
issues of economic policy. Above all, agreement must exist that stability of the
value of money is the indispensable prerequisite for the achievement of other
goals. Particular importance will therefore attach to the principles on which a
European monetary order should be based.
Drawing partially on preliminary work conducted within the Community on the
second stage of the EMS, three models of monetary integration are then presented
and examined with respect to their compatibility with the demands of a future
monetary union. The models that have been selected take ideas into account that
playa role in political discussions or could playa role in them at any time. Since
it can be assumed that the goal of monetary union cannot be reached in a
quantum jump but only as the result of a process of integration encompassing
economic and monetary policy, individual conceivable stages of integration with
their political implications are taken into consideration. The problems arising
from the differing speed of integration on the part of individual countries as well
as from the institutional and legal aspects of integration are also discussed.
II - The final objective of monetary integration
Economic and monetary integration
1. The characteristics of a monetary union
The final objective of monetary union was defined as long ago as 1970 in the
Werner Report in a formulation that still applies today:  A monetary union  implies
inside its boundaries the total and irreversible convertibility of currencies, the
elimination of margins of fluctuation in exchange rates, the irrevocable fixing of
parity rates and the complete liberation of movements of capital.'  The decisive
criteria for a monetary union are thus the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates and
movements of capital within the single monetary area that are free from restrictions.
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The monetary union is the 'monetary superstructure ' of the economic union  in which
the 'four freedoms' have been realized, namely the free movements of goods
services, labour, and capital. Within the common single market, economic activity
is to be based on a free market system of competition. Besides agreement on regu-
lative policy, an economic union demands a far-reaching harmonization of
government regulations in order to bring about equal competitive conditions and
uniform markets. Although structural and regional differences between the
member countries (especially differences in income and productivity) are
compatible with an economic union, the structural and regional policy of the
Community must take them into account.
In principle, national currencies can be retained in the monetary union.  However
the introduction of a uniform monetary symbol would give the union a 'monetary
identity , eliminate the residual risk of parity changes among the national
currencies and hence assure the continuing existence of a single monetary area.
The replacement of national currencies by a common currency would indeed be
the 'crowning act' of the process of monetary integration.
Above and beyond the integration effects of a single European market, a
monetary union provides a number of additional economic  advantages.  Firstly,
the irrevocable fixing of parities means that the exchange rate risk associated with
the intra-Community exchange of goods, services and capital is eliminated. This
will foster, in particular, the integration of the financial markets and the streng-
thening of competition. Secondly, there will be a saving in transaction costs since
market participants will be increasingly willing to accept partner currencies or the
common currency without taking recourse to hedging operations and to hold them
as a means of payment or investment in the place of national currencies. Thirdly,
the creation of a monetary area with a greater weight internationally entails
advantages in transactions with third countries since the international acceptance
of the Community currencies will grow, the Community will become less
susceptible to external shocks and it will be able to represent its monetary policy
interests more effectively at the international level. The introduction of a common
currency would allow full advantage to be drawn from these benefits.
2. Implications for economic policy
Within the monetary union, economic policy must be directed towards eliminating
causes of tension that could jeopardize its cohesion and towards preventing new
tensions from arising. The irrevocable fixing of parity rates is possible only on the
basis of exchange rates at which differences in rates of price increase, balance of
payments positions and in the field of public finances have been eliminated to a
large extent. With fixed exchange rates, insufficient convergence in these three
fields would give rise to adjustment constraints in the real economy that would
endanger the cohesion of the monetary union or would ultimately bring about
adjustments in parities forcefully. The harmonization of rates of inflation at the
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lowest possible level is necessary since any shifts that may arise in terms of price
competitiveness can no longer be offset by realignments. Countries with an above-
average rate of inflation would suffer competitive losses; conversely, tendencies
towards excess demand would be triggered in countries with cost advantages.
When parity relationships are irrevocably fixed, the external positions of the
partner countries must be compatible with each other since competitive weak-
nesses of one partner would burden the aggregate balance of payments position of
the monetary union  vis-a-vis  the rest of the world. Even if the current account
position of the monetary union were in balance as a whole it would not be
possible for a single country within the Community to rely on capital inflows and
the corresponding growth of indebtedness indefinitely. Finally, there would have
to be a large degree of convergence in the field of public finance. Considerable, or
even unlimited, recourse by a Member State (or the central authority) to central
bank credit would make monetary control throughout the monetary area difficult
if not impossible, and -- no matter how they are financed  excessive national
budget deficits would burden the overall current account position of the monetary
UnIon.
Securing convergence within the monetary union -- with the retention of national
currencies initially -- will imply losses in independence in terms of national
economic policy, i.e. a shift of responsibilities from the national to the
Community level. This applies both to fiscal, economic, social and wages policy
as well as  to a particularly marked extent  to  monetary policy..  ideally, within
the monetary union national currencies are 'perfect substitutes i.e. market
participants are indifferent as regards the various existing currencies. The irre-
vocable fixing of parity rates under conditions of complete freedom of capital
movements implies that national interest rate levels must converge (apart from
minor differences arising from market imperfections). It will thus no longer be
possible to conduct an independent national monetary policy that is geared to a
national standard.
The basic stance of monetary policy must be laid down by a coordinating body at
Community level. National central banks will then only be executive organs for
the Community's monetary policy. To the extent that they are able to achieve the
operational objectives laid down by the Community, the harmonization of their
instruments will not be necessary initially. This will in any case be possible only
within limits in the preliminary stages since there are wide differences in existing
structures of national money, credit and capital markets that will not disappear
immediately even after the complete liberalization of capital movements.
However, owing to differing national transmission mechanisms of monetary
policy as well as structural differences in the demand for money, it will be
possible to achieve a uniform policy for monetary growth that is geared to a
monetary target for the Community only gradually. Thus, as far as its practical
application is concerned, national differences will persist. The creation of a
uniform European money market which the central authority responsible for
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monetary policy can manage with instruments of its own will, however, be
necessary at the latest when a common currency is introduced.
Monetary policy coordination needs to be complemented by the  transfer of
responsibility for monetary relationships with the rest of the world to the Community
level  since the exchange rates of the partner currencies must develop uniformly.
Exchange rate policy  vis-a-vis  third countries must therefore be laid down at the
Community level, interventions on the foreign exchange market be decided jointly
(with intervention operations perhaps being centralized at a national central bank
or a common fund for reasons of expediency) and monetary reserves be pooled.
In the field of international monetary policy the Community would act asa single
entity. Instead of individual countries, it would then also need to be a member of
the IMP.
Whereas the national States would necessarily lose their monetary policy inde-
pendence in a monetary union, they can quite easily retain certain reponsibilities
in the field of  fiscal and economic policy,  as is the case in every federation of
States. However, in order to exclude any doubts about the cohesion of the
monetary union from the outset and at the same time avoid an overburdening of
monetary policy, it must be ensured that there is sufficient conformity of action in
fiscal and 
economic policy  within the Community. This is because any lack of
convergence that could give rise to expectations of parity changes would need to
be 'bridged' through interventions and interest rate measures on the national
money markets in order to ensure the continuing existence of the monetary or
exchange rate union. Over time it will thus be necessary to allow for the necessary
transfer of economic and fiscal policy responsibilities from national authorities to
Community organs.
In order to optimize economic policy as a whole the overall economic objectives
for the monetary area should be laid down at Community level. Broad agreement
would also need to be reached on the policy mix, i.e. the combination of fiscal
and monetary policy appropriate for achieving the overall economic objectives.
This would also provide a basic guideline for each country fiscal policy.
Moreover, together with the creation of the single European market, a
far-reaching  but not necessarily complete  harmonization of indirect taxes
would be necessary in order to avoid competitive distortions. Although, given the
existing low degree of mobility of income-earners, direct taxes do not need to be
harmonized to the same extent, with unchanged shares of expenditure by the
public sector in GNP, the harmonization of indirect taxes will also create a need
to adjust direct taxes as well as the overall burden of levies.
In the light of existing structural imbalances within the Community, when parity
rates are irrevocably fixed it will be necessary to put in place a system of ' fiscal
compensation' through a Community organ in favour of the structurally weak
member countries. Transfer payments would compensate the weaker members for
the burdens of adjustment associated with the definitive renouncement of devalu-
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ations as a means of maintaining their competitiveness. Thus, within the monetary
union, balance-of-payments policy is replaced by regional policy, with the latter
helping to finance interregional differences in current account imbalances through
transfer payments. The differences in the level of economic development of indi-
vidual member countries of the Community suggest that  extremely large funds
would be needed to finance the necessary fiscal compensation. Only through a
very effective regional policy could these differences perhaps be reduced to an
extent that would be compatible with the existence of a monetary union.
Incomes policy  must also take the fixing of parity rates within the monetary union
into account. Divergences in regional developments (such as differing rates 
increase in productivity or shifts in demand, for instance) require a corre-
spondingly differentiated development of wages in so far as they are not offset by
fiscal adjustment within the Community. Although regional imbalances can be
offset through the mobility of the factors of production, this kind of adjustment
would be associated with a shifting of capital and finally also of labour out of the
less competitive regions that would be undesirable in terms of regional policy (and
which, owing to the far lesser degree of mobility of labour would not occur
without friction). Thus, given diverging developments in competitiveness
renouncing exchange rate adjustments will require a  differentiated wages policy,
which would also need to cover ancillary wage costs. In branches of industry that
manufacture their products under widely similar conditions a harmonization of
nominal wage developments is to be expected within the monetary union in the
absence of which diverging rates of inflation could arise. For this reason, even
before the inception of the monetary union the basic willingness of both sides of
industry to pursue a wages and incomes policy geared to the operating conditions
of such a union must exist, especially bearing in mind that an increasing orien-
tation of wage demands towards the highest level in the Community is to 
expected within the monetary union. However, given the independent right to
conclude collective wage agreements that is appropriate in an economic union
based on the rules of free competition, the scope for economic policy to directly
affect the development of wages and salaries is very restricted.  Everything will
therefore ultimately depend on a credible and rigorously pursued monetary policy
that limits the scope for passing on cost increases and hence prevents excessive
increases in nominal wages from occurring.
The economic policy implications of a monetary union can be summed up as
follows:  A monetary union presupposes considerable shifts in the responsibility for
economic policy to a central authority and hence a far-reaching reshaping of the
Community in political and institutional terms in the direction of a broader union.
Although  complete political union is not absolutely necessary for  the establishment
of  a monetary union the  loss of national sovereignty in economic and monetary
policy  associated with it is  so serious that  it would probably be  bearable only in the
context of extremely close and irrevocable political integration. At all events, within a
monetary union, monetary policy can only be conducted at a Community level. A
substantial transfer of authority will also be necessary in the field of fiscal policy.
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8 ~  Principles of a European monetary order
Eschewing technical institutional and monetary details, the following section
outlines the decisive principles that absolutely must be taken into account when
setting up a European central bank system. (For the sake of simplification, the
point of departure is the final stage of monetary integration, namely the transition
to a common European currency. However, the following criteria must also be
fulfilled already at the stage when the monetary union is created, I.e. the irre-
vocable fixing of the parity rates of national currencies.) The following principles
appear to be indispensable:
1. The mandate of the central bank must be to maintain  stability of the value of
money  as the prime objective of European monetary policy. While fulfilling this
task, the central bank has to support general economic policy as laid down at
Community level. Domestic stability of the value of money must take precedence
over exchange rate stability. This does not exclude the possibility that depreciation
vis-a-vis  third currencies and the associated import of inflation be counteracted by
appropriate monetary policy measures. In the event of the establishment of an
international monetary system with limited exchange rate flexibility  vis-a-vis  third
currencies, the central bank would need to be given at least the right to participate
in discussions on parity changes.
2. The overriding commitment to maintaining the stability of the value of money
must be safeguarded through the central bank' independence  of instructions from
national governments and Community authorities. This simultaneously requires
the personal independence of the members of the respective organs, assured by
their being appointed to office for a period of at least eight to 10 years without the
possibility of their being removed from office for political reasons.
3. All the member countries would need to be represented in the monetary policy
decision-making body,  with voting power being weighted in the light of the
economic importance of the member countries.
4. A  federal structure  of the central bank system  according to the pattern of the
Federal Reserve System, for instance  would correspond best to the existing
state of national sovereignty and would additionally strengthen the independence
of the central bank. (Before the final stage involving the introduction of a uniform
currency, only a federally structured central bank system is conceivable in any
case. )
5. The  financing of public sector deficits  by the central bank (apart from occasional
cash advances) makes effective monetary control impossible over the long term.
For a European central bank to be able to fulfil its mandate to ensure monetary
stability, strict limitations must be imposed on its granting credit to public
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authorities of all kinds (including Community authorities). This also applies to
indirect governm.ent financing through the granting of credit to any central banks
of the member countries that continue to exist.
6. The European central bank must be equipped with the  monetary policy
instruments  to enable it to manage the money supply effectively without recourse
to quantitative controls (or other forms of direct intervention in the workings of
the financial markets). Interest rate and liquidity policy instruments must be
available both for the general management and for the fine-tuning of the
European money market.
7. The European central bank should be given the right to take part in the estab-
lishment of general regulations in the field of  banking supervision.  Moreover
owing to its expertise, deriving in particular from its business relations with credit
institutions, the central bank should be closely involved in day-to-day banking
supervisory activities.
III  Models of monetary integration
European Monetary Fund
The further development of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF)
to form a European Monetary Fund (EMF) as a kind of 'Regional IMP' probably
comes closest to the concept the architects of the EMS had in mind, seeing that in
accordance with the Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978 the
final system was to be characterized by ' the creation of the European Monetary
Fund as well as the full utilization of the ECU as a reserve asset and a means of
settlement.' In addition , the 'existing credit mechanisms' would be consolidated
into a single fund'. I Moreover
, in conjunction with the conclusions relating to
monetary policy reached at the meeting of the European Council in Bremen on 6
and 7 July 1978, besides US dollars and gold
, '
member currencies in an amount of
a comparable order of magnitude' were to be brought into the Fund. In the
discussions in the years 1981-82 about the entry of the EMS into the final stage it
was assumed that this could also involve a final transfer of reserves.
A regional Reserve Fund with functions similar to those of the IMF would put
this institution in a position to become involved in the process of balance-
of-payments adjustment and financing on the part of its members. In this way, it
could help to avoid recourse being taken to measures that disturb or delay the
process of integration in the event of balance of payments difficulties. In the
opinion of the proponents of such a Fund solution, the use of such balance-
of-payments assistance as well as the resources made available by the Fund for the
specific purpose of financing interventions could at the same time also help to
stabilize exchange rate relationships within the EMS. If, in the course of monetary
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integration, it should come about that national external payments balances cease
to exist and there is only a Community external payments balance instead, then
the Fund would have to support the process of adjustment and financing of the
balance of payments with its resources.
In the case of a Fund along the lines of a 'Regional IMP' whose policy would be
primarily directed towards safeguarding the external balance of the Community
member countries as well as exchange rate stability, the question arises as to the
extent to which such a policy would also foster convergence within the
Community on the basis of price stability. This possibility only exists in the case
of conditional balance-of-payments credits being granted, i.e. when the conse-
quences of insufficient convergence have already become evident. At stages prior
to this, especially when providing resources for intervention purposes without any
conditions attached, it could not impose any convergence constraints in the
direction of non-inflationary growth in the Community. The danger that within
the EMS the orientation towards domestic stability would be pushed into the
background in favour of external stability is obvious. Since the general thrust and
coordination of economic, fiscal and monetary policy would playa role in this
model of a Fund only at the margin (when conditional credits are granted) the
stability-oriented monetary policy of the hard currency countries could be
undermined. Moreover, mixing central bank functions together with areas of
government responsibility within a single Fund bars the way to a European
central bank with a decision-making body that is independent of governments
and is thus to be rejected.
A European parallel currency
1. As an alternative to the gradual development towards a European monetary
union - on the basis of greater economic policy convergence, closer coordination
of monetary policy and diminishing recourse to exchange rate realignments  the
concept of a parallel currency has been under discussion since the mid-1970s.
According to this concept, the driving force behind the process of integration should
be the market, not initiatives taken by national governments or Community
authorities.
Alongside national currencies, an additional Community currency would be put
into circulation which can fulfil all the functions of money (a means of payment
a unit of account, and a store of value) as far as possible. The parallel currency
would be designed in such a way that  without being given preferential
treatment  it would be able not only to maintain its position alongside the
national currencies but also to gradually crowd out the individual national
currencies in line with the generally accepted pace of integration. With the
growing importance of the parallel currency, the national central banks would
increasingly lose their scope for autonomous monetary policy action in favour of
a Community central banking institution since a growing proportion of the money
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in circulation in each country would no longer be under national controL Thus,
there would be a  de facto  loss of independence in the sphere of national monetary
policy without the need for any explicit shift in responsibilities to the Community
level. This process would end with the abolition of the national currencies through
a special sovereign act and the introduction of a single European currency.
Compared with the well-known difficulties of progressively restricting national
responsibility for economic policy through political acts, the idea of a parallel
currency may appear to be quite ' elegant' at first sight. It would meet with the
desire to undertake politically effective and symbolic steps (such as introducing a
European currency, including the issuing of banknotes and coins, and setting up a
European central bank) without a major need to relinquish sovereignty rights at
the outset. However, on closer inspection it becomes evident that  this approach
also requires an immediate and far-reaching need for changes in institutional terms
if the 'currency competition' that is set in motion is to proceed in a way that is
acceptable for all the member countries. In this context, a large number of open
and very complex questions arise. Agreement can be expressed with a recent study
on the European Monetary System, which states that 'the full logical implications
of this approach were never drawn up at the officiallevel.'1
2. Currency competition between the national currencies and a parallel currenCY
can arise only if the latter is placed on an equal footing with all national
currencies with respect to their relevant functions. Besides the envisaged complete
liberalization of capital movements, i.e. the free use of each national currency and
a parallel currency in external transactions, there would have to be equality of
status for each national currency within the domestic economy as well. In order to
ensure a sufficient degree of acceptance of the parallel currency as a means of
payment its utilization would have to be permissible for domestic transactions as
well; however, its full recognition as legal tender would not appear to be
necessary. A harmonization of exchange rate regulations would be required
beforehand in order for an undesirable uneven distribution of the parallel
currency not to come about from the start.
3. The economic effects of the introduction of a parallel currency depend on the
concrete aspects of its design. On the basis of the existing European monetary
unit, the ECU, a large number of parallel currency concepts with in part widely
differing implications can be conceived of depending in each case on the criteria
that are decisive  an independent status for the ECU as opposed to a basket
definition, exchange rate regulations and the role to be played by central banks.
As points of reference, two 'interim solutions' of practical relevance constituting,
on the one hand, the issuing of ECUs at the national level and, on the other hand
their being issued at the Community level are presented below: in the first case
I Gros, Daniel and Thygesen, Niels.  The EMS: Achievements, current issues and directions for the future Brussels
1988.
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the ECU is defined, as at present, as a  basket of currencies  with a fixed, but
adjustable exchange rate (See Type 1); in the second case, the ECU is an  indepen-
dently defined unit  which would be put into circulation as an additional currency
with a fixed, but adjustable exchange rate (Type 2).
By contrast, the 'present state' (a basket ECU with a fixed, but adjustable
exchange rate! without the systematic involvement of central banks in the private
creation of ECUs) as well as the ' final state' of a  de facto  monetary union (basket
ECU or independently defined ECU with an absolutely fixed exchange rate) are
not analysed in detaiJ.2 As far as the 'present state' is concerned, on the basis of
experience the purely private circulation of ECUs (which is only possible on the
basis of a basket ECU) is of limited significance and such a restricted role of the
ECU will not contribute towards monetary integration. Section II already dealt
extensively with the final state. In the case of immutably fixed exchange rates
vis-a-vis  the national currencies, the ECU would not be a parallel currency but a
dual currency; monetary union would then not be an objective still to be attained
by means of the parallel currency but would already exist. The difference between
an independently defined ECU and a basket ECU would be meaningless in the
final state so that this case does not need to be discussed any further.
4. As already mentioned above, the parallel currency approach seeks to approach
the final state of monetary union over the longer term through currencies
competing with each other and with the ECU.
3 In order for the parallel currency
to have a chance in this competition among currencies it must be attractive from
the point of view of individual economic agents as an investment currency (I.e. the
net yield from the development of interest rates and exchange rates must be able
to compete with the net yield obtainable on assets invested in a national currency)
and should not be inferior to the national currency as a transaction currency (I.e.
the transaction costs and the exchange rate risk involved in cash management
must be as low as possible). To the extent that a crowding out of the national
currency occurs, this process must operate in the right direction, i.e. 'good money
must not be replaced by 'bad money' (Gresham s Law) if price stability is to be
maintained. How competition between the individual currencies actually develops
and what monetary policy implications can be associated with it depends crucially
on the way the parallel currency is designed in each case.
) Ignoring the special role of the lira, sterling and the drachma.
2 The independently defined ECU with a  flexible  exchange rate (Type 3) propagated in scientific circles is also not
examined because, although it is a model with theoretical advantages, it cannot be considered a realistic alternative.
3 It apears doubtful whether all member countries would be prepared to engage in unrestricted competition among
currencies with all its consequences, including large-scale crowding out of the national currency! It can probably be
realistically assumed that national monetary authoi-itit":s do not want to risk their currencies being crowded out of
circulation in the domestic economy and will therefore keep the extent to which the parallel currency spreads under
control by restricting its use in one way or the other.
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(a) The basket ECU as a parallel currency  (Type 
As things stand today, the use of the basket ECU as a parallel currency while
retaining fixed, but adjustable exchange rates  vis-a-vis  the individual national
currencies appears to be the most obvious approach. The decisive step towards the
introduction of such a parallel currency would consist in making it possible for
ECUs to be created by the national central banks (in accordance with uniform
directives) or by a Community monetary authority. The basket ECU would then
be created not only ~ as is currently the case ~ by the private bundling together
of the individual components but also through the granting of credit or inter-
vention operations by the central banks or a Community monetary authority.
Under the conditions described above, (apart from third currencies) 12 national
EC currencies and the basket ECU as an investment and external transaction
currency together with two domestic transaction and accounting units would in
this case be available to the citizens of the BC. With fixed, but adjustable
exchange rates, the use of the basket ECU would depend on the risk and yield
preferences of investors; although the basket ECU would be suitable as a diversi-
fication instrument, being the weighted average of the national currencies it
cannot be superior to all other individual currencies or mixtures of currencies.
With freedom of capital movements and persistent divergences within the EMS it
is quite possible that for a number of reasons the German mark will be generally
preferred as an investment currency and will crowd out both the ECU and other
national currencies. Although with an increasing degree of convergence between
the EC currencies the German mark will lose some of its relatively greater attrac-
tiveness for non-residents, the diversification motive for ECD-denominated
investments will lose importance at the same time. Investments denominated in
other Community currencies would tend to be less profitable in the eyes of
investors in each country so that in both cases little argues in favour of
investments denominated in ECD.
The ability of the ECU as a transaction currency to crowd out national currencies
within the domestic economy cannot be judged in much more positive terms
either. Especially in the case of foreseeable divergences, the exchange rate risk
involved would impair the use of the ECU for day-to-day transactions, for
example through the constant need to determine exchange rates irritating
conversion rates and greater difficulty in agreeing prices between domestic
contractual partners who would have to take possible exchange rate risks into
account if the contract is denominated in ECD. Even in the event of greater
convergence, habits, the acquired 'memory of prices' in national currency and
similar factors tend to argue against the spread of the ECU. Thus, on balance, the
best that can be expected is that the ECD would be increasingly used in intra-
Community trade as a 'compromise currency , whereby, however, the crucial
factor would probably not least be the negotiating position of the business
partners concerned.
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As a weighted average of national currencies, a basket ECU can therefore not exert
any durable and especially any symmetrical pressure in the direction of crowding out
national currencies and hence cannot be seen as an additional instrument for
bringing about integration either.  precisely with respect to the fact that the attrac~
tiveness of a basket ECU is not assured as far as individual economic agents are
concerned, it can be assumed that the EC central banks would be obliged to
stabilize the exchange rate of such an ECU through unlimited purchases in order
to foster the use of the ECU,1 Should ECUs circulate on a relatively large scale
such an intervention obligation would have important consequences for monetary
policy; in the final analysis, it would be tantamount to undertaking unlimited
purchases of partner currencies without settlement and bringing about the inte-
gration of the circulation of official and private ECUs. If the market wanted to
exchange ECUs for national currency then this would depress the exchange rate
of the ECU against the currency in question. Through purchases to support the
ECU the desired national currency will then be made available. As a result, ECU
holdings would accumulate with the central banks whose currencies are in
stronger demand than the currencies of its partners (or ECU) whereas the central
banks responsible for issuing the currencies that are less in demand would have to
issue ECUs by purchasing their own currency. On the assumption that divergences
exist within the EMS , a  de facto  asymmetrical crowding out of the national
currencies concerned within Europe would come about. The national stability
policy of the hard currency countries would be undermined. National price
objectives would necessarily have to be sacrificed to the average rate of inflation
in Europe. For these reasons, such a concept alone requires management of the
money supply at the European level in order to ensure an equal rate of money
creation (ECU plus national currency). Only in this way would it be possible to
avoid a 'dual coverage' of GDP in Europe through the circulation of ECUs and
national currencies.
Moreover, redesigning the existing ECU to form a parallel currency would make
it difficult to statistically record the national money supply if ECU banknotes
were to be issued.2 Although it would be known how many ECU banknotes had
been issued all in all, it would not be known how many of them are actually held
in the Federal Republic of Germany or any other country. In addition, there
would be exchange rate-induced fluctuations in the national money supply
expressed in terms of national currency. Finally, account would also need to be
taken of the general possibility that already exists today of shifting funds into
offshore centres; this might possibly play an even greater role for holdings of
ECUs than is the case with respect to national currencies. These reservations
apply in equal measure to the independently defined ECU that is discussed below.
1 If, as is assumed, all the basket currencies are part of a system of fixed, but adjustable exchange rates, then inter-
vention points for the basket ECU  vis-a-vis  each individual national currency can be derived from their bilateral
intervention points. 
2 In case an ECU parallel currency were introduced, ECU banknotes would probably be issued even if the ECD
were not to he declared legal tender.
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(b) An independently defined ECU as a parallel currency  (Type 2)
In the case of an independently defined ECU with a fixed, but adjustable
exchange rate  vis-a-vis  the Community currencies, the development of the value of
the parallel currency would be divorced from the development of the components
forming the basket as it exists today but would depend on the frequency and
extent of future realignments within the EMS. In principle, two possibilities exist
as far as the exchange rate regulations governing an independently defined ECU
are concerned:
On the one hand, the ECU can be made 'superior' to all EMS currencies by
laying down the parities and intervention points of the national currencies
vis-a-vis  the ECU as the focal point of the system. Their bilateral central rates
would then be derived from the ECU parity of each national currency with the
consequence that the bilateral margin of fluctuation between two national
currencies would be twice as large as it is  vis-a-vis  the ECU (for example, a band
of  Ills %  vis-a-vis  the ECU would result in a bilateral band of  2Y4  %). Thus, as
a regional pivotal currency in the Community, the ECU would playa similar role
in formal terms as the US dollar did in the former Bretton Woods System
(without, however, having its own currency area as a base).
On the other hand, the independently defined ECU could be placed on the same
footing as the national currencies; in this case, it would be treated as the currency
of a 13th member country and would correspondingly have the same margin of
fluctuation as the national currencies (whereby it could nevertheless be the focal
point of the parity grid for computational purposes). Although the first variant
would be of greater symbolic importance in the field of European politics and
would foster the acceptance of the ECU as a parallel currency owing to its
narrower margin of fluctuation, in principle both variants raise the same problems
to a large extent.
As far as the ability of the ECU to crowd out other currencies is concerned, its
being defined as an independent entity could potentially have both advantages
and disadvantages because the new ECU could develop a priori more strongly
than the strongest Community currency but could also develop more weakly than
the weakest Community currency. In the absence of additional assumptions, such
as equipping the parallel currency with a 'value guarantee' (whereby, of course
only its use as an investment instrument but not as a borrowing instrument would
be fostered) or assuring its usability worldwide, the ability of an independently
defined ECU to crowd out other currencies as an investment instrument cannot be
assessed conclusively. Ultimately, the decisive factor for the development of its
value would be the extent to which ECUs are created by a Community authority
(or by the national central banks of the Community member countries in
accordance with uniform Community directives) in relation to the monetary
demand for ECUs, which in turn would depend on the degree of acceptance of
the ECU inside and outside the Community.
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As is the case with a national currency, independently defined ECUs would he
put into circulation through credits granted by the issuing authority to banks or
public sector entities as well as through purchases of partner currencies or third
currencies via interventions on the foreign exchange markets. In the final analysis
the governing factor in this process would need to be the monetary demand for
ECUs which results from the use of the ECU as a currency in cash transactions
settlement operations and other payment transactions as well as for investment
purposes in competition with each individual national currency.
It is, of course, difficult to assess according to which criteria such a monetary
demand for ECUs would emerge. This would not least depend on how great the
risk of a change in the value of ECU cash holdings is assessed to be in relation to
holdings in national currency. Holding ECUs for transaction purposes would
probably be a more attractive proposition in countries with a weak currency than
in countries whose currencies tend to appreciate  vis-a-vis  the ECU. Economic
agents in countries with .a strong currency will at best hold ECUs for transaction
purposes to the extent that they have to conclude and also settle contracts
denominated in ECUs in intra~Community trade and payment transactions for
competitive reasons. The wide use of the ECU as a currency by residents as an
investment and reserve currency both inside and outside the Community would
presuppose wide and deep markets as well as the willingness of bodies inside (and
outside) the Community that enjoy confidence to incur debt in the ECU as
currency in a form and on conditions that appear advantageous to investors.
However, a sufficient degree of acceptance on the part of investors - both inside
and outside the Community  is to be expected only if the creation of the ECU
as an independent currency is carefully limited by the central bank(s) responsible
for this task.
The granting of an excessive amount of ECU credits to the national or
Community fiscal authorities (for example, for transfer payments within the
Community) in particular could lead to an oversupply of ECUs and ultimately to
deterioration in the value of the ECU  vis-a-vis  national currencies in the
Community. This would not only impair the competitive position of the ECU in
relation to the national currencies; owing to the obligations of the national central
banks to intervene against the ECU, excess ECUs would also need to be taken out
of the market by the central banks against national currency, which would make it
difficult if not impossible  for the countries concerned to conduct a
monetary policy geared to stability. These risks to monetary policy would need to
be assessed all the more carefully the more strongly the creation of ECUs were to
be subject to political influences and the less flexible the exchange rate of the
ECU were to be.
5. In the final analysis, a parallel currency strategy presupposes that the process
whereby other currencies are crowded. out through the free play of market forces
actually does work. The requisite symmetrical substitution of all Community
currencies by the parallel currency would come about only if the parallel currency
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were given the same domestic status as every other Community currency;
could compete even with the strongest Community currency, taking interest
rate and exchange rate developments into account;
involved minimum costs as a transaction currency, which would practically be
the case only if it were pegged to the national.currenciessufficientlyfirmly.
However, this more or less amounts to a definition of the final stage to which the
parallel .currency is supposed to lead.
The interim solutions comprising
a basket ECU, or
an independently defined ECD with fixed, but adjustable exchange rates
do not provide sufficient assurance that the process of integration would be free
of tensions. On the contrary, they would involve the risk that national monetary
policy would no longer be able to fulfil its mandate to ensure stability owing to
larger-scale central bank interventions. In weighing up the costs and benefits of a
parallel currency strategy it also needs to be taken into account that for
day-to-day payment operations (cash transactions, settlement operations by
machine, cashless payment transactions) a parallel currency would be entirely
impractical. Ultimately, this leads to the  conclusion that little would be gained
politically by introducing a parallel currency but that much would be placed at risk in
terms of stability policy.
A European monetary authority on the way to a single currency
If the concept of a 'regional IMP' that was behind the original plans to create the
EMS appears to be obsolete in the meantime and a European parallel currency is
not an approach towards monetary union that deserves support, then it appears
appropriate to prepare the prerequisites for introducing a single European
currency at a later date by gradually harmonizing the national currencies in quali-
tative terms. Such a development could be brought about by extending the role of
the EC Committee of Governors. In this context, it is not absolutely necessary for
it to become the management body of an EC monetary authority equipped with
operational tools immediately; it could also exercise the function of a central
decision-making body within a Community central bank system comprising the
Committee and the national central banks involved.
The Committee of Governors is particularly suitable for an extension of its
functions because (in contrast, for example, to the Administrative Council of the
EMCF) it is  de jure  free from instructions. However, taking part in this
Committee does not automatically annul the  de facto  dependence on instructions
of individual Governors that exists under national law. It would therefore be
desirable if this dependence could be gradually eliminated as the functions of the
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Committee are further extended and be replaced by increasing independence. As
in the case of all other models, its mandate (maintaining the stability of money)
and its status (freedom from instructions) should be assured at the outset.
Since the process of integration is to be seen as an evolutionary process, before
decision-making responsibilities are transferred to supranational institutions, the
question should be examined as to whether additional possibilities to extend coor-
dination exist and in which direction they lie. Above all, further steps appear
conceivable and would also be useful where the present forms of cooperation are
based mainly on an  ex post  exchange of information (policy  vis-a-vis  third
currencies, changes in the field of supervision, laying down the interim objectives
of monetary policy, etc.). They could gradually be developed into an  ex ante
exchange of information, such as is already occasionally practised on an informal
basis.
In principle, the activity of the Committee of Governors (the title of which could
be changed in the course of this process to 'European Central Bank Council', for
instance, in order to emphasize its importance) would be directed towards coordi-
nating national objectives, individual decisions and the employment of monetary
instruments.  Based on current procedures, the degree of coordination could be
gradually increased in the direction of obligatory advance consultations to the level
of a kind of right to issue general directives.
In this way, the scope for national monetary policy action would be gradually
reduced.  It would, for example, encompass the pursuit of intermediate objectives
adopted in the process of coordination or set later on as part of the power to issue
directives. The scope for action would remain greatest in choosing appropriate
instruments for achieving the objectives, but here again the Committee would gain
increasing influence over the course of time with the aim of gradually
harmonizing the criteria on which the employment of certain instruments is based
extending to the creation of as uniform a set of instruments as possible.
As a kind of natural continuation of the tasks already undertaken by the
Committee at present with respect to the exchange rates of the Community
currencies in relation to each other and  vis-a-vis  third currencies, it would have to
coordinate the intervention policy of the EC central banks with respect to the
internal and external relationships of the Community, with a sufficient degree of
exchange rate flexibility  vis-a-vis  third currencies being assured. In this context,
account would need to be taken of the differing weights of the currencies within
the EMS as well as their international role. Exchange rate policy  vis-a-vis  the rest
of the world would have to take into consideration the fact that the third countries
concerned (the United States and Japan) playa major part in determining the
various exchange rate relationships. At a later stage, the Committee could assume
the responsibility for influencing exchange rates that is still a national preserve, so
that in the event of any foreign exchange market interventions, the national
central banks would progressively operate in the framework of 'their adminis-
tering a mandate . The responsibility for determining central rates could also be
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transferred from the member governments to the Committee. In this way, there
would be a greater scope for relevant decisions to be asserted regardless of
political expediency.
Committee of Governors with scope to influence exchange rate policy and
monetary policy in the member countries could make an effective contribution to
convergence that would foster integration.  The objective behind the basic thrust of
its policy would need to be to influence monetary policy in each member country
in such a way that a symmetrical development is brought about on the basis of as
great a degree of price stability as possible. The success of such an undertaking is
indivisibly associated with comparable progress in terms of integration being
achieved in fiscal policy and other areas relevant to economic policy.
IV  Transitional problems
Legal basis
Competence in the field of economic and monetary policy has not yet been trans-
ferred to the European Community. The Member States continue to be
responsible for these spheres of policy; however, they do have the commitment to
coordinate their policies (Sections 2, 104, 105 and 145 of the Treaty of Rome) in
order to achieve their common objectives, to maintain a high level of employment
and stability of the price level, to ensure equilibrium in the overall balance of
payments and to maintain confidence in their currencies (Section 104 of the
Treaty of Rome).  certain restriction for the member countries through
Community law is to be seen in the fact that they should consider their exchange
rate policies as a matter of common interest (Section 107 of the Treaty of Rome).
Restrictions that go further result from the rules governing the EMS: Leaving
aside two Council Directives relating to the EMCF and the ECU, they are based
on multilaterally agreed acts of self-restriction on the part of the central banks
concerned and hence are not part of the legislation of the Community proper. In
accordance with a regulation in respect of the Treaty (Section 102(a) of the Treaty
of Rome) introduced together with the Single European Act of 1986, institutional
changes in the field of economic and monetary policy undertaken in the course of
further developments require the conclusion of a new Treaty under international
law in accordance with Section 236 of the Treaty of Rome. How far an inter-
national Treaty is necessary in individual cases depends on the scope each central
bank has in extending economic policy cooperation under its basis in law.
This probably differs from country to country since the central banks in the
individual member countries have a differing status in law.
(No definitive catalogue can be drawn up for Germany indicating what acts of
legislation would be required in each case for measures that are designed to
further develop the EMS. In abstract terms, the following guidelines can be set
forth:
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1. In the Federal Republic of Germany, under Section 24 of the Basic Law the
transfer of sovereign rights to international institutions requires .an Act of
Parliament. This requirement of constitutional law is to be interpreted strictly
(Federal Constitutional Law 58, p. 1 ff., and especially p. 35).
2. The Deutsche Bundesbank is able to participate in closer monetary policy
cooperation through greater cooperation among central banks only within certain
limits. A limit would be reached if the Bundesbank were to accept decisions by an
external body - such as the Committee of Governors  with respect to monetary
policy measures which it is its duty to decide upon autonomously. In doing so, it
would relinquish the exercise of the authority it has under the Bundesbank Act.
German public and administrative law assumes that a body that has been
entrusted with tasks and responsibilities exercises these responsibilities directly;
delegating them to another body is only possible if it is empowered to do so by
law. It is also not permissible for such a body to link the decisions entrusted to it
to the agreement of other bodies. In contrast, mutual agreements and concer-
tations are and remain possible.
3. The Deutsche Bundesbank is not able to establish a joint institution together
with other central banks and grant it powers in the field of monetary policy
either; for this, owing to the lack of the necessary authorization, it does not have
the power of organization required under public law.
4. Finally, on the basis of existing law, the Deutsche Bundesbank cannot transfer
parts or all of its monetary reserves permanently and irrevocably to a common
fund; such a transfer would go beyond the scope of the 'operations' the Bank is
empowered to conduct.)
Before national responsibilities are transferred to the Community sufficient clarity
should exist as to the distribution of responsibilities at the Community level. The
point behind this is to ensure that the principles of a European monetary order as
described above have been put into effect at least in basic terms at every stage of
integration. With respect to the position of the Community monetary authorities
this means that no rights of any kind to issue instructions are granted to the
political level and that an influence on national central banks does not accrue to
the national political authorities to which they do not have a right under national
law. This would speak in favour of making the Committee of EC Central Bank
Governors, which is free from political instructions both at the national and the
Community level, the starting point for further development in institutional terms.
The members of this Committee would need to enjoy personal independence from
the bodies that appoint them, which admittedly also presupposes corresponding
independence in their functions at the national level. In contrast, the EMCF
which is tied to directives issued by the EC Council of Ministers and hence is
subject to political instructions, is not suitable as a monetary authority for the
Community.
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Integration in stages
Whether responsibilities in the field of monetary policy can be transferred to the
Community level in several steps or in a single act of law depends on the concept
on which the integration process is based.  In principle, preference should be given to
a global concept of integration with a clearly formulated final objective, as described
above, with the individual steps being geared to this objective.  A process of inte-
gration determined only by pragmatic considerations would not offer any
guarantee that the final objective will actually be attained. It would be in
accQrdance with this global concept of integration if the necessary authorization
were not to be restricted to individual steps in the process of integration but were
to relate to the stage-by-stage plan as a whole, or at least to its major components.
The member countries applied this procedure successfully in bringing about the
customs union in the first decade of the Community existence. However
experience with the plan of 1970 to achieve economic and monetary union in
stages argues against setting a rigid timetable for the process of integration.
Rather, institutional changes, which also include extensions in the spheres 
competence of existing Community institutions, should be made dependent on quali-
tative progress towards convergence in the field of economic and monetary policy.
The member countries would, of course, need to agree on a common procedure to
determine whether the prerequisites have been fulfilled for the next stage towards
economic and monetary union to be put into effect.
From a legal point of view, the establishment of an economic and monetary union
in the Community does not depend on the existence of a political union. Rather
it is an accepted fact that the member countries of the Community can separate
certain tasks from the multitude of responsibilities they have and transfer them to
a supranational institution. They nevertheless continue to exist as States. They
continue to pursue their own policies in major fields and have the necessary
executive power to do so (territorial and individual sovereignty). To this extent
the jointly created supranational entity  in this case, the European Community
exists as an 'association for the specific purpose of integrating certain
functions
As was already stated in the Werner Report of 1970, a lasting economic and
monetary union requires the transfer of far-reaching responsibilities of national
authorities to the Community plane above and beyond - the direct field of
monetary policy. An 'association for the specific purpose of integrating certain
functions' would therefore probably only be able to survive if it is supported by a
far-reaching reshaping of the Community in political and institutional terms in the
direction of a more comprehensive union. To this extent, progress towards
economic, monetary and general political union is mutually interdependent and
thus sets the framework in which progress in institutional terms appears possible.
c ~  Partial integration versus comprehensive integration
Important political considerations can also plead against integration by stages
where individual groups of countries move towards integration at varying speeds.
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Endeavours should therefore be made to include all the Community member
countries in the process of monetary integration.  So long as considerable
differentials exist within the Community in terms of prosperity and productivity
that are not offset to a large extent and in good time through corresponding
transfers of resources in the context of fiscal compensation within the union,
movements in the factors of production between the various regions can occur as
internal market conditions are brought about. The more developed regions will be
given impulses to growth at the expense of the periphery. To the extent that they
do not prefer to allow themselves to be guided by general political considerations
this risk will probably deter a number of member countries of the Community
from joining a monetary union. In contrast, a core group of countries, such as
those comprising the members of the present EMS exchange rate system, appear
to be quite strong enough in economic terms to agree to closer and closer ties with
corresponding consequences in the field of economic policy.
The concept of integration by stages was practised under the 'snake' system and is
practised  de facto  within the EMS. Since monetary policy coordination largely
took place in these systems up to now on a cooperative basis the coexistence of
differing rights and obligations in various countries did not impair cooperation.
, however, substantial progress towards integration is tied to major institutional
bonds individual countries, by exercising their veto
, .
could bring about a situation
where such progress is made only on the basis of the lowest common
denominator. The countries capable of integrating could escape this situation by
agreeing on more rapid steps towards integration among themselves. In this case
the  countries at the lower level of integration would no longer be able to participate
in the monetary policy decision-making bodies of the Community on an equal basis
as is the case at the present level of cooperation by means of a gentlemen s
agreement. Only the countries prepared to subject themselves to its standards could
have a claim to participate fully in the monetary union.
Integration by stages would be tantamount to dividing the Community into two
parts which would not remain restricted to the monetary sphere as integration
progressed but would also lead to the individual member countries of the
Community having different rights and obligations. Although such a system of
differing rights and obligations in individual spheres would not be considered to
be incompatible with the Treaty of Rome, independent bodies of the monetary
union would need to be created alongside the organs of the Community in order
to meet the demands of the final objective. In the light of the present state of
development of the European Community, this division between the level of
cooperation and the level of integration would not only raise serious problems of
a practical nature but the unification of Europe would gain a new quality through
the partial integration of a number of core member countries as compared with
the approach to integration adopted in the past. New hurdles would be raised for
the countries on the periphery that would be increasingly difficult to take. The
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proponents of faster integration of the core member countries see this primarily as
a transitional problem; they argue that, with the system being open to a corre-
sponding extent, the countries initially excluded from this process could catch up
with the train of integration later on when the economic prerequisites to do so
have been created. However,. the danger must not be dismissed that ultimately the
differences between the member countries in economic terms will become
cemented with the division of Europe into two parts in the field of monetary
policy and in the related institutions. Although the pull of an incipient monetary
union would be strong for the countries on the periphery, the high barriers of
access to it might possibly frustrate their joining it in the long run. If the unifi-
cation of Europe as a whole is also being striven for, then two~speed integration
in the monetary sphere would tend to be an obstacle.
Integration under the Treaty of Rome or outside it
The stage-by-stage plan together with the description of the individual steps up to
the final stage could be decided upon in a single package and extend the Treaty of
Rome by the dimension comprising economic and monetary union. This 'package
solution' would have the advantage that it would be the subject of forming a
political opinion in all the member countries only once and that it would not be
necessary to negotiate the union several times over in ' small coin' before the
national legislative bodies, apart from the imponderables of the procedure as
arose with the ratification of the Single European Act.
Through a 'package solution' of this nature , not only would the objectives be laid
down in contractual form but the requisite responsibilities of the Community
would also be established. As a result, the issuing of 'Regulations in unforeseen
circumstances' under Section 235 of the Treaty of Rome would no longer be
necessary. Disagreements would be excluded on the issue, for instance, as to when
institutional changes' occur (see Section lO2(a)) or whether a measure in the field
of monetary policy is still accessible to  extensive  interpretation under
Section 235.
, in the context of such an extended Treaty, a decision-making body decides 
conclude one stage of integration and initiates the next step in monetary policy
cooperation, then the question arises as to which body should be granted this
responsibility. Several solutions to this question are conceivable. The Treaty
already entrusts the Council with the authority to take decisions on such determi-
nations in other cases (see, for example, the determination of the Council with
respect to the transitional period; Section 8 of the Treaty of Rome). In principle
the Commission could also be entrusted with making such a determination. As
regards the technical expertise involved, however, the Committee of Central Bank
Governors could also be considered for this task. A mixed body is conceivable as
well.
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However, if it is assumed that not all the member countries enter the integrational
stage in the field of monetary policy at the same time, it will hardly be possible to
grant these member countries the right to participate in its design. The countries
engaged in the process of integration will not want to expose themselves to the
risk of being partly governed by outsiders and expect that only those countries
take part which expose themselves to the same risk. For this reason, it could prove
necessary to lay down the corresponding rules among the active participants
outside the Treaty of Rome initially. Basically speaking this route was taken with
the inception of the EMS. It would avoid the 'systematics' of the Treaty of Rome
and make monetary integration within the framework of the Committee of
Governors possible, which corresponds to the basic features of a European
monetary order described above. At a later stage, ways would need to be
discussed on how to harmonize the new set of rules with the Treaty of Rome.
The objection could be raised against bringing about monetary integration outside
the Treaty of Rome that this approach would not correspond to the final objective
of .creating an economic and monetary union within the Community. Under
Section IO2(a), it could be argued, member countries have undertaken a
mandatory commitment to adopt the procedure laid down in Section 236 of the
Treaty of Rome when they enter the institutional stage. They would have to
refrain from all measures that could jeopardize the achievement of the objectives
laid down in the Treaty of Rome (Section 5, Subsection 2). The Commission will
also have a considerable interest in incorporating the monetary policy institutions
in the Treaty of Rome.
If the route prescribed under Section 236 of the Treaty of Rome is taken then the
entry into force of changes in the Treaty is made dependent on their being ratified
by all the member countries. An individual member country would then be in 
position to prevent the institutionalization of cooperation, or at least to delay it
considerably.
Concluding remarks
Since the inception of the EMS considerable progress has been made in the
Community in the field of monetary policy cooperation. In conjunction with the
latest measures to establish an integrated financial area and the planned estab-
lishment of the single European market, the perspective of an economic and
monetary union now appears in a favourable light again. Economic and monetary
union would mark the end of a development which, despite all the considerable
progress that has been made, will still take some time to achieve: Not all the
member countries of the Community participate in the exchange rate mechanism
of the EMS, and not all the participating countries subject themselves to the same
conditions. The economic prerequisites for a monetary union that is characterized
by immutably fixed exchange rates between the participating countries will
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probably not exist for the foreseeable future. Even among the members who form
the nucleus of the exchange rate system, tensions must repeatedly be expected for
the foreseeable future owing to differing economic policy preferences and
constraints as well as the resultant divergences in their economic development,
which will make realignments in the central rates of their currencies necessary.
Even within a common single market these problems will not simply disappear
especially seeing that this market will trigger additional structural adjustment
constraints, the extent of which cannot as yet be fully assessed. For this reason
too, it will not be possible to do fully without occasional realignments in central
rates for the foreseeable future. This indicates the necessity for further progress in
the direction of greater convergence in a large number of macroeconomic as well
as structural fields.
The existing EC Committee of Central Bank Governors offers itself as the basic
unit in organizational terms of an EC monetary authority which does not threaten
to run counter to the demands of the final stage at the outset. Competence in the
field of monetary policy could be increasingly transferred to it over the course of
time. In the initial stage it would direct its activities towards coordinating national
monetary policy objectives, individual decisions and the employment of monetary
policy instruments. Parallel to this, it would ensure an increasingly greater degree
of harmonization of the exchange rate policies of the member countries. Working
from this basis, its responsibilities could gradually be extended in the direction of
obligatory advance consultations and go as far as having the right to issue
directives on questions of monetary and exchange rate policy. A major factor in
coordinating monetary policy at the Community level is the centralized process of
shaping policy, which could be undertaken by the national central banks as the
constituent parts of a European central bank system. In organizational terms, the
Committee of Governors could be supported by its own enlarged secretariat.
Developing its own activities in the money and foreign exchange markets on the
part of an EC monetary authority equipped with technical resources and staff as
well as monetary policy instruments would not appear to be necessary until the
national currencies have been abolished and a single European currency has been
introduced. The step-by-step transition from a national to a Community monetary
policy should take place on a legal basis that does not relate to individual steps in
the process of integration but to this process as a whole. As far as possible, all the
member countries of the Community should embark jointly on the path towards
economic and monetary union in order not to handicap the integration of Europe
as a whole at a later date.
If only a few Community member countries were to spur forward this would have
serious economic and political consequences. Ultimately, the danger would exist
of Western Europe being permanently divided into two parts if the barriers to
access to the smaller system were to become too high. However, to the extent that
separate action in Europe were politically desired, the door would have to be left
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open for the countries excluded in the initial stages to join later.  But these
countries could not be granted any right to participate in the affairs of the monetary
union.  Besides institutional arrangements of this nature, however, it is of
outstanding importance for the success of monetary integration for the gradual
transfer of monetary policy to the Community level to be accompanied by
sufficient progress in the integration of economic and fiscal policy. Isolated steps
in the monetary field would overburden monetary policy in political terms and
jeopardize the credibility of the process of unification in the longer run.
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Some analytical and operational considerations
Niels Thygesen 
The author is indebted to colleagues in the Delors' Committee and particularly
Governor C. Ciampi, to the two rapporteurs and to Dr Daniel Gros for
discussions on some of the ideas in the note; he retains sole responsibility for the
analysis and the views expressed.
Introduction
The purpose of the present note is to review briefly some analytical and opera-
tional issues which arise at an advanced stage of monetary integration. These
issues are relevant to the present rather tightly managed EMS which has
developed gradually since 1983, and their resolution could be experimented with
in the decentralized and pre-institutional first stage. They are essential in any
effort to clarify how monetary policy might be designed .and operated in the
second stage if a ' gradual transfer of decision-making power from national auth-
orities to a Community institution' has to take place  (paragraph 57 Report on
economic and monetary union in the European Community,  hereinafter referred to
as 'the Report'). This note accepts that it may not be possible at the present
juncture to propose a detailed blueprint for accomplishing such a transition 
stage two, but the considerations in the following sections are kept in sufficiently
general terms to incorporate a range of analytical and operational approaches.
The note is also relevant to the collective management through the proposed
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) in stage three prior to the introduction
of a common currency.
The note contains three sections. The first asks how the ultimate objective(s) of
monetary and other macroeconomic policies might be formulated to give
concreteness to the general description in the Report. The second discusses to
what extent intermediate objectives might be helpful in underpinning the
attainment of the ultimate objectives. Finally, the third section looks at the
possible instruments by which the ESCB and the participating national central
banks might discharge and divide their responsibility for monetary policy.
1 Professor of Economics, University of Copenhagen.
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Throughout the paper reference will be made to the Table which lists ultimate and
intermediate objectives and the main policy instruments.
All three subjects raised in this note obviously require further analytical work
study of empirical regularities and assessment of practical feasibility. They are
treated here in a highly preliminary way, though with some confidence that the
issues will have to be addressed in order to properly prepare for the second and
third stages outlined in the Report.
Ultimate objectives
As regards the ultimate objectives of policies in an economic .and monetary union
the Report states (paragraph 16) that 'these policies should be geared to price
stability, balanced growth, converging standards of living, high employment and
external equilibrium
It is difficult to assess, in the absence of additional precision on the relative
weight to be given to these wide-ranging objectives, how procedures may be
developed for monitoring whether policies are appropriate. The present note
assumes that the prime contribution of monetary policy to the attainment of
ultimate policy objectives will be made if the ESCB is committed to the objective
of price stability, while supporting  subject to this proviso  the general
economic policy set at the Community level by the competent bodies. This is the
formulation chosen in paragraph 32 of the Report which describes the mandate
for the ESCB.
Implicitly this division of responsibilities implies that all the remaining objectives
would, in principle, be the concern of the non-monetary authorities at the
national and Community levels. Since exchange-market interventions in third
currencies would also be carried out 'in accordance with guidelines established by
the ESCB Council' (paragraph 57 on stage two) and subsequently 'on the sole
responsibility of the ESCB Council in accordance with Community exchange rate
policy' (paragraph 60 on stage three) it is , however, necessary to recall that such
interventions would provide not only an additional instrument for influencing
price trends in the Community, but also the objective of external equilibrium. The
ESCB Council would accordingly be faced with the problem of designing
guidelines for interventions which take into account both its prime objective of
price stability and the need to contain the build-up of unsustainable external dis-
equilibria, most appropriately defined as large collective current account
imbalances  vis-a-vis  the rest of the world. The Report does not say explicitly that
internal price stability always has to take precedence over the external value of
EC currencies in terms of third currencies, but it clearly envisages no significant
degree of commitment to stabilize the latter. Though it may well be in this area
that the issue of designing an appropriate mix of monetary and non-monetary
policies will find the clearest expression, the attainm.ent of some degree of
external equilibrium would impinge primarily on the budgetary authorities.
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In view of this interpretation, the judgment on the performance of monetary
policy and the fulfilment by the ESCB of its mandate would hinge on an interpre-
tation of the objective of price stability. That objective would have to be
expressible in collective terms for the Community, but it could also usefully be
linked to national indicators of a nominal nature in order to monitor the compati-
bility of policies. There appear to be two main contenders for the role of collective
objective.
The first is to use medium-term stability of  average producer prices in the internal
market  for goods as an indicator. The increasing competition and specialization
resulting from the completion of the internal market will tend to make prices for
internationally traded goods more homogeneous, removing gradually the scope
for price discrimination between national markets. A weighted average of national
producer price indices for the participating countries, expressed in a common
unit, for example ECUs, would provide an increasing reliable indicator of a
common price trend. There is evidence from earlier periods of stable exchange
rates, notably the gold standard, that close convergence in producer prices is
observable in an exchange-rate regime of the tightness envisaged, see, for
example
, .
McKinnon and Ohno (1988).
While such an index would give expression in a meaningful way to a common
price performance in the Community, it might be desirable to focus particularly
on the domestic (i.e. internal to the EC) sources of inflation in producer prices for
which ESCB monetary policy would be most directly accountable. A deflator of
value added in manufacturing industry calculated as a weighted average for the
internal market would leave out of account the inflationary (or disinflationary)
shocks such as terms-of-trade changes resulting from swings in the prices of
energy or of other intermediate imports or of raw materials. Such external shocks
generate fluctuations in the inflation rate which may in practice have to be at least
in part accommodated by variations in the collective money supply. An ultimate
objective expressed in terms of stability in the average of national value-added
deflators would not be radically different from the course followed in the
Community in the 1980s; the second oil-price shock led to a temporary
acceleration of producer prices in Europe, even in the Federal Republic of
Germany, while the 1985-86 decline in import prices for raw materials, energy and
other intermediate inputs (as well as in the dollar) temporarily pushed the rate of
change of producer prices below zero in the low-inflation EMS countries.
In .short, by aiming to keep the rate of inflation measured by an average of
value-added deflators within a narrow band close to zero, say between 0 and 2 %
or to keep the average increase in producer prices within a slightly wider band
similarly centred around a minimal rate of inflation, the ESCB could give specific
content to the notion of a stability-oriented monetary policy and simplify the
monitoring of its policies.
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The other main contender is a broadly-based index such as  a Community-wide
consumer price index widely perceived to reflect the cost of inflation to the
economy. In an area as large and diverse as the Community national price trends
measured by consumer prices may, however, diverge substantially between
countries even over the medium term, because the weight of non-traded goods
and services in this index is substantial and price trends for these goods are less
directly constrained by the process of market integration. It might be confusing to
public opinion to annOUnce a collective price objective around which substantial
variation in national performances persisted.
collective price objective formulated in terms of an essentially common
indicator, such as average producer prices may be sufficient for guiding the
aggregate thrust of monetary policy. However, for the purpose of linking up with
monetary instruments or with national macroeconomic objectives which will
continue to have great importance throughout stage two and into stage three, the
collective objective could be supplemented by criteria of national performance
consistent with the common inflation objective. One possible way of doing so,
broadly in line with trends in national policy-making in a number of industrial
countries in the 1980s would be to set targets for  the rate of increase of some
measure of nominal income for each participating country.
To be more specific, objectives for the rate of increase in private final demand
(private consumption, business fixed investment and residential construction)
might be thought of as the national income measure most relevant in the context
of monetary policy. For each participating country, the national and Community
authorities would make a judgment on the unavoidable rate of inflation in private
final demand prices expressed in the national currency and a rate of increase of
real demand judged feasible in the light of trend capacity growth and the initial
situation. The national inflation rates thus calculated would typically in their
average be a bit above the collective objective for producer prices in the
Community, because the broader price indices for final demand would comprise
non-traded goods and services for which productivity increases are typically
slower than for the sectors producing internationally traded goods in the 
market. National inflation rates in terms of final demand prices might also
diverge slightly year by year, as the differentials in productivity between sectors
are unlikely to be uniform across countries. Gradually goods market integration
would tend to impose approximate parallelism on national price levels in this
broader sense, as the range of traded goods expands and factor mobility increases.
Various forms of nominal income targeting have appeared in national policy-
making in the 1980s when the confidence in monetary aggregates as intermediate
targets was weakening, while a turn to objectives for the growth of real output was
perceived as unrealizable and potentially inflationary. Maintaining a suitable
measure of nominal income close to a steady growth path provides a framework
for monitoring national economic policies and for coordinating them interna-
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tionally, as is recognized in some of the main proposals for improving global
policy coordination and reforming the international monetary system, see, for
example, Williamson and Miller (1987) and Taylor (1989).
In the present context, nominal income targeting would provide a linkage to
potential intermediate objectives at the national level and through them to
decisions relating to a money supply process which will remain, at least through
stage two, largely national in execution if not in design. Such a framework would
be suitable for the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in the Community
in so far as it would facilitate the identification of policy conflicts. The latter
would arise if the execution by the ESCB of its mandate for assuring price were to
be eroded by the sum total of national fiscal policies implying a growth rate in
nominal final demand in one or more countries inconsistent with the objective for
average inflation. In this way the framework would pinpoint requirements for
fiscal coordination in an analytically more satisfactory way than by simply
looking at the size of budget imbalances relative to GNP, or to national savings
as a basis for imposing 'binding rules' on such imbalances. By monitoring both
the national component of ESCB monetary policy and fiscal policy in terms of
the same nominal income targets, the risk of open conflicts is reduced.
Intermediate objectives
In principle, it would be possible to gear monetary instruments directly to
ultimate objectives. If the Community-wide index of producer prices were to
accelerate ~ and information on prices could be available with a time-lag of one
to two months  such an observed development would provide an indication that
average interest rates in the Community should be raised to contain money
creation. If the growth rate of nominal demand in a particular country were to
run well ahead of the agreed national target that would  after a somewhat
longer information lag ~ trigger a country-specific response by the tightening of
one or more monetary instruments in the country concerned. Symmetric responses
could be envisaged if a deceleration of average inflation or a shortfall of nominal
demand became observable. Simple feedback rules of this type could provide 
stabilizing framework within which both average and nationally differentiated
departures from targets were dampened.
But further attention to the way changes in monetary instruments influence the
ultimate objectives of average inflation and the rate of growth of nominal demand
in the participating countries through monetary and/ or credit aggregates 
advisable for at least two reasons. First, formulating policy with respect to one or
more appropriately chosen aggregate(s) will improve the understanding of
monetary policy and enhance its credibility; it will become easier to monitor the
actions of the ESCB than in the situation where policy performance is assessed
only on the basis of the ultimate objectives over which monetary policy has
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within any given shorter time horizon, only a limited influence. Second, if reserve
requirements are to be applied as one of the main instruments of the ESCB, they
have to be seen to work in a broadly similar way in the participating countries by
relating to a monetary or credit aggregate which exerts some longer-run influence
on the ultimate objectives.
A possible procedure would consist in setting a collective target for total annual
money creation in the participating countries, consistent with the objective for
average inflation. Abstracting temporarily from net interventions in third
currencies by the participants, total additions to the broad money stock (M2 or
M3) would be matched by the sum of domestic counterparts to money creation in
each country, since purchases of other participating currencies by one partici-
pating central bank are offset by sales elsewhere within the system. There would
in principle, be no sterilization of interventions in partner currencies. The task of
controlling total money creation would then consist in applying instruments which
influence, through incentives or obligations, the readiness of each central bank to
keep domestic credit expansion (DCE) close to a targeted, and collectively agreed
rate for the country in question. Setting the latter through a collective
decision-making process in the ESCB would constitute the core of the  ex ante
coordination effort. The process would assist in making mutually consistent the
national objectives for the growth of nominal demand from which the national
DCEs are derived. Deviations between actual and targeted DCE would in turn
give some early information on deviations between actual and targeted growth in
nominal demand. A procedure of this nature has been outlined in some detail by
Russo and Tullio (1988).
It can not be claimed with confidence that (1) national DCEs can be closely
controlled or that (2) they are tightly linked to nominal demand over shorter
periods of time, two desirable characteristics of intermediate monetary objectives
as analysed meticulously by Bryant (1980). A recent OECD study shows a fairly
weak quarter-to-quarter relationship between DCE (and different monetary
aggregates) and changes in nominal demand for the four largest EC economies.
On the other hand, a clear tendency for both to decelerate has been observable in
Germany, France and Italy (but not in the UK) since the early 1980s (see graph).
Despite the evidently high degree of slack in the relationship of DCE and nominal
demand, using the former as intermediate objective may be justified by two
considerations: (1) it provides the most direct linkage to total money creation in
the area; and (2) it is an extension, in the direction of symmetry, of the present
informal practice in the EMS in which most countries, with the significant
exception of Germany, look to rates of domestic credit expansion relative to
others in the EMS as the consistent underpinning for the main intermediate
objective of maintaining stable exchange rates in the EMS. For the Federal
Republic of Germany the shift from the present intermediate objective (target for
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broad money, M3) to a DCE-target, with in principle no provision for sterili-
zation, should be acceptable, provided overall money creation in the area were
seen to be more directly subjected to stability-oriented, collectively agreed
decisions and efficient instruments for implementing them, as is proposed in the
main Report through the establishment of the ESCB with a mandate to pursue
price stability.
Total money creation would depart from the sum of national DCEs to the extent
that non-sterilized interventions  vis-a-vis  third currencies were undertaken by the
ESCB directly or by one of the participating central banks. There is no
presumption that such interventions would be sterilized; efforts to stem what was
considered excessive depreciation of the area s currencies  vis-a-vis  the dollar
through sales of dollars might well require some overall tightening of monetary
conditions and higher average interest rates for the Community as a whole, and
vice versa in the case of purchases of dollars to stem overly rapid appreciation of
the participating currencies. The degree of sterilization would be matter for dis-
cretionary decisions arrived at collectively through the ESCB Council. The latter
would also, in consultation with the participating central banks, take a view on
which currency or currencies to use in dollar interventions. One important
criterion in reaching such decisions would be to maximize the cohesiveness of the
currencies within the system as that finds expression in the exchange markets.
Guidance would be found also in the degree of correspondence in each country
between a central bank' DCE objective and the observed growth in credit
inc1uding potential effects of sterilization operations linked to interventions in
third currencies which the ESCB may assign to that particular central bank.
For the individual central bank, the main short-term intermediate objective would
continue to be the maintenance of stable exchange rates  vis-a-vis  other partici-
pating currencies. Some  ex ante  coordination of DCE objectives should make that
taksk easier on average; but in practice, the DCE objective may, in particular situ-
ations, have to be overridden to maintain exchange-rate stability.
Instruments available
Even prior to the attribution of any particular instrument to the ESCB, the
collective formulation of ultimate and intermediate monetary objectives would in
itself constitute a major step towards  ex ante  coordination desirable in stage one.
Nothing would prevent the EMS central banks from keeping their present
exchange of information on their respective formulation of domestic monetary
policy, or from giving the reports prepared by a special group of experts for the
Committee of Central Bank Governors a more deliberately common analytical
framework along the lines above. Similarly, the reports prepared by another
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expert group on exchange-market interventions could begin to be used in a more
forward-looking way to formulate intervention strategies rather than to review the
past record. Closer coordination could begin to replicate the effects of a more
advanced stage, even while the policy analysis and recommendations emerging
from it remain strictly advisory, as is the case for stage one.
Yet it is unlikely that anything resembling closely a common monetary policy
could be conducted merely through discussions, but without vesting in the ESCB
genuine decision-making power with respect to at least some significant
instruments of monetary policy. Indeed, that is the rationale of suggesting the
set-up of the ESCB for stage two before the irrevocable locking of parities which
makes a common monetary policy a simple necessity. But there are difficulties in
determining how monetary authority might be shared between a centre  the
ESCB Council and Board -- and the participating national central banks. The
efficiency of operations requires that there should never be any doubt in the
financial markets, among national policy-makers or elsewhere as to which body
has the responsibility for taking particular decisions. Monetary authority is less
easily divisible than budgetary authority where elements of decentralization and
even of competitive behaviour between different levels of government, or within
the same level, may be observed in national States.
Four types of policy decisions have to be considered as being at the core of any
design of a workable allocation of responsibilities within an ESCB in stage two:
(1) adjustment of short-term interest differentials;
(2) intervention policy  vis-a- vis  third currencies;
(3) changes in reserve requirements; and
(4) changes in intra-area parities (realignments).
Reference is again made to Graph 1 above.
The adjustment of relative short-term interest rates  is the central instrument in
managing the present EMS, and a high degree of coordination and occasionally
de facto  joint, or at least bilateral, decisions have been observed. As the paper by
Governor Godeaux explains, participants have developed, particularly since the
so-called Basle-Nyborg agreement of September 1987, a flexible set of instruments
for containing incipient exchange-market tensions: intramarginal intervention
wider use of the fluctuation band, and changes in short-term interest rate
differentials. This combination has proved fairly robust in most periods of tension
since September 1987. But a risk remains that the experience of earlier periods of
tension will be repeated; then public criticism and mutual recrimination between
Ministers for Finance occasionally intensified tensions and made monetary
management very difficult. The main examples of such episodes are December
1986 to January 1987, November 1987 and  to a minor extent  April 1989.
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The participation of additional currencies in the EMS in the course of stage one
notably sterling, which has traditionally been managed with considerable invol-
vement on the part of the UK Treasury and even of the Prime Minister, will make
it urgent to strengthen procedures for genuine coordination further and to make
the transition to a more joint form of management in stage two at an early stage.
While decision-making in this sensitive area would still remain in national hands
in stage two, the launching of the ESCB at the beginning of stage two would in
itself imply that national governments would be less likely than in the past 
involve themselves directly in the management of exchange crises. in the course of
stage one the Committee of Central Bank Governors will already have begun to
perform more efficiently the role of a multilateral arbitrator that has been missing
occasionally in the past. A common analytical framework developed around the
intermediate targets will give more explicit guidance as to who should adjust to
whom. If the proposal to develop a joint operational facility for exchange and
money market operations, as outlined in Professor Lamfalussy s paper, is pursued
that would in itself bring participating central banks into more continuous contact
also with respect to their transactions in their domestic financial markets and
facilitate coordinated action on interest rates.
The gradual and partial upgrading of decision-making on relative interest rate
adjustment from the purely national level to a Community body, in the first stage
the Committee of Governors, from the second stage the ESCB Council, will not in
itself assure that the average level of interest rates in the participating countries is
appr9priate, though it should tend to make such an outcome more likely than the
present system with its occasional inefficiencies of interest-rate escalations and
tensions. To get a firmer grip on the average level of rates, the attribution to the
ESCB of an instrument which permits a collective influence on domestic sources
of money creation would be necessary. Such an instrument is described briefly
below in the form of the ability for the ESCB to impose compulsory reserve
requirements on domestic money creation and to develop gradually a market for a
European reserve base with its own lending rate.
second instrument for which some degree of joint management could be
envisaged is  foreign exchange interventions in third currencies.  There are two
economic arguments for such an attribution: (1) the medium-term need to
contribute to the containment of major misalignments, and (2) the smoothing of
short-term volatility  vis-a-vis  third currencies.
The former argument can hardly be assessed without making a judgment on the
feasibility of a more managed global exchange rate system and the degree of
commitment by other major monetary authorities, notably in the United States, to
support, through interventions and domestic monetary adjustments, any under-
standing reached on the appropriate level of the main bilateral exchange rates.
Given the experience of the period since 1977 and the major present current-
account imbalances, projected to persist well into the 1990s, it would 
hazardous to assume that an emerging joint dollar policy of the EMS countries
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would be anything more than  ad hoc  guidelines for managing a collective
appreciation of the EMS currencies as smoothly as possible. Calculations with
large macroeconometric models suggest that the appreciation may have to be at
least in the order of 20% in real terms on average for the EMS currencies from
the levels prevailing in mid-1989, if the European countries are to assume a
reasonable share of the adjustment of the US current deficit to a sustainable low
level, see Cline (1989). This will put the cohesion of the EMS currencies to a
severe test, but it will also provide a unique opportunity, as was the case in
1985- , for reconciling low inflation in Europe with a relatively expansionary
monetary policy in the Community, hence contributing to an improved and satis-
factory price performance in the crucial transition period from the present more
decentralized operation towards economic and monetary union.
As regards the task of smoothing short-term volatility, it must be noted that
tensions among EMS currencies have often in the past decade been triggered by
financial disturbances from third currencies, notably movements in the dollar
The currencies participating in the EMS were seen by the markets as being
sensitive in different degrees to such disturbances. These perceived differences had
their origins in varying degrees of controls on capital movements and in expec-
tations of the likelihood of divergent policy reactions to the external financial
disturbances. For example, a depreciation of the dollar was normally expected to
strengthen the German mark relative to most other EMS currencies, both because
the German mark had a far larger domestic financial base and the most liberal
regime for capital flows and because non-German authorities in the EMS were
seen as more prone than the Bundesbank to try to avoid the contractionary effects
of the appreciation of their currencies. The tensions to which these - real or
perceived 
.... 
differences in structure and/or behaviour gave rise were occasionally
mitigated by an EMS realignment. Conversely, in periods of .an appreciating
dollar, outflows from Europe were observed to be particularly strong from the
German mark area, reflecting primarily the closer substitutability between the US
dollar and the German mark than that prevailing for other EMS currencies, but
presumably also a decreasing probability of a realignment within the system. In
recent years the liberalization of capital movements in France and Italy and in
some smaller EMS countries, the deepening of continental European financial
markets and the improved cohesion of the EMS economies have all contributed to
a weakening of the earlier negative correlation between movements in the 
dollar (in effective exchange rate terms) and movements in non-German mark
currencies in the EMS  vis-a-vis  the mark, as shown, for example, by Giavazzi and
Giovannini (1989). But the tendency for dollar movements to affect the EMS
currencies differentially may be expected to persist in moderate form into stage
two. The task remains in that case to avoid that such tensions, if they are unwar-
ranted by more fundamental economic divergence within the EMS, persist and
force realignments.
While this could in principle be achieved through joint guidelines for essentially
deceJ).tralized interventions by the participating national central banks, a visible
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capacity to intervene jointly in third currencies, and to do so in ways that further
the cohesion of the EMS, is potentially important. Without a presence in the
major exchange markets the ESCB would lack the capacity to check the impact of
external financial disturbances on EMS stability at source. Hence ' certain
amount of reserve pooling' (Report , paragraph 57) as well as ample working
balances in EMS currencies would be desirable in stage two.
It is impossible to determine  a priori  what percentage of external official reserves
would have to he pooled in order to create a credibility effect in the financial
markets for an emerging joint intervention policy. Leaving the percentage low, say
10 to 20 %, would run the risk of simply complicating existing cooperative
procedures without making a qualitative difference, though even with limited
pooling some beneficial effects could be expected simply from the learning
experience of coordinating interventions through the same trading floor rather
than by concertations over the telephone. Governor de Larosiere describes these
gains relative to the present EMS in his paper.
Joint interventions in third currencies by means of pooling of part of exchange
reserves did not win general favour in the Report as a proposal for the first stage;
too much emphasis might be put on external considerations relative to the
correction of imbalances within the Community (paragraph 54). This argument
would not apply to an ESCB capacity to intervene in stage two along with the
attribution of other monetary instruments with more direct domestic implications
for the participants as proposed here.
A third instrument, specifically assigned to the ESCB would be the ability to
impose  variable reserve requirements on domestic money creation.
Whereas the two first instruments (and the fourth to be discussed below) are
directed primarily at relative .adjustments within the EMS, changes in required
reserve ratios affect the overall thrust of monetary policy. International monetary
agreements, including the Bretton Woods system and the EMS, have typically
been more explicit on relative than on aggregate adjustment in the participating
countries. The EMS procedures for relative adjustment may leave something to be
desired, as explained above and they may leave too much discretion to national
monetary authorities to remove ambiguities and tensions. Yet more attention has
been given to these procedures than to discussion of whether monetary policy has
an appropriate aggregate thrust.
The Bretton Woods system and the early EMS did not have to face up to this
issue directly, because both systems were protected by a mixture of capital
controls for the short term and some scope for changing the exchange rate in the
longer term. The post-1983 EMS has had more difficulty in avoiding the issue. In
the absence of some aggregate monetary target for the whole system, an implicit
monetary rule has emerged: monetary policy in all participating countries has
tended to be determined, via the ambition to hold more rigidly fixed nominal
exchange rates, mainly by that of its largest and least-inflationary participant. The
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practice in the EMS that reserves used for intervention in defending a weak
currency have to be reconstituted within the span of a few months is that
convergence - provided that exchange rates do remain fixed - will be towards the
low inflation in the Federal Republic of Germany and not towards some average
as would be the .case if intervention credits provided a more permanent safety net.
In that case efforts at sterilization would have become more widespread in the
weaker currency .countries, and aggregate money creation could have drifted
upwards.
By using the degree of freedom for aggregate monetary policy by implicitly
attaching policies to the domestic monetary target in Germany the EMS has
succeeded sinc.e 1983 to an unexpected degree in becoming 'a zone of monetary
stability' in the double sense of promoting both  exchange rate  and  price stability.
The challenge for stage two and stage three is to design intermediate objectives
and monetary instruments so as to make likely an extension of these desirable
features within the more collectively managed system marked by the transition to
the ESCB.
A major reason why the past system would in any case have to be revised is that
the hegemonial role of the largest country already shows signs of weakening and
must be expected to be eroded further during stage one, as additional currencies
join the EMS and short-term capital transactions are fully liberalized. This process
affects the size of potential flows in the new member countries, in those countries
that undertake additional liberalization, notably France and Italy, and in
Germany. The ability of the Bundesbank to keep a preferred domestic monetary
target as close to a desired path as has typically been the case for the past 15 years
must be expected to weaken further. Financial integration increases the risk of
policy errors and hence the incentive for all participants to modify the present
paradigm. Another factor working in the same direction is the increasing ease, as
the credibility of fixed exchange rates becomes more well founded, with which all
non-German participants can attract inflows of capital by maintaining short-term
rates only moderately above those in Germany. The improved substitutability
between participating currencies inexorably pushes the thinking of all monetary
authorities in the direction of more attention to aggregate money creation in the
area and to the formulation of intermediate objectives for domestic money
creation consistent with an aggregate target and to designing procedures whereby
the latter can be kept roughly on their agreed course.
Governor Ciampi's paper spells out in some detail how an ability for the ESCB to
impose variable reserve requirements on the domestic money creation for which
each national central bank is primarily responsible could be set up in stage two,
and the present note associates itself fully with the basic idea of that paper and
the analysis of the various technical options available. The essential feature is that
the ESCB should be empowered to impose - uniform or differentiated  reserve
requirements on either the increase in. the monetary liabilites of each national
central bank or on the credit extended by the member banks to their respective
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domestic sectors. This requirement would be met only by holding reserves with the
ESCB; and the supply of reserves would be .entirely controlled by the latter
through allocations of a reserve asset (official ECUs) to each central bank corres-
ponding to the demand for reserves which would arise, if agreed targets for
money creation or DCE were observed. Alternatively, the supply of reserves
would be created by open market purchases of the ESCB. Both cost and availa-
bility considerations would provide central banks with an incentive to stay close
to declared objectives. The ESCB would have to be given some discretion in
extending or withdrawing reserves to provide marginal accommodation. The new
system could replace the present method of creating official ECUs through
temporary swaps of one fifth of gold and dollar reserves as well as the credits
extended through the very short-term facility of the European Monetary
Cooperation Fund.
The system would create a monetary control mechanism analogous to that
through which national central banks, who use reserve requirements, influence
money and credit creation through their banking systems. It would introduce a
certain hierarchy in the relationship between the ESCB and its constituent
national central banks, while leaving some freedom for each national central bank
in designing its domestic instruments.
The reserve requirements could also be applied directly to DCE in the total
national banking system, i.e. on the domestic sources of broad money creation.
The advantage of this method would be to assign the collective monetary
instrument more directly to a natural intermediate objective - DCE - under-
pinning fixed exchange rates, but it might introduce more slack in the control
mechanism, as it would no longer apply to items that appear on the balance sheet
of the central banks for which the latter could be regarded as more directly
responsible.
In the variants of an operational framework for an integrated monetary policy
described in Governor Ciampi's paper and in the previous paragraph, the ESCB
would not have any direct contact with commercial banks or with financial
markets in general. Its sphere of operation would be confined to transactions with
the second tier of the three-tier system, the national central banks. This would be
unduly confining from the time during stage three when a common currency 
introduced. To manage a common currency the ESCB would need to have direct
transactions with commercial banks, as does any national central bank at present.
To prepare for this during the earlier part of stage three, possibly already in stage
two, it may be useful to explore in what ways the ESCB could be put into a
position to have some direct influence on liquidity conditions without always
relying on its ability through guidelines and incentives to exert its influence indi-
rectly via the national central banks. In any case, since legislation enabling the
ESCB to deal directly with financial markets in the final stage of economic and
monetary union would also be part of a comprehensive Treaty revision, attention
to the nature of such contracts is not premature.
171COLLECTION OF PAPERS
One way to give the ESCB such influence would be to allow it to make open
market operations in national markets. The ESCB might, for example, use the
securities it has acquired from the national central banks for such open market
transactions. One could impose, initially, limits on the total amount of purchases
and sales which can be made within any given period. This would be especially
important at the start, when the ESCB would be mainly purchasing securities
since its initial stock would be small. These limits could be raised over time
allowing in stage three the operations of the ESCB to become more important
than those of the national central banks in their respective markets.
different and complementary approach, more directly in extension of the
reserve requirement system applied to national central banks, would be 
introduce a uniform European reserve requirement on commercial bank deposits
or on increases thereof. A small fraction of such deposits would be held with the
ESCB and denominated in ECU. A federal funds market, in which the ESCB as
the only issuer would have strict control of the total supply, could then develop in
which commercial banks would trade among themselves the reserve balances they
need to satisfy the European reserve requirement. The approach would imply that
the ESCB be given direct influence on a market which reflects system-wide
liquidity conditions.
The approach could be implemented by giving the ESCB the authority to set
within limits set in its statutes, a compulsory reserve requirement on all deposits
of Community residents with Community commercial banks. To give banks initial
access to deposits with the ESCB, the latter could initially buy the appropriate
amount of securities in the market; hence the system could be regarded as
complementary to the idea outlined above to permit the ESCB to undertake
limited open market transactions in initial periods. The securities purchased could
be denominated either in ECU or in national currencies, provided, if introduced
in stage two, the proportions of the latter correspond to the weights in the ECU
basket. Once the initial amount of reserves has been created and absorbed into
required reserves, the ESCB could engage in additional marginal accommodation
by supplying federal funds through modest discretionary open-market operations.
A tightening of the federal funds market would come about if required reserves
were to run ahead of this process of supplying them; and a rise in the federal
funds rate would induce banks to slow down the underlying deposit creation. The
approach is compatible with the usual range of operating procedures for a central
bank from interest rate to reserves targeting.
Different operating procedures would presumably be appropriate as the ESCB
extends its authority from stage two to stage three and to the ultimate
management of a single currency, but the basic mechanism would not have to be
modified. In effect, the ESCB could, from its beginning, act in some respects as a
true central bank, reinforcing its more indirect and orchestrating functions
inherent in the way that the earlier proposals constrain it to being a bank for the
central banks only.
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Suggesting some form of reserve requirements as the major instrument for an
emerging joint policy to influence the domestic sources of money creation  as a
complement to the control over the external sources which a joint exchange rate
and intervention policy  vis-ii-vis  third currencies would provide  is bound to
raise critical questions on the approach. Although reserve requirements have
historically been the prime method by which central banks have achieved
monetary control in most countries, reliance on that instrument may appear to be
limited in the Community today (see, for example, the survey of Kneeshaw and
Van den Bergh, 1989). In most industrial countries the banking system has
become indebted to the central bank to an extent that makes it dependent on the
terms on which marginal accommodation of reserve needs is provided. The mech-
anisms suggested illustrate ways in which an analogous influence may be brought
to bear through a reserve requirement system on the relationship between the
ESCB and the participating central banks (the three-tier system) and gradually
extended to financial markets in general. A direct contact between the central
institution and the financial market would provide a smooth passage to the final
stage when the ESCB is to manage a common currency.
The three instruments proposed so far  collective guidance of relative
interest-rate adjustments, joint interventions in third currencies with a definitively
pooled part of foreign exchange reserves and imposition of variable reserve
requirements on domestic money creation  are all major examples of shifts
towards the European level of decision-making authority in well-specified areas of
the kind that could be considered for stage two and extended into stage three as
long as there is no single currency issued by the ESCB beyond the restricted
circuit for the management of the reserves market referred to above.
It remains to consider how the one decision in the EMS which is today subject to
de facto  joint decision-making, namely realignments of central rates, could be
handled in stage two. Would there be a case for vesting authority over this
instrument with the ESCB as part of monetary management rather than leaving it
as in the present EMS with the Ecofin Council? There are arguments for and
against such a transfer.
A major purpose of setting up elements of a collective monetary authority  the
ESCB -  before  the irrevocable lacking of parities which marks the transition to
the third and final stage of economic and monetary union is to constrain
realignments and eliminate the need for them. A more specific objective would be
to assure that the occasional and rare recourse to them will be made in sufficiently
small steps to preserve continuity of market exchange rates around realignments.
This has been an important feature in the containment of speculative pressures in
the recent EMS experience. If financial market participants would interpret a
transfer of authority for making the residual small realignments to the partici-
pating central banks as part of the ESCB's task as a signal of an intended
tightening of the EMS in the transition to full economic and monetary union
such a transfer could prove stabilizing and hence desirable.
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Putting the question in this way, however, suggests the counter-argument, namely
that governments might not succeed in conveying such a signal. They might
instead feel relief at not having, as in the present EMS, to bear the political
burden of visibly initiating a realignment - and without a new more hidden
discipline inherent in membership of a union with irrevocably fixed exchange
rates. The Council of the ESCB might be faced with  fait accompli  situations in
which only a realignment would ease tensions and with national policy-makers
blaming either private speculators or the central bankers themselves for the
outcome. This would imply a deterioration relative to the recent performance of
the EMS.
On balance, these arguments suggest that the decisive considerations in assigning
the authority to undertake realignments are how close participants have come to
meeting the prerequisites for full union. It would be dangerous, if feasible, to shift
the responsibility for deciding on realignments to the ESCB in stage two, if any
major divergence of economic performance has persisted into that stage. But it
would be desirable to shift that responsibility, if the need for realignments were
generally accepted as residual only, and if adequate monetary instruments for
underpinning fixed rates had been assigned to the ESCB along the lines proposed
above. A tentative conclusion is that the authority to decide on realignments could
become part of the mandate of the ESCB in stage two, but that this is less of a
priority than the attribution of the other, day-to-day, instruments of an increasing
collective monetary policy.
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175First stages towards the creation of a European
Bank
The creation of a European Reserve Fund
J. de Larosiere
Reserve
Obviously, the economic and monetary construction of Europe will not be
achieved in a single stage, although much has been secured already. This
construction calls for a pragmatic approach, centred around the gradual
fulfilment of the final objective ultimately chosen.
The purpose of this note is to sketch out some ideas on the nature and pace of
possible initial steps that could lead ultimately to economic and monetary union.
To pass through the different phases, monetary authorities will need a clear
VISiOn:
not only of the medium-term direction in which they should be channelling
their initiatives in the monetary sphere;
but also of the daily implementation of the policies they are responsible for
framing and coordinating.
With a view to giving more practical and more visible form to their cooperation
on exchange rate and interest rate management, the gradual construction of a
permanent body for joint action and deliberation would be a highly significant
step forward. There would be three advantages to this:
it would demonstrate politically, and to the markets, the governments' deter-
mination to progress more actively towards economic and monetary union;
it would rapidly create effective means, on the eve of the opening of the single
European market and in a spirit of cooperation with the other currency zones
to ensure with more efficiency the smooth functioning of the markets;
it would enhance the efficiency of central banks' monetary management at
both domestic and European levels.
The European Reserve Fund (ERF) would be built up progressively. Its powers
would depend on progress towards the construction of Europe and on the respon-
sibilities that the Member States would be prepared to devolve upon it. Its
immediate creation- as a first step towards a European Reserve Bank - would
establish a nucleus around which more ambitious functions could gradually be
assembled, the final stage being the realization of an economic and monetary
UnIon.
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The spirit of the proposal to create a European Reserve Fund
The proposal is inspired by four guiding ideas.
Initiating a training ground process
The creation of a European Reserve Fund aims at promoting joint deliberation
and a common approach with regard to monetary issues in a framework which
would allow permanent information exchanges, regular comparison between
analyses and a closer knowledge of short-term economic developments and of the
policies implemented in individual countries.
The target is to initiate a training ground process allowing individual member
countries to improve not only the coordination of their monetary policies but also
the management of the increasingly growing interaction between exchange rate
and monetary policies.
2.  Strengthening the impact of intervention policies in the foreign exchange
markets as designed within the Group .of Seven
The aim of intervention, that the European Reserve Fund would undertake, will
be to underline as far as possible and considered useful the central banks' will to
act on a coordinated basis within the EC framework.
In its implementation, intervention by the European Reserve Fund would, in a
first phase, strengthen the impact of operations agreed in common by central
banks, without necessarily increasing their volume. Such intervention would thus
have no additional effect, either directly or indirectly, on the domestic monetary
policies of Member States. Indeed, it could be agreed that the ERF' s intervention
should only take place after unanimous agreement has been reached between
member central banks.
Creating a permanent 'think-tank' on monetary analysis
In order to continue to play its strategic role in the construction of Europe
monetary policy must have the support of a common 'think-tank' on monetary
developments. In this area, the current framework of cooperation may be further
improved, not as a substitute for national decision-taking, but in order to
harmonize, in a first phase, concepts, analyses and instruments available for
monetary policy.
Obviously, decisions are not to be reached at the level of the experts in charge of
such surveillance. Policy choices in this area will still be made by individual
central banks, but, prior and parallel to these decisions, analyses and recommen-
dations  will be made in common. This phase is therefore of major significance in
order to promote a consistent analysis of monetary developments and to reaffirm
vis-a-vis  the markets the highest priority given to the common objective of price
stability.
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4.  Increasing the role of the Committee of Governors
With such a goal in mind, the role of the Committee of Governors will have to be
strengthened. However, in order to ensure that the Governors do not limit them-
selves to exchanging views, but can enter into discussions which might result in
recommendations, the regular advice of their experts will have to be made
available to them, not only on specifically monetary issues, but also, as is already
the case each month for the foreign exchange market, on any matter influencing
monetary policy implementation, including short-term economic developments.
It is thus in this spirit that my proposal calls for the creation of an institutional
embryo, i.e. the European Reserve Fund, which has the advantage of gathering
within a permanent framework monetary and foreign exchange policy experts
from participating central banks in order to make available to the Governors
regular and global assessments of monetary developments. This is a major aspect
of the proposal, as it is indeed necessary, from the initial phase of the process, to
create between central banks a common framework for deliberation which goes
beyond the continuation or even a deepening of cooperation between central
banks.
Functions and structure of the European Reserve Fund
The Fund could be built up on the following basis:
A. It would be given certain functions in the foreign exchange and the monetary
sphere;
B. its organization would foreshadow the structure of a European Reserve Bank;
C. it would have to fulfil certain legal and institutional conditions.
A-  The functions of the ERF
In an international monetary system in which the main reserve currencies are
floating, markets are worldwide and capital moves freely, close cooperation is
required among central banks responsible for keeping their .currency within fluc-
tuation margins. Central banks would significantly enhance the impact of their
foreign exchange interventions if, under certain circumstances, they were to
decide not only to consult among themselves, but also to act through the agency
of a common body. Operations conducted through the ERF would have the
advantage of reinforcing the effect of central bank action while permanently
focusing attention on visible progress towards the construction of a European
monetary union.
The ERF's functions would include:
1. intervening in the foreign exchange market;
2. ultimately taking over the powers of the EMCF;
3. progressively setting up a body to exercise surveillance over monetary and
interest rate trends;
4. preparing for the harmonization of national money markets with a view to the
institution, in successive stages, of a European Reserve Bank.
179COLLECTION OF PAPERS
1. Intervention in the foreign exchange market
(a)  Areas of intervention
In the first place, this would concern interventions in third currencies which
would be agreed in common by members, thus preventing any operation from
hindering the domestic policy followed by any given country.
The role of the ERF would be to intervene directly in the markets, thus
embodying the cohesion of the monetary authorities in pursuing a common policy
towards third currencies. It is here that the role of the ERF would be most directly
perceptible and would illustrate the tripolar structure of the international
monetary system: the United States, Japan and Europe. This role would of course
be exercised in line with the broad thrust of the Group of Seven policy.
Secondly, the ERF could intervene in Community currencies ~ with the
agreement of the central banks concerned ~ either intra-marginally or at the
limits, in order to supplement individual action by central banks when strains
appear in the system and require visible affirmation of solidarity.
Obviously, in a first phase the ERF's role with regard to intervention would be a
complementary one, while there would continue to be concerted intervention by
the different central banks. But the ERF would have the advantage of ensuring
close coordination between the individual actions of the central banks and the
overall policy of participants in the Fund.
In a second phase  to be agreed upon unanimously  the shareholding central
banks could decide to hand over to the ERF the power to undertake certain oper-
ations on its own initiative incompliance with the gu;delines set by the Governors
on the Board of Directors.
(b)  Means of intervention
In order to play the role assigned to it in the foreign exchange markets, the ERF
would require sufficient currency reserves to enable it to assert  vis-a-vis  the
markets its capacity for intervening. These reserves would consist of:
an initial endowment, which would be independent of current contributions in
gold and dollars to the EMCF and would represent, for example, initially 10%
of the gold holdings and 10% of the foreign currency holdings of each of the
central banks participating in the European exchange rate mechanism. The
foreign currency component would be paid in dollars; there would be an
additional contribution by participants in their national currency, bas.ed on a
formula to be defined. This endowment would be made on a permanent basis
(and not in the form of renewable swaps as is the case with the EMCF);
additional resources in the form of swap lines with the Federal Reserve Bank
and, possibly, with the Bank of Japan.
As a counterpart to their permanent contributions, central banks would receive
shares. The question arises whether the contributions of individual central banks
should be periodically readjusted.
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There are two possible approaches:
on the One hand, as is the case with the EMCF, a fixed percentage ratio could
be maintained between the amount of reserves held by the shareholding
central banks and their contributions to the ERF. Such a solution, which calls
in question the permanent nature of the initial contributions, would be rather
complex in practice;
- on the other hand, it could be decided not to establish an automatic link
between the volume of the ERF's assets and the amount of reserves held by its
shareholders. The permanent nature of the contributions would be confirmed
by the decision to forgo any periodical readjustment; moreover, the relatively
low level set in the proposal for shareholders' initial contributions should
prevent any central bank from pointing to a decrease in its reserves as grounds
for reducing its contribution to the ERF and strengthening its own means of
intervention.
(c)  Management of reserves
The ERF would manage these reserves itself, thereby further reinforcing 
including in the view of the markets  the degree of cooperation between central
banks.
2. Subsequent taking over of the powers of the EM CF
In working towards greater exchange rate policy coordination among the
members of the EMS, and for reasons of simplicity, the body responsible for
carrying out interventions probably ought not to remain permanently separate
from the one responsible within the Community for managing the holdings of
official ECUs and the Community credit mechanisms.
Consequently, it would be appropriate to give immediate acknowledgement to the
intention that the ERF should ultimately assume the powers of the EMCF once all
the EEC's central banks have joined the European Reserve Fund.
3. Monetary surveillance
Alongside the creation of a foreign exchange department, the ERF would set up a
monetary policy department responsible for:
analysing in particular interest rate trends, monetary aggregates and domestic
demand;
thereby underpinning from both a conceptual and a Community point of view
the concerted management of exchange rates and the coordination of
monetary policies among the different participating central banks.
This phase could go hand in hand with the creation of a monetary policy coordi-
nation committee, which would define common surveillance instruments, propose
harmonized objectives , and progressively graduate from  ex post  analysis to an 
ante  approach to monetary policy adjustment.
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In a second phase, one could envisage vesting in the ERF powers to act 
support of central banks' actions in their respective money markets, by under-
taking swap operations for limited amounts, with commercial banks. Such
supporting action would in any case be marginal, but pending more structured
action (see paragraph 4 below) it could be a first step towards operational
functions in the monetary field.
4. Harmonization of national money markets
A third phase would begin once harmonization of the fundamentals of monetary
and exchange rate policies was practically completed and coordination of
domestic demand adjustment (in fiscal terms notably) an accomplished fact. It
would then be possible to work constructively towards harmonizing the
instruments and policies of intervention in national money markets.
Throughout these different stages, the ERF would be responsible for preparing the
way for the advent of a common currency. In this regard, effective progress in the
development of the ECU  without prejudging its future definition and issuing
process  should be secured alongside the process leading to the ultimate phase
of economic and monetary union.
B --  Organ~affonal affangemenffi
The structure of the European Reserve Fund should clearly reflect the conditions
prevailing at the time of its creation, in other words it should be sufficiently:
- flexible, so as to adapt to changes in its powers and to the gradual adhesion of
all the members of the EC to its operational function;
- ambitious, so as to foreshadow the broad outlines of a future European
Reserve Bank.
Its officials should also be assured of the continuity they need in order to operate
effectively.
The organization of the ERF would be based on a collegiate and consensus
principle, guaranteeing that its operations are coherent with thos.e that the central
bank will continue to perform individually, which implies in particular active
participation in all concertation procedures.
These few principles are not intended to give an exhaustive definition of the
ERF's operational basis, which should be the subject of appropriate discussions.
1. Eligibility
All the EC central banks would be eligible to join the ERF. However, membership
would be subject to:
the pooling of a portion of their reserves;
participation in the exchange rate mechanism, the reason being that the EMS
implies specific constraints on monetary policy and foreign exchange inter-
ventions, both of which require a common approach of the central banks
concerned.
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Management
Foreshadowing the future organization of  European Reserve Bank the
management of the ERF would consist of:
(a) A Board of Directors, which would comprise, ex officio, the Governors of
each central bank participating in the ERF. The Chairmanship would rotate
every two years for example, among each of its members. The Board of Directors
would decide on the organization and administration of the ERF, would approve
the accounts and decide on the appropriation of results.
The ERF's operating income would derive from the investment of exchange
reserves. The ERF' s income statement would take the operating costs of the Fund
into account and the net income  possibly after allowing for provisions 
would be allocated among shareholders in proportion to their contributions.
(b) An Executive Committee; owing to the specific nature of its powers and to
the role that it would eventually play directly in the markets, the ERF would have
a permanent Executive Committee whose m.embers would be selected by the
Committee of Governors on the basis of competence.
This Executive Committee would be small in size, consisting of three or four
members who would have dire.ct responsibility for the different departments of the
ERF.
(c) Two committees would be given the task of supervising the foreign exchange
and monetary policy spheres. These organs, inspired by the US Federal Open
Market Committee, would report regularly to the Committee of Governors and, in
the framework of a more active 'monitoring , would recommend appropriate
action.
The members of these two committees (a Foreign Exchange Committee and 
Monetary Policy Committee) would be appointed by the Committee of Governors
from among its own members and those of the Executive Committee of theERF
with the possibility of co-opting one or two outside personalities. Their term of
office should be long enough to ensure continuity of action (five years' minimum).
Internal organization
Initially, the ERF would comprise a Foreign Exchange and Reserves Management
Department and a Monetary Policy Department, which would both require a
permanent staff.
Subsequently, its structure would be modified in order to incorporate the powers
of the EMCF or other functions, when decided by the monetary authorities.
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4. Location
The question of where to locate the ERF is obviously a difficult one and should
be treated as a political matter. Before reaching a decision, it might be worth
considering entrusting the management of the ERF to each of its members in turn.
However, this kind of organization would diminish the public impact of the Fund
and would encounter very serious operational obstacles.
Another solution, initially, could be to locate the ERF temporarily in Basle, where
the Secretariat of the Committee of Governors and the EMCF are already located.
c ~  Legal requirements for the creation of a European Reserve Fund
It appears, at first sight, as if the legal foundation of the institution of a European
Reserve Fund would have to be the provisions of Article IO2a of the EEC'
founding Treaty, which were introduced by the Single European Act in July 1987.
This is because the creation of a new organization with monetary purposes ~ and
its corollary, the abolition 6f the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF)
may be regarded as 'institutional modifications' and therefore require,
according to the aforementioned Article IO2a, the Treaty review procedure
provided for under Article 236.
The procedure in question would entail, in addition to consultation with the
European Parliament and the Commission:
the calling of a conference of representatives of the Governments of Member
States, whose decisions are taken 'by common agreement'
ratification of the proposed amendments by all Member States 'in keeping
with their respective constitutional rules . In principle, this provision implies
although there is no explicit mention of this point in Article 236 
approval of the aforementioned amendments by the national Parliaments. 
Presumably it would be desirable to secure Parliamentary ratification of a
document that would lay the legal foundations for carrying the process of
monetary integration through to its conclusion. In other words, the document
should provide not only for the initial steps sketched out in this note, but also for
the subsequent stages leading to economic and monetary union and to a European
Reserve Bank. It would be made clear that each stage would require the prior
consent of the Member States.
One of the important questions that would have to be dealt with would concern
the relationships between the European Reserve Bank and the political authorities
in charge of setting exchange parities and framing the main lines of the economic
policy of the Community. In this respect, it would seem that the role of the
Council of Ministers would have to be decisive.
1 The Article 236 procedure was used in 1986 for the adoption of the Single European Act.
184The ECU as a parallel currency
W F. Duisenberg
Any discussion on promoting the ECU as a parallel currency requires answers to
two obvious questions: what do we mean by it and what does one expect to
achieve with it? There are various possible definitions of the ECU as a parallel
currency but they all have one characteristic feature in common: the development
of the BCD as a parallel currency would imply its increased use in international
transactions, both within and outside the European Communities, while national
currencies would  at least for the foreseeable future  retain their functions and
their central rates could continue to be adjusted. A parallel currency therefore
implies the absence of a monetary union, which can be defined as an area with
either a single currency or with national currencies with margins eliminated, full
convertibility and central rates irreversibly locked.
Some technical features
At present two separate ECDs exist:
the official ECU, created according to fixed rules by converting international
reserves and held exclusively by central banks;
the private ECU, assets denominated in ECUs and held primarily by the
market.
The development of the ECD as a parallel currency widely used in international
transactions refers, of course, to ECUs held by the private sector. At first the use
of the BCD by the private sector has shown a remarkable development, but
recently the increase in its use has not continued at its initial pace. However, if the
market were to feel the need, a resumption of its initial growth rate could occur
without changing either the separation of the two ECUs or the basket definition of
the ECU.
Proponents of the further development of the private ECD are reluctant to await
market developments and they feel the need for a more active stance on the part
of the authorities. They see two major distinct avenues along which official
measures can be taken to promote its use, which I shall call the market-oriented
approach and the institutional approach.
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In the market-oriented approach the techniques of the ECU are left unchanged
but the private ECU market is stimulated by actions like those taken by the UK
authorities. These actions are taken with a view to facilitate the functioning of the
private ECU market and to contribute to its depth and its overall liquidity. A
greater use of the private ECU by governments, especially in the sphere of the
Community budget, could also be seen as a possible element in this market-
oriented approach.
If such an approach indeed would lead to an increase in the use of the ECU by
the private sector, this could possibly have implications for monetary policies in
the Member States. For example, this would be the case if the share of the private
ECU in official reserves of EC central banks were to rise substantially. To this
end it has already been agreed that the Dalgaard Group will closely monitor the
development of the private ECU, and will call for consultations if problems of a
monetary character were to arise. A further step could be taken by the inclusion
by Member States of liquid assets denominated in ECUs held by residents in their
domestic monetary aggregates. In that case, of course, liquid assets denominated
in all Community currencies should be included also in this extended 
aggregate.
In general, it would seem that the market-oriented approach would ensure that a
further increase in the use of the ECU would indicate market appetite for the
ECU. Therefore, this avenue would seem to be less problematic than the situation
" which the authorities would provide the market with private ECUs which at
times may not be absorbed by the market without consequences for the exchange
rates, and, by implication, the monetary policies of the Member States.
The second avenue, the institutional approach, is advocated by those who feel that
the use of the private ECU can only be stimulated by giving that task to a
European institution. More precisely, official involvement in the private ECU
would be increased by charging the European Monetary Cooperation Fund
(EMCF) with responsibility for the ECU. Thus the suggestion has been made to
give the Fund a responsibility for the exchange rate relationship between the ECU
and third currencies. Another suggestion is to abolish, in addition, the basket defi-
nition, introducing an 'abstract' ECU.
Charging the Fund with responsibility for the exchange rate  vis-a-vis  third
currencies would mean that, for instance, the decision at what level and for what
amounts to support a weak dollar  at present taken by the central bank of the
strongest EMS currency - would be transferred to the Fund. The Fund would of
course have to be permanently provided with both third currencies and with either
Community currencies or the possibility to sell newly created ECUs to be able to
discharge its interventions.
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The effect on member countries would depend on the ECU's definition. Among
the many possibilities for such a definition three major variants can be distin-
guished:
if the basket definition were maintained any intervention would affect
exchange and monetary policies of all member countries, strong and weak;
if the basket definition were abolished and an ' abstract' ECU were introduced
the maintenance of stable exchange rates between member currencies and the
BCU would require the introduction of ECU intervention obligations for each
member currency.! In that case dollar purchases by the Fund against ECUs
would lead to ECU purchases against national currency by the strongest
members. The difference compared to the present situation, where the stronger
members buy dollars directly, would be that the decision to intervene is taken
by the Fund and no longer by the countries concerned. This implies that
exchange and domestic monetary policies of mainly the strongest member
countries would be affected by actions beyond their control. The size of the
dollar purchases by the Fund and thus of the monetary consequences for the
latter countries would increase if the EMCF would be enabled to create ECUs
by granting credit;
if an 'abstract' ECU through its definition were to become a near-perfect
substitute for the strongest ERM currency, its creation by the EMCF would
have monetary consequences for all Community countries. The need for the
monitoring of an extendedM aggregate, referred to earlier, would increase.
In all three variants official policy aiming at increasing the ECU's p:ivate role
promoting its development into a parallel currency, would imply an increase in
the European Monetary Cooperation Fund's functions. These functions would be
external, but they would by implication not only comprise interventions but also
the creation of central bank money. Therefore they would tend to decrease the
scope for national central banks' internal policy. It is therefore necessary to
consider what its purpose would be and whether all would agree with it.
Arguments for a parallel currency
Various motives, explicit or implicit, can be identified on the part of proponents
of the ECU as a parallel currency. These motives can also lead to different forms
of the ECU as a parallel currency.
It is believed that the increased use of the BCU in international transactions
will enable it to compete with the dollar to an extent that would be impossible for
1 To be able to comply with their interventionobIigations in ECUs the central banks would require
ECU reserves that can be used directly for intervention. One way of providing them with such
reserves would be through abolition of the separation between official and private ECUs.
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any national currency in Europe and that this in time would help Europe to
reduce its sensitivity for dollar fluctuations.
The ECU as a parallel currency is expected to contribute to the development
of a decision-making procedure in the EMS which would be considered more
European' than the present one.
Some hope that if the ECU is widely used for international transactions it may
in time develop into a common currency in a way that is less painful than the
process foreseen in the Council Resolution of 1971, which requires a high degree
of economic convergence and surrender of sovereignty.
~ It is suggested,  inter alia  from the industry side, that a wider use of the private
ECU would diminish transaction costs for intra-Community trade on the
assumption that the exchange risk would diminish also.
Reducing Europe s dependence on a strongly fluctuating dollar would probably
be welcomed by most of us. The obvious way to achieve it would be genuine
European economic and financial integration. Further convergence would enable
European currencies to form a solid bloc, diminishing the adverse effects of dollar
fluctuations on any single member country. However, the development of the
ECU as a parallel currency would by itself not diminish the exchange rate risks
neither outside nor inside the EMS. There is no inherent disciplinary capacity of
the private ECU which would bring about price and exchange stability. This can
be brought about only by firm national policies directed towards domestic price
stability. If these policies succeed in wiping out expectations of EMS
realignments, then a true independence of the dollar will be achieved, all the more
so if they were accompanied by the complete liberalization of capital movements.
Increasing the European Fund's role in managing the ECU and notably charging
it with interventions would transfer decisions from national central banks to the
Fund, limiting national central banks' domestic monetary control. It is precisely
for that reason that this could never take place in isolation but only in the context
of wider economic and monetary integration, while tasks and autonomy of the
European Fund would have to be agreed upon and guaranteed in the Treaty.
How far could a parallel currency provide a road towards a common currency
less painful than the one agreed in 1971 requiring convergence and loss of sover-
eignty? In fact it would not. At best it would imply an unnecessary detour towards
a common currency. But it could equally turn out to become a permanent feature
not facilitating further integration in any way. In so far as it would weaken
discipline in member countries experiencing more inflation than others and
balance-of-payments deficits, it might be rather the reverse.
It is a valid point that a decrease in the transaction costs for European industry
would be desirable. Presently there are in most countries no major obstacles for
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European industry to use the ECU as the transaction currency or the currency of
denomination. It is up to industry to judge whether there is a need to use this
possibility. However, it is not the greater use of the ECU which will determine the
exchange risk, but the level of convergence, as discussed above. A measurable
decrease in transaction costs can only be achieved by the near-elimination of
realignments.
Conclusions
Three conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing.
First.  Economic and monetary union requires economic convergence and the
acceptance of the loss of sovereignty implicit in the abolition of the exchange rate
as an adjustment instrument. The development of the ECU into an international
currency used in parallel to national currencies cannot enable us to avoid this
requirement nor can it facilitate its realization.
Second.  While we can agre.e that no obstacle should be put to the increased
market use of the ECU, the future developments should be closely monitored and
the implications of an increased use for internal monetary policies should be
signalled at an early stage.
Third.  New responsibilities for the European Monetary Cooperation Fund
involving market intervention in ECUs imply a shift in decision-making and
restrict national central banks' scope for control of domestic money supply. Such
new responsibilities therefore would not be consistent with the present institu-
tional framework but would constitute an institutional change. in the Single
European Act.
189The working of the EMS: A personal assessment
J. Godeaux
Introduction
The existence of an extensive body of background material relating to the func-
tioning and performance of the EMS, including academic research as well as
reviews conducted by official committees, makes it possible for this paper to limit
itself to what I consider to be the main elements of an assessment. I have aimed at
balanced judgment; however, the views here expressed, while hopefully
acceptable to many fellow Governors, are mine only.
Before dealing with the actual performance of the System, a brief overview of the
EMS features and developments will be presented. Section I will therefore address
five topics, covering the technical functioning of the System while at the same
time pointing towards the challenges ahead in these domains. Section II will then
discuss the performance of the System under a number of aspects. No attempt to
draw overall conclusions was made as these would involve policy preferences and
personal judgments.
A final remark is that the terms EMS and ERM (exchange rate mechanism) are
used intermittently in this paper as one and the same thing, unless specified
otherwise.
Assessment of the technical functioning of the EMS
In the present section the basic characteristics of the EMS will be recalled, namely
an exchange rate mechanism, based on a regime of fixed, though adjustable
exchange rates, supplemented by credit facilities and destined to involve the
participation of all the Community Member States, giving Europe a distinct place
on the international monetary scene. In particular, attention will be paid as to
how these features have evolved over time since the inception of the EMS and
what may be the challenges ahead.
1.  Exchange rate management: The issue of realignments
When looking back on 10 years of EMS experience, one cannot but conclude that
the scepticism and concerns voiced initially as to the durability of the System were
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unfounded. Expectations that it would develop into a regime of unduly frequent
crawling-peg' type of exchange rate adjustments have not materialized. Neither
has the system generated an excessive rigidity of exchange rates yielding mis-
alignments of real exchange rates.
In the annex to the conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council in
Bremen, it was stated that in terms of exchange rate management the EMS would
be at least as strict as the 'Snake . With the benefit of hindsight one can discern a
number of definite improvements in comparison with the 'Snake' concerning the
issue of realignments.
Firstly, changes in central rates have become truly multilateral decisions.
Secondly, their frequency as well as their magnitude have been markedly reduced
after the initial learning period, i.e. 1979 to 1983.
Thirdly, as a result, adjustments in market exchange rates have been smaller
making speculative capital movements less rewarding. Fourthly, realignments
have been accompanied most of the time by domestic policy adjustments, granting
credibility to the newly established central rates. And, finally, the merits of
exchange rate stability and discipline have been better recognized.
None the less, some problems remain. The timing of realignments and their
magnitude are still influenced by comments and debates of a ' political' nature.
Moreover, the policy option of small and infrequent realignments geared to
combat speculative capital movements in a technical way may give the impression
that exchange rate changes are simply an adjunct to monetary policies. Their
capacity to contribute to the correction of fundamental economic divergences has
been less clearly put in evidence. Realignments should not simply be a periodic
adjustment to inflation rate differentials. These differentials should not be fully
corrected so as to retain an element of exchange rate constraint.
2.  Exchange rate management within the band
Over the years, views regarding the management of currencies within their fluc-
tuation margins in the EMS band have shifted rather markedly. At the outset
flexible use of the band width was regarded as a cushion which could absorb or
dampen some external shocks without necessitating immediate exchange rate
interventions or monetary and other economic policy measures. Only if and when
a currency was out of line with the average of all other participants should this
entail a presumption of action by the authorities concerned. To ascertain that this
rule would apply symmetrically in the case of both weak and strong currency
positions, a divergence indicator was constructed.
Experience showed that this strategy entailed some disadvantages: the ECU did
not prove very helpful for the operation of the divergence indicator and delaying
intervention until it became obligatory, i.e. at the margins, at times resulted in a
market perception that the authorities were no longer committed to defend the
existing parity grid, fuelling speculative pressure and necessitating more inter-
vention than initially warranted.
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This led the authorities to believe that a strategy of keeping their exchange rates
well within the band and limiting movements against key currencies of the EMS
to a minimum would be more rewarding both in terms of influencing market
sentiment and in terms of domestic monetary stability. This new strategy did
entail an increased recourse to intra-marginal interventions relative to marginal
ones as well as a more timely use of interest rate policy, especially for weaker
currency countries.
With the progressive integration of financial markets and with the objective of the
abolition of the remaining capital restrictions, in line with the goal of completing
the internal market in 1992, the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS might have
to face the prospect of increased or new strains calling for some reinforcement of
the System. The result was the so-called Basle/Nyborg agreement providing for a
more active and flexible use of all the instruments available to central banks for
meeting short-term exchange rate pressures and for better coordination of such
action among the ERM participants.
Thus, a more flexible use of the EMS band width was called for, without
returning to the original situation of letting currencies drift to the limits. This in
turn justified the provision of very short-term financing of intra-marginal inter-
ventions under certain conditions. It also made more cooperation on monetary
policy measures imperative. To promote a more effective use of the instruments
available, a strengthened monitoring procedure was put in place.
Although it is still somewhat early to assess the working of the Basle/Nyborg
agreement, experience gained up to now is encouraging. This does not exclude
however, that further measures be considered, essentially in order to gradually
replace the system of  ex post  concertation by one of  ex ante  coordination of
monetary policies.
3.  Financing and settlement of interventions
Contrary to early fears by creditor countries that the EMS would open the door
for more inflationary financing, in view of the increase in volume of available
credit facilities and the creation of the ECU as a means of settlement, the
evidence turns out to be much more balanced. No permanent net ECU positions
have developed VSTF arrangements have never been abused and the STMS
facility has even remained unused. Instead, Member States have preferred market
related balance of payments financing and the use of foreign currency reserves to
settle interventions.
The shift in intervention strategy referred to earlier has contributed to the German
mark becoming the prominent intervention currency to the detriment of the US
dollar. This evolution carried with it both advantages and disadvantages. The
former consisted of opening up the possibility of intra-marginal interventions
against the traditionally strongest currency without influencing the German
monetary base (so-called asymmetrically sterilized interventions). The latter
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pertained to the fact that only one EMS currency, namely the strongest one, was
being sought after to this end by the weaker-currency central banks.
The role of the ECU has thus remained limited, far from attaining a position at
the centre of the System as originally envisaged. Notwithstanding its remarkable
development as a financial instrument, the effective impact of the private ECU
use on the operation of the EMS is still marginal.
4.  Coordination of exchange rate policies  vis-a.-vis  third currencies
It is undeniable that the greater degree of convergence in monetary performance
and policies of the EMS countries since 1983 under the leadership of the
Bundesbank (see also Section II) has reduced the EMS exposure to outside shocks
in general, US dollar instability in particular. As long as convergence remains
incomplete though  preventing EMS currencies from becoming close substitutes
the international environment will remain a potential source of instability for
the exchange rate mechanism.
With the German mark as the nominal anchor in the EMS, the policy choice of
the ERM participants to accept whatever exchange rate target (or absence of
target) the German monetary authorities had chosen for the German mark was
understandable. As such the German mark came to serve equally as the linchpin
between the EMS and the international monetary system.
The EMS has failed to become a representative homogeneous monetary entity on
the international level. This was demonstrated for instance by the fact that the
Plaza and Louvre agreements have incorporated more than one EMS member on
an individual basis, while for their implementation a coordinated intervention
approach by all EMS members was solicited. It has to be said though, that the
EMS has come to receive greater recognition over the years as a specific part 
the international monetary system.
5.  Non- or incomplete participation in the exchange rate mechanism
The fact that the EMS in its wider sense encompasses all EEC currencies whereas
only seven out of 12 fully participate in the exchange rate mechanism has so far
caused no major difficulties for the working of the System, perhaps even saved it
from encountering more frequent tensions. However ERM participation of
sterling might have facilitated exchange rate management for specific countries
such as Ireland. Besides, apart from generating greater instability for the ECU, the
prolonged non-participation of the UK has sustained doubts about the merits and
the potential development of the System, especially in those circles where natural
scepticism was already prevailing.
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Assessment of the EMS performance
To be able to assess the performance of the EMS, it is necessary to bear in mind
its objectives. For this it suffices to recall the following passage in the conclusions
of the Presidency of the European Council in Brussels in December 1978: 'The
purpose of the EMS is to establish a greater measure of monetary stability in the
Community. It should be seen as a fundamental component of a more compre-
hensive strategy aimed at lasting growth with stability, a progressive return to full
employment, the harmonization of living standards and the lessening of regional
disparities in the Community. The System will facilitate the convergence of
economic development and give fresh impetus to the process of European Union
In the following subsections the attainment of the abovementioned goals will be
assessed under three headings: the EMS as a zone of monetary stability, as a
determining factor of economic performance and convergence, and as an
instrument of increased (monetary) cooperation.
1.  The EMS as a zone of monetary stability
Monetary stability comprises an internal as well as an external aspect: low
inflation and exchange rate stability. Although no priority between these two was
established at the outset, it gradually became accepted that monetary policies
should be geared to make national inflation rates converge on price stability and
that this in turn would lay the foundations for lasting exchange rate stability.
Nevertheless, even in the absence of convergence on price stability, the EMS has
already made a definite contribution to the realization of the objective of
exchange rate stability. Indeed, as numerous studies using different methodologies
have shown, the variability of exchange rates of ERM participants  whether in
nominal or in real terms  decreased markedly not only in comparison with the
Snake' period but also over time , when comparing the first half of the 10 years of
EMS experience with the second half. Moreover, the EMS results compare
favourably with those of non-ERM participants inside and outside Europe.
More important still is that this outcome did not result from capital controls or
interest rates acting as shock absorbers. In effect, capital controls have gradually
been diminishing while the observation of interest rate variability before and after
the EMS does not show a clear tendency towards rising instability.
Concerning internal monetary stability, the same three types of comparison as
presented above can be made. Compared with the ' Snake' the EMS did not lay
the ground for looser monetary policies but rather provided a framework in which
anti-inflationary policies could be pursued more effectively. Of course, one cannot
brush aside the favourable external monetary environment in assessing the relative
merits of the EMS. It is, however, extremely difficult to quantify this effect in
isolation.
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As to the question whether the EMS provided a better framework than other
national experiences, where one has also witnessed a remarkable deceleration of
inflation, the debate has so far been inconclusive. What should be borne in mind
in this respect is that these other countries in bringing down their inflation rates
frequently resorted to an increase in the short-term variability of exchange rates or
even accepted the occurrence of misalignments, elements which are incompatible
with the overall monetary stability objective of the EMS.
Last but not least, the more recent evidence and projections on monetary and
credit policies and performances is indicating a clear trend towards convergence
of money growth and inflation performance among the ERM participants at low
levels as compared with the other Community members. This seems to imply that
the EMS is finally paying off in terms of credibility with regard to its anti-infla-
tionary stance.
One should warn, however, against too relaxed an attitude in these matters.
Internal monetary convergence on price stability is not fully achieved yet, with the
measure of dispersion in inflation still having to reach the low level attained in the
1960s on average. Monetary and exchange rate policies should therefore proceed
along the lines followed in the past to preserve the acquired stability firmly.
Thus, exchange rate realignments will remain unavoidable for the time being,
which raises the difficult issues of their timing and their being accompanied by the
necessary adjustment measures so as not to rekindle the vicious circle which
nearly made the System collapse in 1981-83.
2.  The EMS as .a determining factor of economic performance and convergence
Three issues will be addressed in this subsection: firstly, a sketchy description of
the degree of convergence in economic performances and policies in the EMS;
secondly, the question whether the causes for the less satisfactory results can be
attributed to the System proper; and, thirdly, what will be their consequences for
the working of the EMS. It is obvious that these are complex and even
controversial matters which the present paper can only describe in a general way.
1. Economic performances and convergence
It can be said that the prime goal of the EMS is the creation of a sound basis for
internal and external stability as a precondition for the achievement of the
broader economic objectives set out by the European Council in December 1978.
To attain this goal, a fair degree of convergence in economic performances must
be achieved, especially in the field of costs and prices.
If differences in economic variables such as real GDP growth, current-account
and fiscal balances must no longer endanger exchange rate stability, a reasonable
degree of convergence needs to be achieved in these areas too. One cannot deny
that results obtained so far have fallen short of what was desirable or necessary.
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Real GDP growth may have been converging slightly, but at a low level instead of
at the higher figure arrived at elsewhere in Europe. Recent developments of
growth performances have shown more encouraging signs. It remains to be seen
though, if this does announce a reversal of the long-term trend of sluggish growth
in the EMS. Current-account imbalances have not disappeared, with shrinking
deficits for some Member States only being replaced by increasing surpluses for
others. Fiscal disequilibria have remained large with public-debt levels conse-
quently still on the rise in a number of countries.
2. Is the EMS to blame?
The question has to be asked whether the situation as described above was caused
by the EMS. Or, phrased otherwise, would the situation have evolved more
favourably without the existence of the System? Complete answers are not
available. Statistical analysis cannot provide decisive evidence on all counts if
only because several standards of reference may be put forward to assess the
performance of the EMS.
In a broader time perspective one must not overlook the fact that at the start of
the 1980s the current-account and/or fiscal balances of most of the ERM
participants were not very satisfactory, quite often being worse off than in other
non-EMS countries in Europe. The adjustments imposed on some EMS members
led them to policy measures conducive to dampening domestic demand, leading
in turn to slower growth in the EMS compared with growth performances outside.
The necessary adjustments could surely not have been delayed in the absence of
the EMS. On the contrary, the existence of the EMS provided the weaker currency
members with a credible commitment to strengthen their public finances in a
non-inflationary way. Their willingness to resist inflationary pressures arising out
of the devaluations of their currencies in order to improve their current account
situations, however, gave rise to realignments that most of the time did not totally
wipe out differences in their real exchange-rate movements  vis-a-vis  the German
mark in particular. As mentioned above, this limit placed on realignments has the
merit of maintaining some ' foreign exchange constraint' in the weaker economies.
But one may ask whether the tendency to a relative undervaluation of the German
mark might not have enhanced German competitiveness and added external
stimulus to Germany s growth rate. This would have alleviated the need for
Germany to give further stimulus to domestic demand.
It appears extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify the relative importance
of the various factors that account for the persistent divergences in the area of
fiscal-policy and current-account developments. With regard to the latter which
are increasingly mentioned as a possible threat to EMS stability, the analytical
work done so far does not offer a satisfactory explanation of the persistent diver-
gences by referring to the relative cyclical positions and cost/price developments
only. It seems that other more structural factors need to be taken into
consideration equally.
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3. Consequences for the EMS
Irrespective of the causes of disappointing growth performances, current-account
disequilibria and fiscal-policy divergences, the persistence of these phenomena
will clearly have an unfavourable impact on the functioning of the System.
As yet two major consequences can be perceived. The first one is a credibility
problem in so far as references to a possible deflationary bias of the System and
to the risk of a build-up of fundamental balance-of-payments disequilibria do cast
some doubt on the intrinsic stability of the System and on its potential devel-
opment. Secondly, it is undeniable that fiscal-policy and current-account diver-
gences imply the persistence of interest-rate differentials which themselves could
delay or complicate the progression of convergence.
The System has to defend itself against the objection that it is a low-growth area.
It has also to defend itself against the objection that it is an ' asymmetrical' system.
To avoid misunderstanding, the whole question of asymmetry deserves deeper
analysis and research.
3.  The EMS as an instrument of increased monetary cooperation
The EMS monetary cooperation has now reached a content that largely outweighs
the degree of cooperation achieved in most other areas of Community policy. A
lot of the credit for this achievement is due to the flexibility of the System.
Pragmatic arrangements were often preferred to strict or explicit rules. This prag-
matism has permitted the evolutionary change as evidenced in the ECU package
of July 1985 and most visibly in the Basle/Nyborg agreement of September 1987.
It may be recalled that the 'flexible cooperation approach' was at the outset
conceived as a transitory arrangement only. According to the Brussels Resolution
an institutional phase had to be reached not later than two years after the
inception of the System. However, in December 1980, the European Council
decided to postpone  sine die  such a step. Frankly speaking, there is not much
hope that this institutional step will be taken in the near future nor much
insistence that it should be.
One can therefore say that in the perennial debate on 'rules versus discretion , the
participants in the System have laid great weight on discretion.
am quite sure that this pragmatic approach is still capable of bringing further
progress. Yet one cannot avoid the fact that, in order to cope with the challenges
ahead, namely, preserving monetary and exchange rate stability in an envi-
ronment of free capital movement while contributing to the completion of the
internal market, one should except a continuous move towards collective
decision-making on even the most vital parts of national monetary policy.
Although the present strategy of voluntary policy coordination undoubtedly still
leaves room for ample improvement, the question arises how long such a stance
can continue meeting the increasing requirements of joint monetary policy-
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making and can remain a satisfactory answer to the expectations of market
operators, of public opinion and of the political sphere.
We therefore have to ask ourselves whether a new Basle/Nyborg package can be
put together and made public or what institutional step can be taken despite our
obvious preference for the pragmatic approach. To paraphrase the English
expression about justice, ' not only must progress be made, it must be  seen  to be
made
199The  ECU  banking market1
A.  Lamfalussy
After strong growth in the earlier years of this decade, the expansion of the
reporting banks' ECU-denominated assets and liabilities slowed down markedly
in 1986, and the share of ECU assets in banks' total non- dollar Euro-currency
assets has since then remained stable at around 9%, although there have been
renewed signs of dynamism and vitality more recently.
In mid-1988 the reporting banks' ECU assets amounted to ECU 95 billion. The
bulk of this was booked with banks in Belgium/Luxembourg, France, the United
Kingdom and Italy, with very little business elsewhere.
The ECU market is .first and foremost an interbank market, with direct business
with non-banks being relatively less important than in most other sectors of the
Euro-market. For example, in mid-1988 interbank positions accounted for 77 and
89 % respectively of the reporting banks' ECU assets and liabilities. Apart from
supporting their ECU business with non-bank customers and their role as interme-
diaries in the ECU bond market, the banks use theECU for arbitrage, funding
and hedging operations. There is an active exchange market in ECUs, with spot
and forward contracts and an efficient private clearing system with an estimated
daily volume of ECU 15 billion.
The reporting banks' outstanding credits to non-bank entities amounted to ECU
22 billion in mid-1988, whereas deposit liabilities to non-banks totalled barely
ECU 7 billion, or only 4 % of overall non-dollar Euro-currency deposits. Given
this very pronounced net creditor position, it would appear that the growth of the
ECU market has been driven above all by borrowing demand. By far the most
important borrowers were non-bank entities in Italy and France, where use of the
ECU has been officially encouraged through its partial exemption from foreign
exchange restrictions and by public-sector borrowings in ECUs. In mid-1988
residents of these two countries accounted for over one-half of total ECU credits.
1 The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of Helmut Mayer in the preparation and drafting
of this paper.
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In more general terms ECD borrowing may be attractive to entities from
countries where domestic currency interest rates are higher than ECD rates, and at
times when there seems to be relatively little danger of a depreciation of the
domestic currency  vis-A-vis  the ECD. This helps to explain the buoyancy of the
demand for ECD credits in the period up to 1985 when the strength of the
German mark within the EMS exchange rate band was mitigated by the unusually
firm dollar. ECD borrowing may also be attractive for international firms with
operations in several BC member countries and for firms (such as Saint-Gobain)
which have begun to use the ECD for their published accounts. FinaJIy, ECD
borrowing may to some extent be related to the role of the ECD as a unit of
account in commercial transactions. Around I % of France s and Italy s interna-
tional trade is reported to have been invoiced in ECDs.
The relatively small amount of ECD-denominated non-bank deposits suggests that
its attractiveness as a near-money substitute and store of liquidity is quite limited.
In fact, since end-1985 ECD deposits have not, on balance, shown any growth at
all. Moreover, the supply ofECD deposits is geographically highly concentrated
with nearly 45 % of the total amount coming from residents of the Benelux
countries. One important reason why non-bank ECD deposits grew much less
than ECD credits was that, in contrast to ECD borrowing, depositing in ECDs
was restrained by foreign exchange controls (e.g. in Italy and France) or other
legal restrictions (Germany). However, these regulatory obstacles have now largely
been removed, or .are in the process of being removed.
On the positive side, a possible argument in favour of the ECD as a deposit outlet
is its high interest level and its relative exchange rate stability due to its basket
characteristics which should make it attractive as an alternative to the dollar in
times of dollar weakness. As on the borrowing side, the ECD denomination
should be attractive as a hedging intrument for firms with operations in several
EC member countries and for firms that keep their accounts or conduct business
in ECDs. Moreover, in some countries the ECD is also used to some extent for
payment purposes, for example via current accounts or in the form of travellers
cheques.
Finally, it should be noted that there has been a fairly steady growth of the private
ECD for official reserve purposes, although, at ECD 2.1 billion, the identified
amount of crossborder official ECD deposits in mid-1988 was still quite modest.
In addition, there are about ECD 34 billion of ECD bonds outstanding in the
international issue market. A substantial proportion of this paper is undoubtedly
in the portfolios of non-bank holders.
One factor that may affect the demand for BCD assets, and possibly also ECD
borrowing, is the forthcoming five-yearly review of the composition of the ECD
basket in September 1989. Particularly if the Spanish peseta and the Portuguese
escudo were to be included in the basket, this would tend to reduce the weight of
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the German mark and the Dutch guilder in favour of currencies which bear higher
interest yields and which tend to be more depreciation-prone in the eyes of the
market. While the rules for changing the ECU weights require that on the day 
adjustment the ECU' s exchange rate shall not be affected, this provision obviously
cannot safeguard the spot (discounted) value of longer-term ECU assets, unless
the change in the basket weights has been fully anticipated by the market. This
however, will primarily affect the demand for ECU bonds. The demand for
private ECU deposits, which are mainly short term, could only be affected shortly
before the basket adjustment, and possibly afterwards if the market felt that the
higher interest yield was no adequate compensation for the higher exchange risk
involved. It should, moreover, be noted that the combined weight of the peseta
and the escudo in the ECU basket would be unlikely to exceed 7 %.
To sum up, following the vigorous growth in the first half of this decade, the
expansion of banks' ECU business has fallen back in line with the  overall devel-
opment of the non-dollar sector of the Euro-currency market. Whilst by no means
negligible in absolute amounts, the bank's ECU operations with non-banks are
still very small in relation to total Euro-currency business. In particular, ECU
deposits have, on balance, shown no growth in recent years, despite the removal
of a number of regulatory constraints. The ECUs used by the banks for lending
purposes have, therefore, had to be created largely through the 'bundling' or
forward covering of the constituent currencies. Moreover, the geographical distri-
bution of non-bank ECU borrowers and depositors remains highly skewed and
some special incentives for ECU-denominated borrowing have fallen away as a
result of the scrapping of exchange controls.
Despite a recent pick-up of its rate of growth, the ECU market does not at present
appear very likely to take over from the other sectors of the Euro-currency market
and develop spontaneously into a major parallel currency in the EEC member
countries. For this purpose the geographical spread of borrowers and the
non-bank deposit base in particular would have to be much broader. Greater use
of the ECU in commercial transactions and also for payment and accounting
purposes would undoubtedly help the further development of the market.
Enhanced confidence in the stability of the EMS exchange rate structure would
probably also be supportive, although this would tend to reduce the differentials
between ECU and national currency interest rates. Increased use of the ECU for
official borrowing, exemplified by the recent UK issue of Treasury bills, together
with the prospects for 1992, should provide some renewed stimulus to the growth
of the market. Nevertheless, it seems doubtful whether, without major further
official efforts to encourage its use, the ECU will in the foreseeable future playa
pivotal role in the growth of the international banking market.
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TABLE 
Development of the ECU banking market1
ECU assets
of which:  vis-a-vis  banks
vis-a-vis  non-banks
ECU liabilities
of which:  vis-ii-vis  banks
vis-ii-vis  non-banks
vis-ii-vis  monetary
authorities
Memorandum items
ECU assets:
in billion DM
in billion USD
(share in non-dollar
Euro-market2
ECU Euro-bonds
outstanding:
in billion ECU
in billion USD
(share in non-dollar
international bond market3
(outstanding amounts in billion ECU)
1982
end-Dec. end-Dec. end-Dec. end-Dec. end-Dec. end-June end-Dec. end-June
1988
15.4
(1.7)e
(2.
1983
14.
12.
10.4
1.4
1984
39.
28.
11.2
31.
27.
88.
28.
(7.
(oo
1985
63.
49.3
13.
57.
49.
138.
56.
(9.
18.
16.
(oo (6.
1986
70.
54.
15.
61.
53.
1.0
146.
75.
(8.
24.
26.
(7.
1987
74.
57.
16.
64.
57.3
1.1
154.
84.5
(8.
29.
33.
(7.3)
1987
82.4
62.1
20.3
69.
60.
1.6
169.
107.4
(8.
31.5
41.0
(7.3)
95.
73.
22.
82.
73.
1.9 0.3
197.
108.4
(9.
34.
38.
(7.
e = Estimates.
External and local positions in ECUs of banks located in Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland (as from end-December
1987) and the United Kingdom.
As a percentage of total non-dollar foreign currency assets (expressed in current dollars) of reporting banks.
As a percentage of total non-dollar international issues (expressed in current dollars).
32.4
11.9
(3.1)
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IThe ECU, the common currency and the monetary union
Gunter D. Baer
ommaso Padoa-Schioppa
Issues and options
1. The following terminology may be used to facilitate the discussion of the
common currency and the ECU:
common currency  describes a currency which is used throughout the Community
and is  not  the national currency of either a Member State or a third country. Two
types of common currenCY can be distinguished:
(i) a  parallel currency,  which is a common currency that is created independently
, and in addition to, national currencies. It circulates in parallel with
national currencies and competes with them;
(ii) a  single currency  is a common currency that has replaced all existing national
currencies as a result of an institutional decision (rather than a market
process).
A common currency may, however, also be understood as signifying the use of a
common numeraire  (as in the case of the private ECU today) or a  common reserve
instrument  as a means of implementing a common monetary policy.
2. The issue of the currency in a monetary union revolves around two interrelated
questions:
(a) What is the need for, and role of, a common currency in the process leading
to monetary union?
(b) What should be the future role of the ECU?
3.  A common currency in the process leading to monetary union.  Varying views may
be held on this question. One is that no common currency is needed in order to
achieve monetary union, because the irrevocable locking of parities, full mobility
of capital and the pursuit of a single monetary policy suffice for the creation of
such a union, i.e. a single currency area. Alternatively, it may be argued that ulti-
mately the move to  a single currency  is necessary in order to reap the full benefits
of monetary union. According to this view, only a single currency can provide a
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convenient  numeraire  for the transactions of private economic agents and substan-
tially reduced uncertainties and transaction costs. It can also be pointed out that
no monetary union has ever existed without a common currency, and that the
credibility of the 'irrevocable locking' would be at risk if many different
currencies continued to exist.
4.  The role of the ECU.  Any proposals concerning the role of the ECU obviously
depend very much On the views held regarding the need for a common currency.
However, it should be borne in mind that the ECU already exists, that it holds a
place in private markets, that certain expectations have been raised concerning its
future role in the process towards monetary union and that it carries a symbolic
value to which political leaders may attach importance. To many observers it
seems natural that the ECU' s role should grow with progress towards monetary
union and that it should become the Community s single currency. Others may
consider that it is premature to formalize arrangements for a common currency,
and that all that is needed is to promote convergence and monetary stability.
5. There are three options regarding the future role of the ECU, which are not
necessarily mutually exclusive.
6. Firstly, the ECU would remain a basket of Community currencies and serve as
common numeraire.  All possible impediments to its voluntary use in private
financial and commercial transactions would be removed, but no particular
official action would be taken to promote it; no new institution would be required
to manage the ECU, but the monetary effects of its growing use would have to be
monitored.
7. Secondly, the official ECU (which could remain a basket) would be used as a
common reserve instrument  in managing a common monetary policy; in this case
the ECU would become the reserve money of the European system of central
banks. This approach has been suggested in Governor Ciampi's paper. The
expanded use of the official ECU in this way wold not require a link between the
official and the private ECU, and the latter would evolve in accordance with the
first option.
8. Thirdly, as has been suggested by some academic economists, the ECU could
be made  a parallel currency.  It would be issued by a central institution and
permitted to circulate freely throughout the Community as a means of payment
store of value and unit of account. The ECU would be an additional  13th 
Community currency, it would have to be defined in its own right (so-called
abstract ECU) and it would form part of the exchange rate arrangements. Its
acceptance and use by private market participants would depend essentially on its
quality as money.
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II  Propositions relating to the ECU
9. Four possible propositions are stated and examined below:
lO. 'A  parallel .currency approach is neither a useful nor a desirable way of estab-
lishing a monetary union  . Under the parallel currency approach the ECU would
be created independently of, and in addition to, national .currencies, circulating in
parallel with them and competing with them. The idea of its advocates is that the
ECU would 'crowd out' national currencies , thus establishing a monetary union in
a 'painless' way. The critics of this approach reject it on two grounds. Firstly, it
would not contribute to solving in an orderly manner the problem of coordinating
national monetary policies; on the contrary, it would add a 13th player to an
already difficult coordination exercise. Secondly, it could undermine a monetary
policy oriented towards price stability, because it would add a source of money
creation that is difficult to link to the needs of economic activity.
Some concrete implications of this proposition are that before the final stage:
(i) the ECUshould remain a basket;
(ii) no independent monetary policy would be instituted for the ECU;
(iii) no link would need to be established between the private and the official
ECU circuits.
11.  'An "imprimatur" should be given to the ECU as the future single currency of the
Community A single currency, while not strictly necessary for the creation of a
monetary union, might  for economic as well as psychological and political
reasons  be seen as the natural and desirable further development of such a
union. However, before the Community could consider adopting a single
currency, exchange rates would have to be irrevocably locked (the timing of which
might depend much more on the effective coordination of policies than on
growing use of the ECU). Once exchange rates are permanently fixed the ECU
will become a very close substitute for any national currency.
One concrete implication of this proposition is that:
(i) there should be no discontinuity between the present ECU and the future
single currency, i.e. any debt contracted in ECUs before the introduction of
the single currency would be payable at face value in ECUs if, at maturity, the
transition to the single currency had been made.
12.  'All impediments to the voluntary use of the ECU as a common numeraire and a
means of settlement by private economic agents would have to be removed' Barring
official action discriminating in favour of the ECU (which would result in unde-
sirable financial market distortions) and excluding a link between the official and
the private ECU, there are, broadly speaking, two types of measure: direct
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encouragement (e.g. increased borrowing in ECUs by public sector entities; larger
exchange market interventions in ECUs; some official support for the ECU
clearing system) and indirect encouragement (e.g. removal of restrictions on the
private use of the ECU by giving it the status of a foreign or national currency in
each member country; demonstration effects through increasing operations in
official ECUs within the EMS and by enlarging the group of other holders).
Some concrete implications of this proposition are that:
(i) as a  numeraire  the ECU would have equal, but not privileged, status  vis-a-vis
the national currency denomination; therefore
(ii) the ECU would be an additional unit of account wherever national legislation
specifies the use of a  numeraire.
13.  The official ECU could playa role in the conduct of a common monetary policy
in an advanced stage of monetary union  . Governor Ciampi presented a scheme in
which the official ECU would be used as a reserve instrument in managing a
common monetary policy in the Community. This scheme represents one, but not
necessarily the only, way of giving operational meaning to the .concept of a single
monetary policy. In considering whether there are other operational schemes for a
common monetary policy, it has to be borne in mind that the ECU should not
become a parallel currency (i.e. the official ECU must remain an asset used only
within the circle of central banks) and that the official ECD already performs a
number of functions in central bank operations.
212proposal for stage two under which monetary policy
operations would be centralized in a jointly-owned
subsidiary
A. Lamfalu$sy
Introduction
1. This note describes an institutional reform that BC central banks could
introduce to mark stage two of the transition to European monetary union. The
proposal is based on the following premises concerning stage two:
it is assumed that the new Treaty has been ratified and that the enhanced
policy concertation carried out by the Committee of EC Governors during
stage one has yielded results;
in the monetary field, stage two is supposed to go beyond stage one in three
important respects: (a) at least the embryo of a federal central banking system
should be put in place; (b) while the final word on the conduct of national
monetary policies is to remain with the Member States, there should be a
visible further strengthening in the extent of policy coordination; and
similarly, (c) while it would still be possible to alter intra-Community
exchange rates, there should also be visible progress in coordinating inter-
vention policy in the exchange markets;
progress in these three areas should be such that it prepares the ground for the
move to stage three, i.e. the irrevocable locking of exchange rates and the full
operation of a federal central banking system.
2. With these premises in mind, three possible approaches to stage two are
proposed. The first would be to implement a gradual but formal transfer of
decision-making power from the monetary authorities of the member countries to
federal central banking institution. The second approach  outlined in
Governor Ciampi's contribution to this collection of papers- would be to set up
a formal two-tier system of monetary control based on the requirement that
1 The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of Creon Butler in the preparation and drafting of this paper.
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member central banks back their creation of local currency reserves with ECU
reserves supplied by a federal central banking institution. Finally, at the core of
the third approach set out in this paper is the idea that EC central banks should
set up a jointly owned subsidiary, whose facilities they would share in performing
certain of their functions  notably the implementation of monetary policy
through the domestic money and foreign exchange markets  but which would
not require them to give up any substantial degree of individual sovereignty over
those functions.
3. The first two approaches implicitly assume that some element of central bank
authority or resources would need to be put under collective control as a
necessary condition for establishing a new operational institution in stage two. 
contrast, the third approach essentially reverses the order of progress so that oper-
ations are centralized in a new institution  before  resources are formally pooled or
authority is granted to a collective body. Following recent EC terminology, the
resulting situation could be characterized as common operational facilities with
home-country control'
4. Section II describes the central bank operations that would be centralized in the
joint subsidiary, while Sections III and IV examine the likely benefits and costs of
the scheme. Sections V and VI consider some more detailed questions of
implementation. Section VII contains conclusions and poses some unresolved
questions.
II - What functions should be centralized?
5. In principle, several functions of the EC central banks could be performed
through shared facilities. However, the largest boost to the monetary union
process would come from centralizing the operations through which national
monetary policies are implemented. This would cover domestic open market and
lending operations, as well as intervention in the foreign exchange markets. It
would be achieved by establishing a common operations floor and accounting
system within the jointly owned subsidiary which could be known from the outset
as the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). Initially, each member central
bank would staff its own operations on the common floor rather like a branch
but over time these separate national staffs would be merged into a single unit (see
Section V). Although their operations would be performed through common
facilities, and hence be completely transparent to their partners, individual
member central banks would retain ultimate responsibility for the deployment of
their national foreign exchange reserves, and for the supply of domestic bank
reserves.
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III  Benefits of the scheme
6. By centralizing the implementation of national monetary policies in a single
institution, the EC central banks would give a powerful demonstration, both
politically and to the markets, of the progress that had already been made in the
concertation of national economic policies, and of the seriousness with which they
were pursuing the ultimate goal of monetary union.
7. To maximize the reform s impact on market perceptions the member central
banks could agree fairly early on in stage two not to reveal the source of
instructions for operations by the ESCB. Thereafter the market would find 
much harder to exploit differences in emphasis among member central banks.
Moreover, the risk of separate actions by member central banks being misinter-
preted in the markets would be greatly reduced. At the same time the common use
of the ESCB for exchange rate intervention would impose considerable discipline
on member central banks to coordinate their actions so as to give consistent
signals to the markets. This would apply to all users of the shared facilities, even
those which were not full participants in the ERM.
8. The transparency of individual national operations, together with the
experience of working closely together, would enhance the level of trust and
understanding among the staffs of member central banks, at the operational level
and perhaps also at the policy-making level. When combined with the rapid inter-
change of information on both domestic and foreign operations, this would help
to improve coordination on market tactics and might also lead to further advances
in policy concertation.
9. Over the longer term the sharing of detailed information on national money
market institutions and short-term transmission mechanisms, in conjunction with
the 'installation' of all EC control mechanisms on common facilities, would
encourage efforts to clarify and converge the domestic operating mechanisms for
each currency. This would not only ease the transition to a unified monetary
control procedure, but would also help to .ensure that the ESCB developed into an
institution focused on the objective of price stability within the Community.
10. A less certain benefit of the scheme would be the cost savings that might result
from centralizing monetary operations. There could be substantial economies of
scale, with the added interim benefit for small countries of being able to develop
more sophisticated operating procedures than would be possible on an individual
basis.
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IV  Implications for national sovereignty
11. The scheme could impinge on national sovereignty in two respects. Firstly,
member central banks would no longer be able to disguise the content of their
domestic and foreign monetary operations from their EC partners. This loss of
privacy is the key to many of the benefits described above, but to the extent that it
does represent a sacrifice it provides an opportunity for all member central banks
to demonstrate their commitment to the ultimate goal of monetary union. Indeed
the inclusion of all important monetary operations in the scheme is essential to
ensure that all EC central banks make an equivalent commitment to it, even those
without well-developed money market operations.
12. Secondly, there could be a tendency over the long run for national money
markets to migrate to the country in which the ESCB operations were located.
However, it should be recognized that the development of one dominant financial
centre could well be an inevitable long-run consequence of achieving monetary
union, even with the adoption of a federal system for policy-making. The 
experience illustrates this to the extent that monetary policy implementation is
centralized at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Indeed the individual
reserve banks' open market operations were centralized at the FRBNY before a
centralized approach to policy-making was clearly established.
Implementation
13. Structuring the ESCB as a jointly owned subsidiary would enable all member
central banks to participate despite their heterogeneous legal structures.
14. Initially, each member central bank would staff its own operations on the
common floor; thus the ESCB would essentially consist of  collection of
branches' of the member central banks, albeit sharing the same facilities. If
necessary, individual banks could transfer their operations gradually, but they
would all have to meet the same deadline for transferring their complete monetary
operations to the floor.
15. Full transparency within the ESCB would exist from the outset. This would be
essential both to achieve the key benefits of the scheme and to enable rapid
progression to the point at which the various branch staffs of the member central
banks could be reorganized as a single corporate unit. Direct home-country
control over operations could be maintained even after the merging of branches is
complete, but it is more likely that the member central banks will be increasingly
willing to give discretion to the ESCB staff to manage their respective operations
within broad policy guidelines.
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the ESCB could have important side benefits since it would help to ensure that the
progressive integration of European banking systems under the single market
programme was closely monitored from the perspective of monetary policy and
systemic risk.
21. The long-term management of member central banks' foreign and domestic
assets is also closely related to their monetary operations and could easily be
centralized at the ESCB using the principle of shared facilities with home~country
control. However, some countries may wish to make a distinction between foreign
assets with monetary and non-monetary uses, and therefore retain some part of
their foreign exchange reserves under the control of national treasuries.
VII  Conclusion
22. The scheme presented here has two distinctive elements. First is the  implicit
constraint that it places on member central banks by requiring them to implement
their national monetary policies through shared facilities. By comparison with the
various possible  explicit  mechanisms for demonstrating the existing level of
monetary policy concertation and encouraging further advances, this approach
involves a smaller risk of unintended disruption in national implementation
procedures.
23. A second distinctive feature of the proposal is that the new institution would
replace  rather than duplicate facilities that already exist in the member central
banks. This would minimize the risk of real or perceived conflicts emerging
between the member central banks and the new collectively owned institution. It
would also mean that once the merger of the different national operating staffs
had been completed, the new institution could fit, with little further adaptation
into the institutional framework that would ultimately be required in stage three.
24. There is much that the scheme presented here does not do. Most importantly,
it does not attempt to solve the problem of how a stage three decision-making
body will determine the appropriate EC monetary stance to achieve domestic
price stability. In addition, it only ensures instantaneous as opposed to  ex ante
policy consultation, and it does not introduce any automatic mechanisms tending
to discourage realignments. Finally, it does not do anything directly for the devel-
opment of the ECU.
25. However, there can be little doubt that, as an institutional demonstration of
the Member States' stage one achievements in policy concertation and of their
commitment to reach the final goal of monetary union, the plan would have a
major impact. Over the longer term the scheme could significantly improve the
scope for convergence in monetary procedures and for further policy concer-
tation, provided the political will for such goals existed. At the same time, the
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16. One look at the global treasury operations of a large commercial bank today
should lay to rest any doubts regarding the technical feasibility of the plan. Such
operations span multiple currencies and instruments with separate books and lines
of responsibility to senior management for individual dealers.
17. A more difficult questic - is whether the geographic separation of a member
central bank's operating personnel from their counterparts in the domestic private
sector would lead to a loss of market 'feel'. This problem may in the long run be
alleviated by the relocation of important domestic counterparts to the financial
centre hosting the ESCB's operations. But in any case, any loss of domestic infor-
mation would increasingly be compensated for by the growing relevance of the
information on operations in other member countries made available through
participation in the joint facilities.
18. At first the ESCB balance sheet could be structured as a collection of accounts
owned by the member central banks and their private sector counterparts
mirroring the monetary accounts that at present exist on member central banks
balance sheets. However, as the ESCB increasingly raised its profile, it would be
desirable to interpose ESCB-owned accounts in all monetary transactions between
the member central banks and private financial institutions, and possibly in trans-
actions with certain official entities as well. One could envisage a situation arising
towards the end of stage two in which the entire monetary operations of the indi-
vidual member central banks were captured in their accounts and in their trans-
actions with the ESCB. At the same time, all the likely private sector participants
ina stage three European 'fed funds' market would, by the end of stage two, have
well-established direct relationships with the ESCB.
VI  Treatment of non-monetary operations
19. At present the domestic monetary operations of some member central banks
may be closely integrated with other financial tasks performed on behalf of the
government or private sector. This could pose a problem since it is not the
intention of the scheme to transfer the whole of a member central bank' s financial
activities to the ESCB. However, it should be recognized that the substantial
disengagement of the monetary and non-monetary activities of member central
banks would be a necessary precondition for achieving a unified monetary control
procedure in stage three.
20. It is also possible that member central banks may wish to take advantage of
the facilities provided by the ESCB to centralize more operations than would be
strictly necessary to capture the implementation of monetary policy. For example
a natural complement to the transfer of monetary operations would be the central-
ization of member central banks
' '
town' clearing systems used to perform the final
daily clearing among the major commercial banks in each country. This role for
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scheme would exert subtle pressures of its own by forcing Member States to
present a consistent common front to the markets.
26. The proposal raises some questions regarding institutional arrangements which
would require further clarification. For example:
- What would be the legal constraints on individual central banks in delegating
their monetary operations to a mutually owned subsidiary while retaining sole
ultimate control over those operations?
- What are the key monetary operations of each central bank? Would it be
difficult to disentangle these from other financial tasks carried out on behalf 
the government or the private sector?
219The basic difference between the frameworks for policy
decision-making provided by the EMS and EMU
Pierre Jaans
In the European Monetary System (EMS) policy decisions in the monetary,
economic, fiscal and budgetary fields are within the unrestricted competence of
national authorities. Decisions are taken autonomously, sometimes after consul-
tations with Community bodies, which may or may not entail adjustments in
planned decisions.
For those countries whose currencies participate in the exchange rate mechanism
there is a certain restriction of national sovereignty in so far as changes of central
rates can no longer be decided unilaterally, as was the case in the European
monetary 'snake' but are subject to the consensus of all participants. The
experience with both systems, however shows that the material impact of this
constraint is of limited importance in practice.
Thus, in the framework provided currently by the EMS, policy decision-making
rests with several autonomous (national) decision ce;ntres. The complex process is
characterized  inter alia  by interaction, interdependence, reactivity and compe-
tition between national economies of heterogeneous political traditions, institu-
tional structures and degrees of economic development.
Under this system of 'spontaneous' order, a very important, if not the main source
of short-term surveillance and sanction is the foreign exchange market and the
balance-of-payments performance. If the stance and the mix of policies chosen at
a national level are credible to the market, the current exchange rate in the EMS
will not come under attack. If the policy cocktail lacks credibility in the market or
if the balance-of-payments performance falters, the market will fairly rapidly exert
growing pressures on the currency of the .country concerned and thus trigger
corrective action by policy-makers.
It may be argued that foreign exchange markets may at times be affected by
misjudgments leading to a significant overshooting. This has been the case with
the US dollar market because of the strategic value and the world reserve
character of that currency. In the case of European currencies, however, which
have no significant strategic and/or reserve currency role, the foreign exchange
markets have in general not developed into lasting misalignments of their
respective values. (In this respect it is interesting to note that gyrations of the
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creation of a single European currency because such a currency would, in the
absence of a strong political union, lack the political and strategic format of the
US dollar.
The relative success of the EMS owes a great deal to the discipline stemming from
foreign exchange markets, since in the case of some countries participating in the
exchange rate mechanism (for example, Belgium in 1982 and France in 1983),
fundamental reorientations of policy choices were greatly accelerated through the
acceptance of market pressures. In retrospect in would at least seem doubtful
whether, in the absence of market pressures, it would have been possible, by mere
analysis and suasion, to scrap a sacred political cow like automatic wage
indexation.
Thus it can be said that, in the case of countries whose currencies participate in
the exchange rate mechanism, foreign exchange markets have performed a helpful
function of discipline and, together with balance~of~paym.ents performances, have
provided useful early warning indicators and guidelines for policy~shaping and
decision ~making.
After the transition to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with a centralized
monetary policy for a single currency or a set of currencies linked by irrevocably
fixed parities, the monitoring and guiding role of foreign exchange markets and
balance-of-payments performances will by definition cease to exist.
Decision-making in monetary policy and in certain areas of .fiscal and budgetary
policies will rest with a central authority. Member countries (EC regions in
economic terms) will however retain a still significant portion of autonomy in the
field of economic and budgetary policies. The budget of the Community (the
central budget) will remain comparatively small. There will be no intra-
Community exchange market and balance of payments, for intra-Community
transactions will be dedramatized to mere statistics with no effects on foreign exchange reserves. 
Under these conditions the adequacy of policies at the central level and of policy
combinations between the Community level and national (regional) levels will
have to rely solely on a majority based consensus on analysis, on evaluation and
on the choice of appropriate means as well as on 'burden sharing
Misalignments between centrally decided policies and policies decided at national
level, or coordinated but erroneous policy choices at both levels, will no longer be
signalled by the reaction of foreign exchange markets. Similarly, regional
payments disequilibria will be dedramatized since they are no longer accompanied
by a depletion of foreign exchange reserves.
Economic and Monetary Union, as compared to the present European Monetary
System, is a more 'constructivist' order which eliminates market effects and is
based on coordination and political compromise. Past experience with deliberate
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political coordination and fine-tuning in the economic area, both in the
Community (for example, the common agricultural policy) and in a wider context
(for example, the 'Locomotive approach' in 1979 On a Group of Ten level) failed
to produce convincing positive results.
Under such a system the identification of misalignments may be delayed either
involuntarily or for pertinent political reaSOns. Regional disequilibria may build
up in a gradual way, imperceptibly and easy to ignore in the short to medium
term. As a result, severe losses of competitiveness, disindustrialization and unem-
ployment may develop before a new political consensus about the correct
diagnosis and corrective action are reached. Coming late, such action has to be
more robust and painful than if it had been taken in a timely manner under the
more immediate pressure of the foreign exchange markets.
Conclusions
The EMS, and more specifically the adhesion to the exchange rate mechanism
has been and continues to be an efficient factor of convergence by imposing the
sanctioning power of foreign exchange markets on policy decision-making.
EMU would eliminate market pressures and would have to rely mainly on a more
or less political consensus on analysis, evaluation, the choice of means and
burden sharing in the determination of policy mixes at the community level and
national levels.
As long as there is a significant need for further adjustment and convergence of
economic and budgetary performances of member countries, the framework of
discipline provided by the EMS appears to be more appropriate because it is
quicker in correcting deviations from the path of orthodoxy of market-oriented
economIes.
223An operational framework for an integrated monetary policy
in Europe
C.  A. Ciampi
Introduction
1. The purpose of this paper is to organize thinking on how to carry out, from an
operational point of view, an integrated monetary policy in Europe. The scheme
illustrated below is designed to stimulate further reflection and does not pretend
to provide a fully-fledged blueprint. The present contribution is a synthesis of two
earlier documents discussed in the Committee and incorporates comments and
suggestions made by some of the members, particularly Professor Thygesen. The
paper focuses on the institutional aspects of the development of monetary
coopen'tion towards full unity and does not address the equally important issue of
the m:;: _ket development of the ECU, which has been thoroughly examined by
Governor Duisenberg.
2. The paper is divided into two sections. The difficulties inherent in moving
towards monetary unification exclusively on the basis of  ad hoc  cooperation
among the member countries are examined in the first section, while a possible
solution to these difficulties is described in the second.
II  The limits of coordination in conducting a common monetary policy
3. The Werner Report assigns the basic role in the working of a monetary union to
the irrevocable locking of parities. It recognizes that a perfect monetary union
implies a common currency, but argues that creating a fixed link between
currencies can produce an equivalent result. However, the Report suggests that
this only applies if the irrevocable locking is akin to the fixed relationship
between notes of different denominations of a given currency. In other words, the
irrevocable locking of currencies brings about a monetary union only if it implies
and is supported by a common monetary policy.
4. The theoretical possibility of achieving 'perfect coordination' of monetary
policies through informal arrangements cannot be excluded, but the probability of
this occurring in practice is very low. The prerequisites of such coordination are
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very demanding and costly: the collection, processing and evaluation of the infor-
mation needed for the conduct of monetary policy would be cumbersome .and
inefficient; more importantly, the willingness to take each other s views into
account in order to reach a consensus may fall short of what is needed.
5. The first problem in this respect is that exchange rate fixity leaves the level
towards which interest rates in participating countries must converge
undetermined. Nor is it sufficient to provide unambiguous operational guidance
to establish monetary stability as the final objective of the system. The link
between this final objective and day-to-day monetary policy is too tenuous, and
no econometric model or other formal device could be relied upon to establish it
unequivocally. A common judgment, exercised through appropriate pro.cedures, is
needed, but this is precisely what is lacking in a system of coordination, and
conflicting opinions and policies are likely to emerge.
6. Another shortcoming of  ad hoc  coordination is the difficulty of ensuring
continuous compliance with the agreed monetary policy stance. It is conceivable
that monetary policies will be forced to diverge, openly or otherwise, from the
coordinated stance. For example, monetary policy could be required to support
albeit temporarily, the level of economic activity, or to finance the budget deficit.
This would have devastating consequences: as soon as the market realized that the
mutual trust and voluntary compliance underpinning the system were in danger, it
would test the commitment of monetary authorities to maintain parities, entailing
the risk of large capital movements that could jeopardize the irrevocable locking
of parities.
7. To sum up, it is not sufficient for member c.entral banks to  declare  that they will
pursue a common objective of monetary stability and informally coordinate their
action; they must be  seen  to be doing so at every moment; otherwise the market.
may suspect a policy disagreement, particularly when intermediate objectives are
reformulated in the face of changing circumstances.
8. This is why an  operational framework for an integrated monetary policy 
required. Such a framework would ensure that monetary policies which were
distinct, though coordinated, would be .operationally merged into  one  policy,
thereby meeting the conditions for the lasting viability of the irrevocable locking
of parities. Any definition of these arrangements, and hence of the minimal
requirements of a workable monetary union, must provide: (l) an unambiguous
procedure for translating the final goal of monetary stability into specific
objectives;  (2) the  instruments  for ensuring national monetary authorities
compliance with the decisions taken in common. The first issue has been
discussed in the contributions to the Committee on the institutional aspects of the
ESCB, the second is covered in the following section.
226FRAMEWORK FOR AN INTEGRATED MONETARY POLICY IN EUROPE
III 
-- 
An  institutional scheme for a common monetary policy
9. This section outlines a scheme based on the creation of a central monetary
institution. This, together with national central banks, would constitute a
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). In terms of the steps towards
monetary union identified in the Report, the scheme fits into the second stage, in
which there is still a plurality of currencies not tied by irrevocably locked parities
and monetary policies are closely coordinated but not yet completely unified.
10. Under the scheme the monetary organization of the Community would have
three levels:  the central monetary institution, national central banks and
commercial banks. At the top, the central monetary institution would only engage
in transactions with member central banks; these, in turn, would maintain their
present relationships with domestic commercial banks. The central monetary
institution would act as the central bank of the national central banks and use its
creation of ECU reserves to influence the monetary actions of member central
banks. The basic principle underlying the scheme is that there is a link between
the ultimate target of price stability, the undertaking to fix parities, the interest
rate prevailing in each country and the underlying liquidity conditions, which in
turn are determined by the action of each member central bank. This approach
which is based on the 'fundamentals , leads to a system that will allow the central
monetary institution to control the liquidity creation of the national central banks
as the ultimate source of monetary developments.
11. The ECU would still be a basket currency and only m.ember central banks
would hold  ECU deposits with the central monetary institution.  In this latter
respect, the situation would be similar to that prevailing domestically, where
deposits with the central bank are predominantly held by banks and provide the
ultimate means for settling interbank accounts. Of course, in this set-up,
commercial banks and their customers would be free, within the aggregate targets
set by the ESCB, to denominate deposits and other monetary instruments in
ECUs.
12. The scheme involves three fundamental components. The first is 
autonomous balance sheet  for the central monetary institution, in line with the
structure of all monetary institutions (national central banks, the IMF, the BIS);
this would allow the central monetary institution to take operational decisions
rather than serving simply as a forum for concertation. The second is a
mechanism for ensuring direct and  firm control of the supply of ECUs  by the
central monetary institution, in strict analogy with the control exercised by
national central banks over the domestic money supply. The third is a set of
provisions to  strengthen national centr.al banks ' demand for official ECUs  created
by the central monetary institution by making them a necessary ingredient of the
process whereby central banks supply liquidity to the private sector.
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13. The balance sheet of the central monetary institution would be based on
capital  in the form of contributions of international reserves by national central
banks, along the lines of the proposal of Governor de Larosiere. For instance
USD 4 or USD 5 billion of international reserves could be contributed according
to a distribution key reflecting the relative economic importance of participating
countries. In return, central banks would receive shares of the central monetary
institution, 1. e. a participation in its capital.
14. Firm management of the supply of ECUs by the central monetary institution
requires that all the channels of ECU creation be brought under its direct control.
At present, the amount of ECUs created through the swap mechanism depends
entirely on exogenous factors: changes in the gold price, the dollar exchange rate
and the quantity of reserves. Such swaps will therefore have to be abolished. They
could be replaced by an  initial contribution  of international reserves 
exchange for ECUs - by member central banks, amounting, for example, to the
equivalent of 3 % of their respective monetary bases.
15.  Credit mechanisms,  the other channel of ECU creation, are similar to the
rediscount facilities for commercial banks at the national level. However, while
automatic rediscount facilities are generally on a small scale in national systems
and the supply of liquidity to commercial banks mainly discretional, the EMS
credit mechanisms are mostly automatic and for unlimited amounts up to 75 days.
To bring the creation of ECUs from this source under strict control, the central
monetary institution should be given the power to grant member central banks
discretional credit in ECUs, in the same way as a central bank refinances
commercial banks through open market or rediscount operations. The cost of this
credit would also be fixed discretionally. In turn, this new mechanism would
allow a significant reduction in the scope of very short-term financing (VSTF), for
instance by reducing its average duration to 15 days, limiting its applicability to
the financing of marginal interventions, eliminating automatic renewals and
making it more expensive, in the nature of a Lombard-type facility.
16. The third component needed to complete the scheme, after arranging for an
autonomous balance sheet and firm control of the creation of official ECUs, is a
specific and  exclusive use for the ECUs  held with the central monetary institution.
This is provided by requiring member central banks to hold the ECUs (created
through the channels described in paragraphs 14 and 15 above) as deposits with
the central monetary institution in the form of both  compulsory  and  free reserves.
The reserve requirement in ECUs would link the supply of liquidity by member
central banks, and therefore the aggregate monetary conditions in the
Community, to the creation of ECUs by the central monetary institution. In this
way, a strong relationship would be established between the action of the central
monetary institution and that of each member central bank. Through this link, the
stance decided in common within the ESCB would be transmitted to all the
members of the system.
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17. The system could be implemented in different ways, depending on whether the
reserve requirement were applied to the liabilities or the assets of the national
central banks, as illustrated in the following two paragraphs.
18. If the reserve requirement were imposed on the  liabilities  of participating
central banks, the central monetary institution would have the power to ask
member central banks to hold compulsory reserves in ECU amounting to the
equivalent of .a certain percentage of the total monetary base, or of its increases.
The reserve requirement in official ECUs would establish a connection between
the supply of central bank money by member central banks, and therefore the
aggregate money supply in the Community, and the creation of official ECUs by
the central monetary institution. Since central bank money in the participating
countries would also be created as a counterpart of net unsterilized interventions
in third currencies, indirectly these would also be affected. National central banks
would only be able to undertake autonomous foreign exchange operations against
third currencies to the extent that they offset the latter s monetary effects by
changes in the credit extended to domestic counterparts.
19. As an alternative, the reserve requirement could be applied to the  credit
extended by national central banks to the domestic sector. The total expansion of
central bank money in the system would be the counterpart of the credit extended
to the domestic sector plus the net effect of un sterilized foreign exchange market
interventions against third currencies. The .central monetary institution would
therefore have to take a stance on the desired overall amount of intervention. This
could be achieved by allowing the central monetary institution to intervene
directly in the market or by subordinating national central bank interventions to
guidelines laid down by the ESCB. With the target rate of domestic credit
expansion given, there would be a presumption that these interventions would not
be sterilized. It would also be conceivable to apply the reserve requirement to the
sum of domestic credit and official reserves in third currencies. In this case
guidelines on un sterilized intervention would no longer be needed.
20. ECUs held with the central monetary institution in excess of the compulsory
level would constitute  free reserves.  Central banks would need such reserves to be
able to expand their monetary base, settle obligations in the system and obtain
international reserves from other central banks (negotiability) or the central
monetary institution. The central monetary institution would be under no obli-
gation to buy or sell international reserves against ECUs; it would only do so to
the extent that such action was consistent with its monetary objectives, in analogy
with central bank behaviour when deciding to intervene in foreign exchange
markets. The convertibility of ECUs with the central monetary institution would
thus be at the latter s discretion, and would be assured whenever it was deemed
necessary to counter a monetary disturbance of systemic significance.
21. As far as the  functioning of the system  is concerned, the governing body of the
ESCB would decide each year, in the light of an appraisal of the economic
situation, how much money and credit should be created overall in the
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Community in order to support economic activity in a non-inflationary envi-
ronment. This target would then be translated into a figure for the central
monetary institution s ECU supply, which would guide the liquidity creation of
national central banks.
22. The mechanism described above would be instrumental in achieving the
monetary policy objectives set for the Community. If, for instance, it were
necessary to make the aggregate monetary stance of the system more restrictive
the ESCB could reduce credit in ECUs to member central banks, increase its cost
and/ or increase the ECU reserve requirement. Conversely, if the ESCB judged
that a more expansionary stance were needed in the aggregate, it could increase
ECU credit, reduce its cost and/or decrease the ECU reserve requirement, and the
resulting free ECU reserves would support the desired monetary expansion by
some, or all, of the national central banks. If, on the other hand, the problem was
the tendency for money to expand  in a given country  beyond the stability-oriented
common plan, the ESCB could ask for a special deposit of reserves from the
central bank of the country concerned. Analogously, if a currency came under
speculative attack on foreign exchange markets while the underlying monetary
policy was considered appropriate, the ESCB could provide ECU credit and help
restore balanced conditions in the market.
23. The foregoing examples appear to imply that the main monetary policy
instrument of a system based on ECU reserve requirements has to be a quanti-
tative aggregate, but in fact the scheme can easily be generalized. The ESCB might
also be guided in its supply of official ECUs by interest rates. In view of the
degree of exchange rate fixity expected for phase two, interest rates in member
countries would have to converge within a narrow band. The ESCB could then
carry out its monetary policy by focusing on the level of interest rates. For
example, if liquidity increased too much in a country, interest rates would tend to
fall and pressures would develop on foreign exchange markets. The appropriate
response of the ESCB would be to withdraw official ECUs with the aim of
inducing the national monetary authorities to rein in the expansion of liquidity.
The opposite action would be warranted in the .case of insufficient liquidity.
24. While the basic features of a system of ECU reserve requirements for national
central banks are relatively simple, the implementation of the scheme would have
to take account of a certain number of factors, such as differences in national
money multipliers, the effect of realignments and the distribution of reserves
among national central banks.
25.  National monetary base multipliers  differ considerably at present, in particular
because of the disparities in national reserve requirements in respect of
commercial bank deposits. These differences will be reduced by the pressure to
converge produced by the liberalization of capital flows and financial services.
Nonetheless, the remaining differences would result in a transfer of official ECUs
from a national central bank with a low multiplier to one with a high multiplier
having an expansionary effect, even with a given total quantity of official ECUs.
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This would not be an entirely new problem since national systems often have
different reserve coefficients for different types of deposit, so that a shift can
affect the observed multiplier. However, the problem would undoubtedly
complicate the task of the ESCB, requiring careful monitoring of the distribution
of official ECUs and, whenever necessary, intervention to adjust the overall
quantity available, in order to offset the expansionary or contractionary effects of
transfers of official ECUs between national central banks.
26. As for the effects of a  realignment  on the operation of the scheme, the central
bank with a depreciating currency would record an increase in the value of its
ECU reserves expressed in national currency and end up with free ECU reserves
while the central banks whose currencies appreciated against the ECU would need
to acquire additional ECUs. The monetary consequences of these effects would
hav~ to be dealt with by appropriate technical devices built into the system.
27. More generally, there is the issue of the  distribution of ECU reserves among the
participating national central banks.  This arises because national central banks are
likely to behave differently from commercial banks. National reserve requirements
work predictably and affect all banks in the same manner because commercial
banks act mainly on the basis of profit motives. Accordingly, in most cases there
is an active market for the asset that can be used to satisfy national reserve
requirements, with interest rates determining whether any given bank is willing to
supply or to demand additional reserves. Especially at the start of the proposed
scheme, there is no guarantee that every national central bank would increase its
national monetary base in response to an expansion in the supply of official
ECUs. Furthermore, national central banks wishing to expand would not be able
to count on a market in which to obtain additional official ECUs. In this case, the
ESCB would have to guide and adjust the distribution of ECD reserves among
national central banks.
28. At an  advanced  stage such as that described above in paragraphs 9 to 22, when
responsibility for monetary policy is exercised at Community level, the ECUs held
with the central monetary institution would be the  only  asset permitting national
central banks to expand their aggregate supply of high-powered money, albeit
with a required reserve coefficient that could initially be small. National central
banks would not be able to acquire these ECUs automatically from the central
institution either through an unconditional right to convert reserves held in other
currencies or through access to any of the credit mechanisms. Scarcity of high-
powered ECUs would provide effective control over the expansion of money and
credit in the Community.
29. At an  intermediate  stage of the process, when national central banks still have
primary monetary responsibility, some flexibility in the supply of official ECUs
and in the way this is linked to the creation of high-powered national money
would allow member central banks to expand or contract the money supply in
their countries without being rigidly tied by their ECU reserves. In these
conditions ECU operations carried out by the ESCB using the mechanism
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described above would serve primarily to highlight, and in part counter, diver-
gences by individual central banks from the commonly agreed monetary and
credit objectives of the Community. The ESCB should also initially take account
of the specific needs of each participating country when making and carrying out
its plans; its hold on the system s monetary policy would only be tightened
gradually. Accordingly, some leeway could be provided by not making the
automatic very short-term financing (Lombard-type facility) too strict, in terms of
duration and cost, and by granting member central banks the right to exchange
ECUs for international reserves and vice versa under certain specific conditions.
As 'gards the link betwe.en ECU creation by the central monetary institution and
national money supplies, some flexibility could be allowed by fixing ranges for
the ECU compulsory reserves rather than a specific level.
IV  Conclusions
30. In institutional terms the proposals presented in this paper involve a very
significant step towards monetary union and a loss of monetary autonomy. In
practice, however, capital mobility and the exchange rate constraint already dras-
tically reduce the room for autonomous monetary policies: the ultimate responsi-
bility attributed to national monetary authorities is severely limited and each
national policy-maker influences, and is influenced by, all the others. Seen in this
light, the only innovation in the scheme illustrated above is that the constraint
would be explicit and exert an  ex ante  influence on the formulation of monetary
policy, instead of being hidden and having an  ex post  effect in the exchange
market. Accordingly, the pooling of monetary responsibilities would not so much
be a new phenomenon, as the  admittedly important  development of an
existing trend.
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